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TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Hung-ch'i No. 11, November 1, 1975)

Page

In Commemoration of 40th Anniversary of Victory of the Long March - Editorial by Jen-min Jih-pao and Chieh-fang-chün Pao (p. 3) 2

Deepen the Study of Theory in Conjunction with Criticism of Water Margin - by Ch'ih Heng (p. 5) . . . 5

Learning from Tachai Is a Great REvolutionary Movement - by Hua Yün (p. 8) 9

Push the General Forward by Having the Point Direct The AReа - by Chuang Ning (p. 12) 14

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Page

Never Stop Learning from Tachai (p. 16) 19

Quicken the Pace of Farm Mechanization - by T'an Feng (p. 21) 25

Be Ambitious When You're Poor, Guard Against Revisionism When You're Rich (p. 26) 32

There Is Plenty of Room for Development Through Self-Reliance (p. 31) 37

An Important Document Opposing Capitulationism - by T'ien Chih-sung (p. 36) 43

Comment on Hu Shih's Verification of Water Margin - by Yü Fan (p. 41) 49

Look at the Essence Through the Appearance - Comment on Sung Chiang's struggle against Kao Ch'iu - by Fang Ching (p. 47) 56

Is There Such a "Law" for Peasant Uprisings? - by Yang K'uan (p. 51) 61

"Yielding Position to Men of Virtue" and Capitulation (p. 56) 67

Some Understanding from Our Criticism of Water Margin (p. 59) 71

The Power of the Sea - comments on the main theme of the film "The Second Spring" - by Ch'in Hsin (p. 62) 75

Attach Importance to Popularizing Sciences - by Hsiang Ch'ün (p. 68) 82

Let Revolutionary Poems and Songs Occupy the Battlefield - by Jen Tu (p. 73) 88

Please Look at a New Trade of the Soviet Revisionists - by Yang Ko (p. 76) 92

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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are full translations of articles appearing in People's Republic of China periodicals.

Quotations from Chairman Mao

The communist spirit is growing apace throughout the country. The political consciousness of the broad masses is rising rapidly. The backward sections among them are exerting themselves to catch up with the advanced, which demonstrates that the socialist revolution in our country is forging ahead in the economic field (in those places where the relations of production have not yet been completely transformed) and in the political, ideological, technical and cultural fields.

Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to make this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This must be made known to the whole nation.

The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything. When the Party's line is correct, we have everything: if we have no men, we will have them; if we have no rifles, we can get them; if we do not have state power, we will be able to seize it. If the line is incorrect, we will lose what we already have.

* * *

In Commemoration of 40th Anniversary of Victory of the Long March

Editorial by Jen-min Jih-pao and Chieh-fang-chün Pao

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

Full of revolutionary pride, the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country today commemorate the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, precursor of the People's Liberation Army.

Led by our great leader Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, the First Front Army of the Red Army arrived in northern Shensi on October 19, 1935. The Second and Fourth Front Armies arrived there together in October the next year. Thus the three main Red Army forces completed their great strategic movement and successfully joined up with the 25th Army, which had arrived earlier, and the Northern Shensi Red Army. The Long March was a great and sublime epic in which the Red Army swept across 25,000 li /12,500 kilometers/ through the length and breadth of eleven provinces, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands and smashing encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception by several hundred thousand enemy troops. Chairman Mao has said: "The Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, ... it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine." "A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was over." The historic meritorious service of the Red Army's Long March is indelibly engraved in the minds of the people of all nationalities of the motherland. The Red Army's heroic deeds during the Long March will always encourage the Communists and revolutionary people of our country to advance valiantly along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line from generation to generation.

Chairman Mao has said: "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything. When the Party's line is correct, we have everything: if we have no men, we will have them; if we have no rifles, we can get them; if we do not have state power, we will be able to seize it. If the line is incorrect, we will lose what we already have." The history of the Long March fully proves this brilliant thesis of Chairman Mao's. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, at the beginning of the Second Revolutionary Civil War we built up an army and established red base areas we had not had before, and we smashed the enemy's repeated "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and developed the excellent revolutionary situation. Because Wang Ming usurped the central leadership of the Party in 1931 and pursued a "Left" opportunist line, the revolutionary forces suffered heavy losses amounting to 90 percent of their strength in the red areas and almost 100 percent in the white areas; the Red Army was compelled to shift its forces and start the Long March. At that most critical moment for the Party and the Red Army, the Tsung-i Meeting rectified the Wang Ming line militarily and organizationally and established Chairman Mao's leading position in the whole Party. This enabled the Red Army to preserve and temper its backbone forces, defeat Chang Kuo-t'ao's Right opportunist line and triumphantly complete the Long

March, thereby opening up a new situation for the Chinese revolution. A review of the history of the Long March helps us come to the profound understanding that no matter how tortuous the course of the revolution may be, the revolution triumphs and develops when we implement Chairman Mao's line and it suffers setbacks and defeats when we depart from Chairman Mao's line.

The struggle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line on the one hand and Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line and Chang Kuo-t'ao's Right opportunist line on the other was a struggle between Marxism and revisionism. All those who practice revisionism are capitulationists. Completely violating the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, Wang Ming, a self-styled "100 percent Bolshevik," first turned "Left" and then Right, and finally went over to the enemy in betrayal of the country to serve as a running dog of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. Chang Kuo-t'ao opposed marching to the north to fight the Japanese aggressors and advocated fleeing south, and finally surrendered to the Kuomintang reactionaries and became an ignominious renegade. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao followed the same path. This teaches us that to uphold Marxism, we must persist in the struggle against revisionism and capitulationism and oppose capitulationists.

The Long March serves as very vivid and rich teaching material on the struggle between the two lines. The basic line of the Party tells us that the struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines exists throughout the entire historical period of socialism. Socialism or capitalism--we are still faced with the two possibilities today. The struggle between the two lines will continue in the next 50 or 100 years, and even 10,000 years from now there still will be the struggle between the two lines. We must inherit and carry forward the Red Army's glorious tradition in steadfastly implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, uphold the Party's basic line for the historical period of socialism, study conscientiously and well the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, actively participate in the criticism of Water Margin and go on criticizing the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Through study and criticism, the people of the whole country will learn to distinguish between correct and erroneous lines in complicated struggles. This is our surest guarantee for continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Whether to practice unity or splittism was an important aspect of the two-line struggle during the Long March. Wang Ming engaged in factional activities, "with me as the core"; Chang Kuo-t'ao, on the strength of his having a large number of soldiers and rifles, set up his own bogus central committee. Their intrigues to split the Party and the Red Army were contrary to the people's will and were bound to fail. Chairman Mao advocated that people "hailing from all corners of the country," no matter from which mountain stronghold or front army, from the north or from the south, should all unite for a common revolutionary objective. Precisely because Chairman Mao's revolutionary line was followed and the forces of the Red Army of various fronts were united, the Long March ended with defeat for the enemy and victory for us. It is essential to inherit and carry forward the Red Army's glorious tradition of unity in struggle, stress the political line, the whole situation, the Party spirit as well as unity and discipline, implement the Party's proletarian policies conscientiously and promote stability and unity.

The hardships the Red Army came across during the Long March were almost without parallel in history; the heroism it showed was also unprecedented. "The Red Army fears not the trials of a distant march; to them a thousand mountains, ten thousand rivers are nothing"--this revolutionary spirit of the heroes of the Red Army is something we should learn from at all times. The Chinese revolution has won great victories but, as Chairman Mao has taught us, "our past work is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li." We have a longer journey ahead and greater and more arduous tasks. Our working and living conditions are now far superior to those at the time of the Red Army's Long March, but we must never abandon the revolutionary tradition of hard struggle. We should maintain the same vigor, the same revolutionary enthusiasm and the same daring death-defying spirit we displayed in the years of revolutionary war, and carry on our revolutionary work to the end.

In commemorating the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army's Long March, our hearts turn with great respect to the revolutionary martyrs who heroically laid down their lives in the course of the Long March and we extend our warmest regards to the veteran Red Army men still fighting on various fronts. The people of the whole country are at present conscientiously carrying out Chairman Mao's three directives on studying theory and combating and preventing revisionism, on stability and unity and on pushing the national economy forward, and they are working hard to speed up socialist construction, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and be prepared against war. The situation is fine and also pressing. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country should inherit and carry forward the revolutionary tradition the Red Army established during the Long March, and unite to win still greater victories.

(Originally carried in Jen-min Jih-pao and Chieh-fang-chün Pao on October 19, 1975)

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Deepen the Study of Theory in Conjunction with Criticism of Water Margin

by

Ch'ih Heng (池恒)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

In his instruction regarding the question of theory Chairman Mao has taught us: "Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to make this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This must be made known to the whole nation." Here, Chairman Mao has put before to us the depth of study--"to thoroughly understand," and also the breadth of study--"to be made known to the whole nation." After going through this period of study, comrades of the whole Party and the people of the whole country have raised their level of Marxist theory and their consciousness of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have strengthened their consciousness of persisting in the Party's basic line and combating and preventing revisionism, and they have promoted stability and unity and the development of the national economy. The results have been tremendous. However, using Chairman Mao's demand as the yardstick, protracted efforts still have to be made in study--both in depth and breadth. Chairman Mao's important instruction on the criticism of Water Margin has given a new impetus to the study of theory. We must persist in the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship in conjunction with the criticism of Water Margin.

The experience of the study movement in the past 6 months or more proves that the theory of proletarian dictatorship has mighty power in mobilizing the masses to criticize capitalism and build socialism vigorously. Studying theory well and following the correct line are the basic guarantee for promoting stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward. To develop the excellent situation and win new victories in revolution and construction in any place or on any front, it is essential to go on studying theory well as a cardinal matter having a bearing on the political line and the whole situation. In response to Chairman Mao's great call on "learning from Tachai in agriculture", the Party is mobilizing to develop agriculture and to strive to popularize Tachai-type counties throughout the country. In order to lead this great revolutionary movement to still greater victories, it is also necessary to grasp the study of theory well and, with the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the weapon, to deepen education on the Party's basic line as well as criticizing revisionism and capitalism so as to further enhance the ideological revolutionization of leading groups at all levels and give full play to the enthusiasm of the masses for building socialism. This should be the way to learn from Tachai, and to do other tasks as well. The busier our work, the heavier our tasks and the greater the difficulties and resistance we face, the more essential it will be for us to study well and give full play to the mighty power of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The criticism of Water Margin now unfolding is an important component part of studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is an important aspect of combating and preventing revisionism on the political and ideological fronts. Chairman Mao points out: "The merit of the book Water Margin lies in the portrayal of capitulation. It servies as teaching material by negative example to help all people recognize capitulationists." "To help all people recognize," as "to be made known to the whole nation," calls upon us to carry out extensive education among the broad masses. Chairman Mao has always attached importance to the role of teachers and teaching material by negative example. Studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship in a positive way and unfolding the criticism of this teaching material by negative example, Water Margin, will enable us, by putting both positive and negative things in clear perspective, to understand more profoundly the importance of the three principles--"practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire." It will be of tremendous educational value to our struggle for combating and preventing revisionism and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat today if we, through the criticism of Water Margin, see clearly the true face of the capitulationist Sung Chiang, and how he pushed the capitulationist line to undermine the revolutionary struggle, disintegrate the insurgent forces and bury the revolutionary cause. It will do us good to sum up all kinds of experience and lessons learned from the two-line struggle. Capitulationists and the capitulationist line existed in the past, exist at present, and may exist in the future. This is a most dangerous thing to the cause of the revolution. Revisionists such as Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao are modern capitulationists. They practice class capitulationism at home and national capitulationism abroad. They all capitulate to Soviet revisionism. Criticizing Water Margin will help us further deepen the criticism of the revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, and raise our ability to distinguish between genuine and sham Marxism, between revolutionaries and capitulationists and between the correct and erroneous lines. Thus we will be able to more steadfastly adhere to the Party's basic line in future struggles, persist in combating and preventing revisionism, and carry on the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat through to the end.

For a long time, many erroneous viewpoints croped up in the criticism of Water Margin. The basic reason for this has been failure to apply the viewpoint of class struggle and the struggle between the two lines in looking at a problem, and to draw a demarcation line between the revolutionary and capitulationist lines, with the result that the capitulationist line might even be defended. The existence of these erroneous tendencies in the criticism of Water Margin is not an isolated phenomenon, for it shows that Marxism has not completely occupied all positions in the ideological sphere and the task of all-round dictatorship of the proletariat must continue to be fulfilled. What Water Margin advertises and praises are the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius; Sung Chiang's guiding thought in practicing capitulationism is based on the same doctrines. Using the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method to criticize Water Margin in order to understand its essence of preaching capitulationism and to clarify various erroneous viewpoints--this will not only help enlarge the Marxist position in the field of literature, but will also help uphold Marxism, criticize revisionism, the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and certain erroneous idealist

and metaphysical viewpoints handed down from old times, and strengthen all-round dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the fields of philosophy, history, education and all other fields of ideology.

Therefore, criticism of Water Margin and deepening the study of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship are consistent and should be properly coordinated. Only by grasping the theoretical weapon well can we thoroughly expose and profoundly criticize the capitulationists, the capitulationist line and its guiding thought--the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, as extolled by Water Margin. Furthermore, criticism of Water Margin will further push the study of theory forward. Many places have achieved relatively good results in making unified plans and arrangements for theoretical study and criticism of Water Margin, in making a penetrating analysis of Water Margin by applying the Marxist viewpoint, and in arriving at a profound understanding of the basic Marxist viewpoint through analysis and criticism. The experience in this respect is worthy of being popularized.

To deepen the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must properly sum up the good experience gained in the early stages when we studied seriously in close conjunction with reality and integrated study with application, and we must further strengthen the organization of and leadership over the study movement.

Today we must still exert sustained efforts in "reading and studying seriously and having a good grasp of Marxism." In other words, we must not only have to study seriously the quotations and related works by our revolutionary teachers on the dictatorship of the proletariat and achieve a comprehensive understanding of the spirit and essence of Chairman Mao's instruction on the question of theory, but we must also read some books systematically in the light of certain important questions which must be understood urgently in the current struggle, including a number of important questions raised in the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture. In so doing, we will be able to deepen our understanding of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, draw a clearer line of demarcation between Marxism and revisionism, and enhance our ability to analyze and solve problems with theory. In studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, we must grasp its stand, viewpoint and method so that in carrying out work in all fields we can better adhere to Marxism, criticize and combat revisionism, and implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies.

The key to deepening the study of theory lies in carrying forward the revolutionary style of study by integrating theory with reality and persisting in combining study with application. The reality in question refers principally to that of the struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines; it means keeping in mind how to carry out the Party's basic line and fulfill the task of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat on all fronts and right down to all grassroots units. The Party's basic line is our life blood. Without carrying out the Party's basic line, criticizing capitalism and going all out for socialism, we will depart from the most fundamental practice of our revolution and go astray. It will be basically impossible to make study successful. Many questions have cropped up in practical struggle and must urgently be answered correctly on the basis of integrating theory with practice. This is a vast classroom

for integrating theory with reality. Many places have achieved comparatively good results in carrying out study in a lively and practical manner because they have combined study with education on the Party's basic line as well as with the movements to learn from Tach'ing in industry and Tachai in agriculture. They use theory to guide practical struggle and study theory in the course of practical struggle. In so doing, they have both developed their work and deepened their study. It is an important task to strengthen the building of leading groups at all levels. Some places have combined the study of theory with strengthening the building of leading groups and with the remolding of world outlook. They differentiate the two different types of contradictions and apply the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient," long advocated by Chairman Mao to comrades who make mistakes. Definite results have been gained, and experience in this respect must be summed up.

Moods of complacency and laxity are obstacles to deepening study, and must be overcome by sustained efforts. It is essential to constantly analyze the development of the study movement, to sum up and exchange experience periodically, to grasp the typical cases to push the whole situation forward. For those areas and units that have lagged behind over a long period of time, vigorous steps must be taken to help them so that they can catch up as soon as possible. Continuous efforts should be exerted to run reading classes well. It is necessary to strengthen the building of worker-peasant-soldier theorist contingents. We must not only use but also help them, that is, we must help them improve themselves politically, ideologically, theoretically as well as in the style of work. We must affirm their achievements and overcome their shortcomings so as to bring their backbone role into full play among the masses in the course of study. With the whole Party and the people of the whole country deepening and persisting in the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship, the excellent situation of revolution will surely be further developed. We will advance in broad strides toward the grand goal of building China into a strong modern socialist country.

* * *

Learning from Tachai Is a Great Revolutionary Movement

by

Hua Yün (华 云)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

The National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture has successfully concluded under the close concern of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. The meeting issued this militant call: Mobilize the whole Party, make ever greater efforts to develop agriculture and strive to build Tachai-type counties throughout the country. Learning from Tachai in agriculture and building Tachai-type counties throughout the country are a great revolutionary mass movement to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and build up a socialist agriculture with greater, faster, better and more economical results. Our comrades who are working as leaders should be in the van of this movement, and lead the masses to make concerted efforts to promote this movement well.

Tachai is a red banner planted personally by Chairman Mao. It is a typical example in adhering to the Party's basic line, continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialist agriculture. The orientation of Tachai is the orientation for the development of China's socialist agriculture. The building of Tachai-type counties throughout the country is urgently called for by our commitment to implement Chairman Mao's important directive on studying theory and combating and preventing revisionism to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is urgently called for by the need to push the national economy forward so that China may join the front ranks of the world before the end of this century, and by the need to compete with the enemy for time and speed and do well in preparations against war. China now is in a crucial period of historical development. Next year will mark the beginning of our Fifth 5-Year Plan for the development of the national economy. By 1980 China will build up an independent and fairly comprehensive industrial system and national economic system. Before the end of this century the whole country will realize the modernization of its agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology, and our country's national economy will join the world's forefront. To achieve this grand goal requires both multifarious and arduous efforts. In this connection, one key link is to do a good job in developing agriculture. Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy. Without a fairly rapid development in agriculture it would be impossible to build an independent and fairly comprehensive industrial system and national economic system, nor would it be possible for the modernization of industry, national defense and science and technology to develop at a flying speed in the absence of a modernized agriculture. In 1957, Chairman Mao pointed out: "We have a rural population of over 500 million, so the situation of our peasants has a most important bearing on the development of our economy and the consolidation of our state power." In order to further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, consolidate the worker-peasant alliance,

carry through the great strategic principle "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony," restrict bourgeois rights, gradually narrow the three major differences, and create the material conditions under which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to either exist or be engendered, we must make good efforts in agriculture. We will accomplish nothing if we do not mobilize the hundreds of millions of peasants nor push agriculture forward.

There are many things that have to be done in developing agriculture. But the central link is to learn from Tachai in agriculture and build Tachai-type counties throughout the country. Since the movement to learn from Tachai was launched, more than 300 advanced counties in learning from Tachai have emerged in various parts of the country. The experience of some of the advanced counties shows that, when the movement to learn from Tachai is carried out on the scale of a county, it will be conducive to making overall plans and strengthening leadership and the county will be able to take bigger strides and gain faster results by leading all its communes, production brigades and production teams forward. If we build more than one-third of the counties in our country into Tachai-type counties in fact as well as name within the next 5 years, China's dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist system will be further consolidated, the socialist revolution in our countryside will deepen, and the entire cause of socialist construction throughout our country will develop still more substantially. Our country will be better able to weather storms and remain invincible. Given another few years when the majority or the overwhelming majority of the counties in the country will have been built into Tachai-type counties, our countryside, which is still very backward today, will become a prosperous paradise, and the face of our country as a whole will undergo tremendous changes.

In building Tachai-type counties throughout the country, it is necessary to learn from Tachai's fundamental experience, carry out the Party's basic line, and keep to the socialist road. There are many contradictions in the countryside, but the basic one remains that between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. It is reflected in a concentrated manner in the struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines. This is the main contradiction in the countryside. Chairman Mao points out: "Our country at present practices a commodity system, and the wage system is unequal too, as in the eight-grade wage scale and so forth. These can only be restricted under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus it will be quite easy for people like Lin Piao to rig up the capitalist system if they come to power. Therefore, we should read some more Marxist-Leninist works." Class struggle is protracted and complicated. Not only will the overthrown exploiting classes attempt to restore capitalism, but there is also the possibility of new bourgeois elements being engendered. Among the peasants the influence of the tradition of small production still exists, and a number of middle peasants who are economically better off are still affected fairly seriously by spontaneous tendencies toward capitalism. The capitalist road was taken in the past, and may still be taken in the future. Bad people who sneak into the Party may take this road, so may

good people without a high level of consciousness. Some communes and brigades have similar conditions; in some cases they are situated in the same mountains and along the same rivers. But some have developed fast while others have remained stagnant or even gone backward. Why? A serious investigation will reveal that the main question is whether or not to grasp the struggle between the two roads and two lines as the key link. Experience proves that the collective economy will prosper where leadership is in the hands of Marxists and the poor and lower-middle peasants and where people persist in taking the socialist road. In places where leadership falls into the hands of bad people or people who are bent on taking the capitalist road and where people are sliding along the capitalist road, the collective economy will remain stagnant and backward. The comrades of Tachai say rightly: "If you do not close the capitalist road, you can't march toward socialism." However, we still have some comrades who lack an understanding of the laws governing class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact, their thinking remains in the stage of the democratic revolution. That is why they often fail to tell socialism from capitalism. Having such a mentality, they dare not grasp, or even evade, the problems of the collective economy concerning orientation and road, and the problems of the struggle between the two lines within the Party. How can they learn from Tachai well? Some comrades say: "Hsiyang county displays the courage to criticize and fight capitalism. Some of our areas fail to do this. In particular, they do not try energetically to solve problems within the collective economy concerning the orientation and line." This is exactly where the gap is the largest between some backward counties and Hsiyang. In order to learn from Tachai's fundamental experience it is necessary to act in light of the present standards for a Tachai-type county to conscientiously study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, read more Marxist-Leninist works, show courage to expose the contradictions between the two classes, two roads and two lines, criticize revisionism and capitalism, and unfold an active ideological struggle. You can hardly expect good results in learning from Tachai if in doing so you regard Tachai merely as a typical model of production and work for production only for its own sake, while making no efforts to learn from Tachai's fundamental experience.

As far as leading cadres at all levels are concerned, building Tachai-type counties throughout the country is also a political and ideological revolution. Not only do they have to struggle against revisionism, capitalism and all erroneous ideas, but they also have to revolutionize themselves ideologically, get rid of the world outlook of the lazy and cowardly and persist in overcoming such erroneous ideas as arrogance, complacency and moving in a rut.

Some comrades say: "Our conditions are unfavorable; it is not easy to learn from Tachai." Such an idea must be corrected. Favorable and unfavorable conditions are relative, and they are not fixed or unalterable. It is people, not things, that are decisive. Chairman Mao points out: "We should have faith in the masses and in the Party. These are two basic principles." Taking the Tachai road and accelerating agricultural development are the common wish of the poor and lower-middle peasants and other commune members. The hundreds of millions of peasants have a potentially inexhaustible enthusiasm for socialism. What is important is that we should be good at essentially discovering such enthusiasm. Speaking of

objective conditions, do Hsiyang, Lin, Suchien and Shouyang counties have favorable conditions? Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, however, leading cadres at all levels there have given full scope to the superiority of the people's commune which is large in size and has a higher degree of public ownership. They have boldly mobilized the masses to vigorously criticize revisionism and capitalism and to go all out for socialism. They have relied on their own efforts to rearrange rivers and mountains. They have transformed rivers and mountains and increased their production in several years, in some cases 2-3 years. As a result, they have changed their poor and backward counties into advanced ones in learning from Tachai.

What is important here is that cadres at all levels, like those of Tachai and Hsiyang, should arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, have the great aspirations to "transform China in the spirit of the foolish old man who removed the mountains," show great revolutionary enthusiasm, and forge close ties with the masses. To develop socialist agriculture, they must have the great spirit of changing heaven and earth and smash small producers' narrow-mindedness. The force of habit--only looking after the immediate interests without giving consideration to the long-term ones and only calculating small incomes and expenses without counting big ones--is still a spiritual fetter for some of our cadres. Without smashing this fetter one cannot see the superiority of the socialist collective economy or the mighty strength of the masses. In such a case, one dares not aim high. Of course, speaking of aiming high, we mean aiming high by combining revolutionary mettle with a practical approach. Strategically we should despise difficulties, but tactically we should take them seriously. It is impossible to rearrange rivers and mountains on the scale of a county without taking a scientific approach.

Some comrades used to feel complacent over some achievements made, saying that life was much better than before, and that they were doing almost as well as others. Thus, they rest on their laurels and advance no further. Such an attitude must also be corrected. We communists want to emancipate the whole of mankind. What little achievements or even immense achievements we made are only like a drop in the bucket compared with the task of building the great socialist motherland and that of realizing the long-range communist ideals. Is there any reason for these comrades to regard their achievements as their "baggage?" The Tach'ing workers have scored tremendous achievements on the petroleum front. However, they always feel that their contributions are too small compared with the needs of the 800 million people and the great goal of communism. We should have the stamina and aspirations of the working class and link our work with the great goal of communism. We should regard every achievement we make as a starting point for a new step. Only thus will we feel the need to do more, work more strenuously, aim higher, and always persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Advanced units must also look at themselves from the "one dividing into two" viewpoint. The comrades of Hsiyang county put it well: "An advanced brigade is advanced because its cadres and masses dare to

expose contradictions, wage struggle and strike down capitalism. An advanced production brigade which fails to recognize contradictions and struggle against capitalism will degenerate tomorrow." The more advanced a brigade is, the greater the need for it to see its shortcomings and set an even bigger goal for itself to achieve. Only thus will it become more advanced, scaling one peak after another. An advanced brigade also faces contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. For instance, how should it restrict bourgeois rights on the basis of developing and strengthening the socialist collective economy? How should it develop the economy at the commune and brigade levels to promote the further development of the people's commune system? How should it handle the relationship between the state, the collective and the individual in order to increase accumulation and reserves and make more contributions to the state? How should it further raise the socialist consciousness of the commune members in order to enable them to see the great goal of communism and give full scope to the communist style? All these questions should be correctly solved under the guidance of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In production, an advanced brigade should also march in breadth and depth. The development of production is unlimited. There is no reason whatever for us to be content with the achievements we have made.

The current situation is excellent. There are many favorable conditions for building Tachai-type counties throughout the country. Through the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, we have criticized the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and the principles and policies laid down by him for agricultural development have been imprinted ever more deeply in people's minds. The socialist collective economy has further been developed and strengthened. The socialist enthusiasm of the peasants in their hundreds of millions is soaring as never before. Industrial support for agriculture has been increasing. Thus, we can certainly fulfill the task of building Tachai-type counties throughout the country in not too long a period of time if we adhere to the Party's basic line, fully arouse the socialist enthusiasm of the masses and cadres and give a greater scope to the role of the educated youths settling in the countryside. Chairman Mao pointed out in 1958: "Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are 'poor and blank.' This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful language can be written, and the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted." Let's work hard. The freshest and most beautiful pictures of a new socialist countryside are now unfolding before our eyes.

* * *

Push the General Forward by Having the Point Direct the Area

by

Chuang Ning (庄宁)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

China's socialist revolution and socialist construction are now in an important period of historical development. The tasks and work before the Party committees at all levels are very arduous and heavy. The National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, convened under the close concern of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, issued a militant call to the whole Party to mobilize to develop agriculture vigorously and build Tachai-type counties throughout the country. The situation is both excellent and pressing, and new development must be made in all fields of endeavor. In these circumstances, how can we do our work still better? An important way is to "go deep into one point, gain the experience and push the general forward." ("Introductory Note to 'Tengchia Hsiang, a Model of Cooperation") This is a dialectical-materialist method of work consistently promoted by Chairman Mao. We must sum up our experience, raise our consciousness, and apply this scientific method of work to our own practice of struggle.

Since the start of the great proletarian cultural revolution, Tachai's advanced experience has bloomed and borne fruit in many places of the country, with Tachai-type communes and brigades emerging in large numbers. There are now more than 300 advanced counties in learning from Tachai in the country. These results are inseparable from the adoption by the leadership at all levels of the work method of having the point direct the area in order to push the general forward in the course of implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. During the current movement to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, many leading comrades in various areas and on various fronts have gone deep into reality, carried out investigations and study, struck root at the grassroots level, worked arduously, and studied and summed up the experience of advanced models. They have striven to spread the advanced experience to the whole area and have achieved fairly good results. The masses say elatedly: "Having the point direct the area is just like rolling the snowball; we must aim high in both revolution and production." With the development of production, we should all the more use the work method of having the point direct the area in order to push the general forward, and so raise our art of leadership to a new level.

The revolutionary work in which we are engaged is a process of knowing and transforming the world. To achieve the desired results in work, we must make our work methods conform to the dialectics of development of objective things and to the objective laws governing the movement of human knowledge.

The work method of having the point direct the area in order to push the general forward is based on the dialectical law governing the development of things. The development of a thing is a contradictory movement inside it, involving a process of growth from small to big and from quantitative to qualitative change and from partial qualitative to complete qualitative change. "The opposite aspects in a contradiction unite as well as struggle against each other, and it is this that impels things to move and change." ("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People") From the point to the area--this embodies the process of such contradictory development. Advanced models are new-born things and are always in the minority at the beginning and may even be located in only one or two points. But because they are new-born things, they necessarily will struggle against their opposites, and develop and expand gradually from the point to the area to assume the dominant position. Such a process of development is also a process of changing the features of things. We may see from our practical work that when advanced models in an area or on one front are still in a minority, it is still impossible to say that the features of this area or front have changed radically in a general and overall manner, and at most they can only be said to have undergone partial qualitative change. But if these advanced models are popularized to the whole area, growing from a minority to a majority and transforming an advanced point into an advanced area, then qualitative change will occur in the features of an area or front. We adopt the work method of having the point direct the area to push the general forward because we grasp this dialectical law of development of things, and we have brought man's subjective initiative into full play and caused the new-born things to grow gradually from the point to the area, from small to big and the minority to the majority and realize revolutionary changes.

Adoption of the work method of having the point direct the area to push the general forward is also consistent with the law governing the movement of human knowledge. The Marxist theory of knowledge holds that "from the particular to the general, and then from the general to the particular" are two inter-related processes of human knowledge. "Human knowledge always proceeds in a cyclical and recurrent manner, and with each cycle (if it is based strictly on the scientific method), it is possible to raise man's knowledge to a higher level and deepen it unceasingly." ("On Contradiction") The relationship between the particular and the general in this process of knowledge is manifested in practical work as a relationship between the point and the area. Our leading comrades must go deep into the points and carry out serious research into such questions as the characteristics of the current movement, the law governing it and how to lead it. They must also arrive at a comparatively adequate understanding of the experience of different types of points. In this way, when they come to work in the whole area, they will know what they should do and be able to apply the experience of the point to direct the work of the area. When we spread the experience of the point to the area, we may still encounter new problems and gain new experience. We may bring these problems and experience back to the point and study them. With each such cycle, we will be able to push our revolutionary work a step forward, make our experience for leading the movement still richer and more perfect, and increase our leadership abilities. The process of work from the point to the area and then from the area to the point is a process of continuous deepening

of our knowledge from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular, and this is an objective demand for increasing our knowledge and doing our work well. If we depart from the objective law governing the process of knowledge in the course of practical work, we are unlikely to win victories.

Having the point direct the area in order to push the general forward is a concrete application in work of the dialectical-materialist world outlook and methodology. To doggedly uphold this scientific method of leadership, we must smash the ideological influence of metaphysics and unceasingly raise our consciousness of the need to grasp the point and have it direct the area.

First and foremost, we must correctly handle the relationship between the point and the area. Chairman Mao points out: "No aspect of a contradiction can exist in isolation. Without its opposite it also loses the condition for its own existence." ("On Contradiction") This is also true with the relationship between the point and the area. An area is composed of points; without points there will be no area, and without the area, the points also will lose their conditions for existence. In work, if we grasp the area but overlook the points or grasp the points but overlook the area, we will not act in accordance with the dialectical relationship between the point and the area. It is imperatively necessary for our leading comrades to go deep among the points and exert strenuous efforts to bring up advanced models in order to enable the cadres and masses to have an example to learn from and a goal to pursue. This is what we mean by saying that "light a lamp to shine over a vast field." However, grasping typical models well is but the first step in doing our work well. To spread the experience of advanced models to the whole area involves more arduous work. It is not the attitude of a revolutionary to be merely satisfied with grasping a few advanced models without seeking progress over the whole area. "When a lonely flower blooms, it does not signify the advent of spring; only when all flowers bloom does spring arrive." There will be a new flying leap in all fields of work only when the experience of advanced models is spread to the whole area and only when the backward are turned into advanced, and the advanced more advanced. Having the point direct the area in order to push the general forward is a work method complete in itself. No work in the area can be done well when that of the point is ignored; and when the work of the area is ignored, that of the point loses its significance in relation to the whole and can hardly be done.

When it comes to concrete work, there are often cases in which the experience of the point is not spread to the area by sustained efforts. Some comrades always feel that advanced models are blessed with particular conditions and their experience is difficult to spread. This is a metaphysical idea, and anyone who holds this idea fails to see that under certain conditions the experience of the point can be transformed into the fruit of the area. If we look at a problem from the dialectical point of view, we will see that a thing contains within itself not only particularity but also universality of contradictoriness, with universality residing in particularity. An advanced model is developed in a given time, at a given place and under given conditions, and its experience has a particular aspect. When applying this experience to the area, we must

concretely analyze the different conditions or we shall accomplish nothing. However, particularity is always linked with universality. Under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship in our country, even when conditions vary from one area to another and from one department to another, yet none is not restrained and dominated by the objective law of class struggle during the historical period of socialism. The main reason why advanced models are advanced is that in these places people implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and act in accordance with the objective laws governing class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment. In this sense, their experience is of universal significance and reflects things of common essence of revolutionary struggle. If we onesidedly emphasize the particularity of advanced models and deny their universality, we will negate the most important and basic things in these advanced experiences. As a matter of fact, many advanced models have gradually grown up under the most difficult circumstances and by surmounting all sorts of difficulties. If there is anything "particular" in them, it is that the cadres and masses in advanced units, having been tempered and tested through struggle, have a higher degree of consciousness in class struggle, line struggle and continuing the revolution and have greater socialist zeal. But the same thing can be done in any other place given efforts. The key issue here is whether the leadership has a correct ideological and political line. When this line is correct, the experience of advanced models can bloom and bear fruit throughout the area.

As regards the development of objective things, balance is relative and imbalance absolute. In the course of revolution, some areas and units always march ahead of others. Their advanced experience reflects the objective laws of development of things and stands for the development and orientation of revolution and construction. But why is it that the experience of advanced models in some places is always so difficult to spread out? An important reason is that there the thinking of the leadership lags behind reality and the situation and cannot keep pace with the march of advanced models, the leadership lacking in initiative to spread the experience of advanced models. The process of spreading the experience of advanced models is also a process of the leadership at all levels unceasingly marching forward along the path of ideological revolutionization, a process of continuously raising the Marxist theoretical level. Our leaders must constantly take the advanced models as a mirror in which to examine themselves, find out their shortcomings and promote their own continuing revolution. Leaders who differ in their consciousness of the line also differ in their understanding of advanced models, and their attitudes toward spreading the experience of advanced models as well as the results of spreading this experience also differ. We should make our own thinking conform to reality, keep abreast of the situation, and make our work meet the needs of the developing revolution.

Everything has a process of gradual development, and this is also true with spreading the experience of a point. Chairman Mao taught us, saying: "As regards the work of an area, one-third of it must be grasped well first." He added: "We should not start work throughout the area at the same time. Instead, we should select strong cadres to work first in certain points, gain the experience, popularize it gradually, and then develop our work in a wave-like manner." ("Essentials of Land Reform in Newly Liberated Areas") This clearly tells us that popularizing the experience of a point should first be carried out in an limited area.

It is certainly impossible to achieve the aim of pushing the general forward if we are so anxious for quick success as to start work in all areas at the same time. In order that the point is made to direct the area successfully, we must map out an overall plan and satisfactory arrangements for the work of the whole, having not only a clearcut objective but also concrete methods, so that we may spread the experience of the point realistically to the whole area according to a plan, with a clear aim, systematically and by separate stages and groups. Provided that the thinking of the leadership is clear and the measures it adopts are effective, it is possible to have the point direct the area, push the general forward and advance our work ceaselessly.

The dialectical-materialist, scientific method of work is our guarantee for carrying out a correct line. Chairman Mao has said: "If we have correct principles and policies but neglect the methods of work, problems will still occur." ("Methods of Work of Party Committees") What method of work we should adopt is an issue bearing on the line and the whole situation. We must continue to break the bondage of metaphysical thinking, reduce our blindness, and raise our consciousness. We must persist in applying the work method of having the point direct the area to push the general forward, continue to raise our level of leadership, surmount the difficulties, and fulfill still better all militant tasks entrusted to us by the Party.

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Never Stop Learning from Tachai

by

CCP Yingk'ou County Committee

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

Responding to Chairman Mao's great call "In agriculture, learn from Tachai," the mass movement to learn from Tachai is thriving all over the country. How to catch up with the rapidly developing situation and build a Tachai-type county is an important problem we must now solve. During the movement to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, our county Party committee summed up its work, bearing in mind the results of learning from Tachai in agriculture in the county. It further recognized that we could continue to march forward without a hitch along the road of learning from Tachai only if we strove to raise our consciousness of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, seriously study Tachai's basic experience, and always preserve a clear political mind and abundant revolutionary energy.

A striking feature of Tachai is that it has never been satisfied with the achievements it gained and keeps moving and making new contributions year after year. We must never forget this in learning from Tachai. In the course of developing the movement to learn from Tachai, we often lacked its spirit--never be complacent but always march forward. Very often, after having achieved something, we became so conceited that we halted our pace. Looking back over the road our county has travelled over the past decade, we know that the experience and lessons in this respect are very deep. In 1965, impelled by the socialist education movement, our county's per-mow output of grain reached 433 catties, and we were among the first counties in Liaoning province to surpass the target laid down in the National Program for Agricultural Development. However, up till 1969 we were still unable to reach the target set for south of the Yellow River, as for five years in a row our grain output hovered around 400-500 catties per mow. In those years, we felt that we could well be satisfied with the level attained in production and had achieved something in learning from Tachai. Consequently, when summing up our work or introducing experience, we were always fond of speaking about "stability." The Agricultural Conference for Northern Regions in 1970 popularized the experience of Hsiyang in building itself into a Tachai-type county in three years. Only when we looked at how much Hsiyang had achieved in three years did we begin to examine our "stability" from the "one dividing into two" viewpoint, find our shortcomings and recognize the danger of conceit and complacency. Then we marched. Since surpassing the target set for south of the Yellow River in 1970, we have continued to improve every year. In 1974, the county's per-mow output of grain reached 813 catties, making our county the first county in our province to surpass the target set for south of the Yangtze River. That year we sold to the state 200 million catties of commodity grain, nearly doubling the amount we sold in 1970 and trebling that in 1965 before the great cultural revolution. Summing up the experience and lessons drawn from the zero growth of the first five years and the continuous growth of the last five, we realized that the process of learning from Tachai was first of all a process of our county Party committee continuing to raise its consciousness of continuing the revolution, and that it was

only when we continued to adjust our ideological and political line that we could establish the ambitious goal of developing large-scale socialist agriculture, smash the idea of being content with the status quo and moving in a rut, and spread out Tachai's experience.

Conceit and complacency are a serious disease of thoughtlessness. During the socialist period the struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines goes on violently in the countryside. When we have the moods of conceit and complacency, we are likely to be intoxicated with the achievements we have made and become so conceited as to refrain from going deep into reality and among the masses and from investigating the current conditions of the two-road struggle in the rural areas. Or, even when we do go down, due to political insensitivity, we will not be able to recognize clearly the current manifestations and characteristics of the two-road struggle. As a consequence, we may allow capitalist activities to spread unchecked or even turn on the green light for them. This is exactly what happened. Just when we were relishing our obsession with "stability" in those years, capitalist tendencies re-appeared in some communes and brigades. Evil winds prevailed in some brigades, where people went to other areas to work for themselves, felled trees indiscriminately, or opened small plots of wasteland for their private use. In other brigades, "subsidiary occupations are stressed at the expense of agriculture" and "cash is stressed at the expense of grain"--these and other erroneous tendencies within the collective economy spread unimpeded. As a result, many backward brigades could not change their features for a long time, while some advanced ones turned back and regressed. This showed that many problems were concealed behind the word "stability." Judging by farm production alone, we also cannot be satisfied with stabilizing at one level, but must continue to advance and increase output in order to meet the needs of the developing situation. It can be seen that conceit and complacency are a stumbling block to the road of building a Tachai-type county. If we do not overcome this idea promptly, we surely will not be able to lead the masses to attack on our own initiative and occupy the rural positions with socialism in the sharp and complex struggle between the two roads. On the contrary, the rural positions would be occupied by capitalism. Isn't this in itself a question of line?

The practice of many advanced units proves that we can win one victory after another if we learn from Tachai in the Tachai spirit, continue to sweep away the obstacle of blindness and complacency standing in the way of our advance, always regard the achievements made as a new starting point for continuing the revolution, always remember class struggle, and persist in taking the socialist road. This point is illustrated by the experience of Shuiyuan Commune in our county. This commune was originally located in a saline low-lying area subject to waterlogging in nine years out of ten. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and through the hard struggle of the cadres and the masses, it gradually transformed into an area of fish and rice distinguished by high and stable yields. However, taking Tachai as its example, it never remained content with the achievements already made but always persisted in the Party's basic line, constantly analyzed the situation and features of class struggle, and mobilized the masses freely to expose the contradictions and criticize revisionism and capitalism, with special emphasis on the criticism of capitalist activities carried out by a small number of people

hoisting the collective banner. In addition, it continued to use socialist ideas to educate the peasants. As a result, it surpassed the target set for south of the Yangtze River in 1970 and broke the thousand-catty barrier in per-mow yield in 1972, and has made new progress in recent years. Shuiyuan's experience has once more proved that "the masses have potentially inexhaustiable enthusiasm for socialism." The masses have a strong desire and demand for learning from Tachai and catching up with Hsiyang and are not satisfied with the lack of progress in our county over five years. The basic question is that the leadership of our county Party committee must have a correct ideological and political line before it can fully arouse the socialist enthusiasm of the masses and march in broad strides and unceasingly on the road of learning from Tachai.

The struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines is the basic motive power for the progress of socialist society. By grasping it as the key link in the thousands of threads of rural work, it will be possible to solve other contradictions easily and to speed up the development of socialist agriculture. In close conjunction with the movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work and later that to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, we have over the years further studied the basic line of the Party, deeply criticized the revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, analyzed the situation of the struggle between the two clases and two roads in the rural areas, promptly grasped the main tendencies in various periods, and applied typical examples to carry out socialist education persistently. We were able to criticize capitalist tendencies the moment they appeared, firmly reject evil winds and practices the moment they emerged, and deal stunning blows to the class enemies. As a result, the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture developed in depth in the county. Those communes and brigades which were already relatively advanced made new progress, while those that lagged behind quickly caught up. Kouyen Commune, located closely to Shuiyuan Commune, had better natural conditions than Shuiyuan. But at one time its Party committee, giving in to moods of conceit and thinking that "we can't be any worse than Shuiyuan," did not seriously grasp the two-road struggle. As a result, the erroneous tendency to "stress subsidiary occupations at the expense of agriculture" and "stress cash at the expense of grain" reared its head, and the struggle against nature was relaxed. So, while Shuiyuan marched south of the "Yangtze River," they still hovered around the "Yellow River." Later, they made six study visits to Shuiyuan, and then realized that the biggest gap between them and Shuiyuan was that they failed to grasp the fundamentals in learning from Tachai in the way Shuiyuan did. After repeated criticism of capitalist tendencies, they aroused the socialist enthusiasm of the masses and marched south of the "Yangtze River" after one year of hard work. They broke the thousand-catty barrier in 1973.

The practice of struggle tells us that on the road of building a Tachai-type county, the key to whether we can advance or halt lies in whether the county Party committee can seriously study Tachai's basic experience, whether it can grasp the struggle between the two classes and two roads as the key link, and whether it can continue to adjust its own ideological and political line. Only when it is good at applying the dialectics of one dividing into two to analyze the question of

revolutionization of its own "squad" can it forever guard against complacency, preserve a clear political mind and vigorous revolutionary spirit, and become a combat headquarters leading the masses to build a Tachai-type county.

On the road of learning from Tachai, we must continue to make new progress, in addition to smashing the bondage of the thinking and habits of small producers and setting an ambitious goal of building large-scale socialist agriculture. We must work hard, aim high and continue to improve the production conditions. Some comrades often lack such a revolutionary spirit. After our county reached a grain per-mow output of 700 catties, some people again became shortsighted. They thought that since the paddy fields in the western part of the county had surpassed the target set for south of the Yangtze River, it was impossible to further increase the yield significantly, and that in the east mountainous part of the county the conditions were so poor that it was difficult to change them in a short time. Their conclusion was that we could not work any harder and output had reached its peak. This was apparently a big mistake. Mankind always continues to develop and will not remain at the same level. "The viewpoints of stagnation, pessimism, inertia and conceit and complacency are all wrong." To think that we cannot work any harder and output has reached its peak reflects the shortsightedness of small producers and the old idea of following the beaten track, a metaphysical viewpoint running counter to the law of development of things. In the mountain areas in the eastern part of our county Lüwang Commune had the worst natural conditions in the county. Some people said: "On entering Lüwang, you'll step on rocks every inch of the way. The mountainous land is so poor that what you sow in the spring can't be reaped in the autumn." However, the poor and lower-middle peasants there were determined to work as hard as Tachai to change the features of the mountain area. Braving the cold and the snow, they marched to the Laochiaoting Mountain, the second highest mountain in southern Liaoning more than 1,000 meters above sea level, improved the soil with humus, flattened the land and built terraced fields. Developing the mountain area on a large scale, they doubled grain output again and again. The practice of the masses shows that there is neither an end to the road of learning from Tachai nor a limit to changing production conditions. The county, "going up one level higher," has vast potential, great hope and great possibilities. The key is to have a great zeal for work. If the members of the "squad" of the county Party committee establish the far-reaching ideals and aspirations of the proletariat, they can stand on a higher ground and see farther, map out a unified plan for the county and lead the masses to go on marching on production in depth and breadth. Over the past few years, the leading comrades of the county Party committee three times led the office cadres to go down to the grassroots level to investigate the results of the movement to learn from Tachai in various communes. In the light of the experience and demands of the masses and in view of the different characteristics of the central, eastern and western parts of the county, they drew up a comprehensive plan of improvement centering on soil and water control. In the paddy field areas in the western part the emphasis was placed on building strip fields; in the dry crop areas in the central part the emphasis was placed on building garden plots; in the mountain areas in the eastern part the emphasis was placed on building terraced fields. All this gave an impetus to capital construction on the farmland. A new situation soon appeared in the whole county: projects were undertaken in all communes and brigades. The six communes in the central part of the county were short of water and vulnerable to drought. In order to change the features of

this area as quickly as possible, in 1971 we planned to build a reservoir with a capacity of 3,100 cubic meters on the Tach'ing River and cut through one ridge and two mountains to lead water to the central part from two rivers. At that time, however, because some comrades of the county Party committee were content with doing things on a small scale and feared all sorts of difficulties, this project was not approved and in consequence was shelved for two years. In 1973, the county Party committee, through the rectification of work style, criticism of the idealist outlook of history and smashing the conservative thinking, unified its views. This project, which was originally scheduled to be completed in two years, was completed in one year or more. Relatively substantial development was also attained in other farmland capital construction projects. At present, high- and stable-yield fields in the county amount to 620,000 mow, representing 70 percent of the total cultivated acreage, averaging 1.2 mow for each person, a hundred percent increase over 1970.

Learning from Tachai in agriculture is a profound socialist revolution and will never be plain-sailing. We must not only overcome the interference from erroneous thinking and line, but must also be prepared at all times to cope with the attack of various kinds of natural calamities. As regards natural calamities, we must not only hope for the best but also prepare for the worst both mentally and materially, and it is only by doing so that we can overcome them when they do break out and minimize the loss in agricultural production. If we are so conceited and complacent as to take them lightly, then when serious natural calamities strike, we would be placed in a passive situation. Natural calamities also test our resolve and results in learning from Tachai. When the Tachai spirit gets into people's hearts, they will be able to resist and beat the natural calamities when they come.

On February 4, this year, a strong earthquake took place in our region, and toward the end of July torrential rain wrought grave destruction. Then, when the crops were at the filling stage, an autumn drought rarely seen in the past struck. In a short span of seven months, three serious natural calamities occurred in succession. Particularly the earthquake caused unanticipated difficulties to agricultural production. A large number of farmland water conservation projects were wrecked and large tracts of strip fields were covered up by sand. What could we do in face of natural calamities of such serious proportions? At that time, a small number of people lost heart and thought that it was impossible to make any significant progress in learning from Tachai. Others wanted to take the evil road, saying "let's each care for ourselves and demonstrate our ability." To be frightened by natural calamities into doing nothing or to establish the idea that man will triumph over nature, to resist natural calamities with socialism or to seek "a way out" through capitalism--the struggle between these two kinds of ideas and roads is serious. Under the close concern of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, we organized the cadres and the masses to seriously study the theory of proletarian dictatorship and Tachai's revolutionary spirit in beating drought and reclaiming wasteland in three years. Extensively comparing the new society with the old, we educated the cadres and masses to uphold the conviction that "only socialism can save China" and rely on the collective strength to overcome natural calamities. The cadres and masses doubled their confidence and their zeal for work. They said: We still have people and the land; when houses collapse, let's build

new ones, and in times of natural calamities there is a greater need to learn from Tachai. "Once correct ideas characteristic of an advanced class are grasped by the masses, they will turn into a material force for changing society and changing the world." All the communes and brigades quickly mobilized to restore production, rebuild their homes and continue to undertake farmland capital construction on a large scale. The farmland water conservation works wrecked by the earthquake in the western part of the county could, according to the normal estimate, be restored in at least half a year, and some people were worried that sowing would be impossible this spring. However, in various communes and brigades all members, young and old, women and men, were mobilized to work together and completed the task in one month, insuring that rice transplanting could be done in time. Kuantun Commune, located in the center of the earthquake, suffered the most, but this only hardened its fighting will. While residual shock was still going on, they built 5,000 mow of terraced fields in one spring, several times more than in a corresponding period the previous years. Proceeding in the same spirit, the people of the whole county successively overcame floods and drought. This year is a year our county suffered most from natural calamities since the liberation, and a year in which the largest number of farmland capital construction projects were undertaken at the highest speed; it will also be a year in which the best harvest will be reaped. Practice proves that as long as we arm the masses with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, cling to the correct line, resist natural calamities in the Tachai spirit, and learn from Tachai in a penetrating manner amid the struggle against natural calamities, we will be able to beat natural calamities and continue to march forward on the road of building a Tachai-type county.

Chairman Mao teaches us: "Under certain conditions bad things can lead to good results." Natural calamities are bad things as they cause us definite losses and difficulties. Yet, through our efforts, we can turn them into good things. The question lies in strengthening Party leadership and closely relying on the masses. The struggle against natural calamities can enable the cadres and the masses to receive good tempering and profound education, display a stronger revolutionary spirit, and further see that the Tachai road is the only road leading to the development of socialist agriculture. This struggle will also enable us to identify problems and weak segments of our work so that we may develop our achievements and surmount our shortcomings and march faster on the road of learning from Tachai in the future. For instance, we discover that because we completed a number of farmland capital construction projects over the past years, we have strengthened our ability to resist natural calamities and that these projects have played a vital role in resisting natural calamities and striving for a bumper harvest this year. We also see, however, that the standards for some of the farmland capital construction projects are still not high enough and that some projects were not promptly rounded out with subsidiary projects and hence could not cope with more serious natural calamities that might break out. To remain invincible in face of natural calamities of all sorts, we must think of the worst, make good preparations, and set high standards and strict demands. Under the current excellent situation at home and abroad, we are determined to press ahead with the victories, continue to scale new peaks on the road of learning from Tachai in agriculture, and strive to make bigger contributions to the revolution.

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Quicken the Pace of Farm Mechanization

by

T'an Feng (譚枫)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and with the deepening of the movements to learn from Tach'ing in industry and Tachai in agriculture, the pace of farm mechanization in our country is accelerating. Striving to achieve farm mechanization in the main by 1980, the working class is stepping up its efforts, the poor and lower-middle peasants are exerting themselves, and various trades and occupations are working energetically. Conditions for accelerating farm mechanization are better now than at any time in the past. In a socialist country with a farming population of several hundred million like ours, the bright prospect of replacing manual labor with machinery is gradually becoming a reality. Our leading comrades should seriously study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, stick to the Party's basic line and with full confidence, lead the masses to advance so as to make bigger strides and bring about faster development in farm mechanization during the struggle to build Tachai-type counties throughout the country.

After the establishment of rural people's communes, Chairman Mao pointed out, the fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization. Bringing about farm mechanization and electrification on the basis of farm collectivization is a cardinal matter for our Party in pursuing the struggle between the two lines in the countryside to insure that socialism defeats capitalism. In a country like ours, if we had put mechanization ahead of cooperation upon the victory of the democratic revolution, as Liu Shao-ch'i advocated, it would have meant in reality our having forsaken cooperation, and the result would inevitably have led to capitalism. It was only after Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line was criticized and boycotted by the whole Party and people of the whole country under the leadership of Chairman Mao that several hundred million peasants began to follow the broad path of socialism with determination. To guide the peasants to advance continuously along the socialist road, it is imperative to endeavor to bring about farm mechanization on the basis of farm collectivization. This is an inevitable trend of socialist revolution and construction. It is also an important condition for further developing socialist revolution and construction. The people's commune plus mechanization not only provides the only way to develop a large-scale socialist agriculture, but also serves as an important link in building an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial system and national economic system and achieving modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. It will strengthen the material basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat and help deepen the revolution in the realm of superstructure. It is of tremendous significance in further consolidating the worker-peasant alliance, making the socialist position stronger in the countryside, restricting bourgeois rights, and gradually narrowing the three major differences.

The role of farm mechanization is being vividly demonstrated in some counties, communes and brigades that have basically achieved farm mechanization. One can receive a profound education by observing the new features of these places. It serves as an eye opener to inspire confidence and strength. With machinery replacing manual work, labor productivity has increased many times, and our ability to resist natural disasters has also been strengthened greatly. Agricultural production is progressing in both depth and breadth. It has brought about all-round development in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery, continuous expansion of the collective economy, and a stronger socialist position. The superiority of the people's communes characterized by being bigger in size and of a higher degree of public ownership is better manifested. The development of agriculture also helps accumulate funds for the development of industry, national defense and science and technology, provide foodgrain, raw materials and labor power, enlarge the domestic market for industry, and promote the development of the national economy as a whole. This will make it possible to implement more effectively the policies "be prepared against war and natural disasters and doing everything for the people" and "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony," and to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Many facts make the masses of peasants see more clearly the superiority of large-scale socialist agriculture, inspiring them to break resolutely with old traditional ideas, free themselves from the fetters and influence of the force of habit of small production and take the socialist road more unswervingly. If farm mechanization is achieved in the main in various parts of the country, what a brand-new situation will appear!

Striving to achieve farm mechanization in the main in a matter of several years is a glorious but arduous task. We have a lot of work to do. But, in all places and units, the most essential thing is to grasp the struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines as the key link and do well in implementing Chairman Mao's line, principles and policies. "The correctness and incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." Chairman Mao's revolutionary line has been our life blood in bringing about agricultural cooperation and in establishing people's communes in the past. It is also our life blood in bringing about farm mechanization today. Historical experience has proved that a struggle between the two classes, two roads and two lines has existed all along on such questions as to whether or not it is necessary to carry out farm mechanization, how to carry it out, whether it is necessary to depend on the state or rely chiefly on the masses, how to manage and use farm machinery and whether such mechinery genuinely serves agricultural production. This struggle will still be unavoidable in the future. During the decade from 1956 to 1965 after agricultural cooperation, we did not grasp farm mechanization as satisfactorily as we hoped, mainly because the revisionist line interferred with and undermined our work and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, principles and policies were not properly enforced. During the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, by criticizing the revisionist line of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, the cadres and masses raised their consciousness of the struggle between the two lines and put revolutionization in command of mechanization. This provided an orientation and a soul for mechanization, and the pace quickened.

The quantity of irrigation and drainage equipment, chemical fertilizer and tractors made available for agriculture over the past 4 years exceeds the total for the previous 15 years. Comparing 1974 to 1965, output of irrigation and drainage equipment increased 12-fold, tractors 6-fold and chemical fertilizer 2.5-fold. As the masses say, given a wrong line, there is a stoppage; given a correct line, there is progress. Practice tells us that using Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, principles and policies in unifying the thinking and action of cadres and masses is the basic guarantee for accelerating farm mechanization. In the course of carrying out farm mechanization from now on, we should still oppose erroneous tendencies to depart from the socialist road and run counter to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

There are two kinds of policies for carrying out farm mechanization. One is to rely on the masses, and the other is to depend on the state. These two policies reflect two different lines. Chairman Mao has persistently stressed the need to bring the initiative of both the central and local authorities into play and implement the policy of walking on two legs. In carrying out farm mechanization, it is particularly necessary to bring the initiative of the localities into full play under the unified planning of the central authorities and vigorously develop local industries which serve agriculture and agricultural mechanization. Only by so doing can we uphold the principle that the manufacture of farm mechinery should mainly rest with the localities concerned and can we take whatever measures are necessary in light of local conditions to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results. China is a vast country with both hilly areas and plains. The soil and weather vary from south to north and east to west. The crops and farming systems also differ. Large quantities of farm mechinery and tools of different kinds and functions are needed. If we depend on a few large enterprises and walk on one leg, we will be unable to satisfy the various demands of various localities and push mechanization ahead quickly. The localities will be able to seize the initiative in carrying out farm mechanization if they self-reliantly run some small local industries such as steel, coal, chemical fertilizer, cement and machine building according to local conditions. In this respect, the comrades in Kwangsi have profound experience. Before 1970, the pace of farm mechanization was slow because the leadership confined its thinking to "waiting for and relying on state aid." With their thinking emancipated after 1970, they transformed their attitude of "waiting for and relying on state aid" into one of "doing, trying and producing everything" by themselves. The masses were aroused to run iron and steel, coal and power plants by self-reliance, thus greatly enhancing their ability to produce farm machinery. Compared with 1970, this year's output of walking tractors is expected to increase more than 7-fold; that of "Bumper Harvest-37" tractors and internal combustion engines over 4-fold, and that of chemical fertilizer some 2.5-fold. Some 800 2.5-ton trucks for farm purposes are expected to be turned out this year; these trucks were not available before. Production of plows, hoes, trailers and pulleys for walking tractors and tractors of other types has also seen continued growth, meeting the demand in the main. This has laid a sound foundation for accelerating agricultural mechanization.

Kwangsi originally had a relatively weak industrial foundation. Prior to 1965, there was no iron and steel industry, while output of coal and power was low. However, Kwangsi still accelerated agricultural

mechanization under these very circumstances. Take Hunan for another example. Production of chemical fertilizer there in the past was also very low. During recent years, however, Hunan has produced by self-reliance some 80 to 90 sets of equipment for the small chemical fertilizer industry, thus markedly enhancing chemical fertilizer production.

Facts like these vividly demonstrate that, as with all other kinds of work, in farm mechanization "the decisive factor is man, not things." While material conditions are important and must be taken into consideration, it is man who creates and controls them. As long as we take Chairman Mao's revolutionary line as a guide and give full play to the masses' socialist enthusiasm and creative power, we can produce machines if there are no machines, increase output of machines step by step if we do not have enough machines, and raise our technological level if it is low. In those localities where conditions are bad and the foundation is weak, the state should render necessary support and assistance in material and technology. However, they cannot rely solely on state aid. The viewpoint that farm mechanization cannot be accelerated by one's own strength because of a weak industrial foundation is erroneous. There are many localities where the industrial foundation is not so strong and production conditions are not so good, but they have made rapid development in farm mechanization. Other localities, with stronger industrial foundations, richer resources and a higher technical level, have made slow development. This serves to explain that the major problem lies not in the strength of industrial foundation but in leading cadres' consciousness of political line, the firmness of their idea of taking agriculture as the foundation and their determination to achieve mechanization by self-reliance. With determination to grasp agriculture, operate industry for agricultural development and run industry well to support agriculture, we will surely speed up mechanization. In localities where the industrial foundation is strong and the role of industry as the leading factor can be given fuller play, steps should be taken to provide more machinery and other products for agriculture, to do a good job in achieving local mechanization as quickly as possible, and to render more assistance and support for other places throughout the country. In those localities where the industrial foundation is relatively weak, action should be taken to start with what is urgently needed locally by relying chiefly on one's own strength. If big projects are not feasible, small ones should be started first. If mechanization cannot be achieved immediately, semi-mechanization should be undertaken first. If the locality cannot produce machines, it should manufacture parts first and start with maintenance and repair service. Measures should be adopted to insure gradual development from small to big, from easy to difficult and from simple to complex. If we persist in doing so, it will not take long to push farm mechanization forward. On the other hand, if we wait for necessary conditions to emerge and rely on aid, no one knows when it will be realized.

Experience tells us that if a locality wants to speed up farm mechanization mainly by self-reliance, it does not need to build many new factories. The most important thing for it is to make full use of existing industrial and mining enterprises and take the road of innovation and tapping potential.

Under the Party's centralized leadership, Ch'angchou municipality, Kiangsu, maps out an overall plan for existing enterprises, organizes cooperation and coordination, breaks down the boundaries between different trades, and conducts technical transformation. It also carries out rational division of labor and production at fixed points. As a result, it has achieved relatively quickly a capacity to produce 15,000 walking tractors and 38,000 small diesel engines annually. The money invested is equivalent to only 37 percent of the cost that would be required to build new factories with a comparable scale. Moreover, production costs are low and quality is good. Yent'ai prefecture, Shantung, has given full play to the initiative of its hundred and more enterprises by pooling all of their strength, and succeeded in speeding up farm mechanization mainly by relying on its own efforts. A province or a region invariably has a number of industrial and mining enterprises, and small factories and handicraft cooperatives are everywhere. If we firmly grasp the education in ideology and political line, help them foster the idea of taking agriculture as the foundation, organize the initiative of industry to support agriculture, have old factories lead the new ones and the larger lead the smaller, and practice division of labor and coordination, it will be possible to rapidly form a stronger production capacity, and, under the situation where few or no new factories are built, to provide agriculture with large quantities of machines, spare parts and other products of good quality.

To develop farm mechanization with greater, faster, better and more economical results it is also necessary to rely on the collective strength of the people's communes and fully mobilize the socialist enthusiasm of peasants in their millions. Whether or not to believe that the poor and lower-middle peasants and commune members can undertake farm mechanization through self-reliance is likewise a question of line. Anyone who thinks that the peasants are backward and that the state must allot funds so peasants can till the land follows the revisionist line advocated by Liu Shao-ch'i. Practice proves that doing things in this way, we not only cannot develop mechanization with greater, faster, better and more economical results, but may take to the capitalist evil road. Criticism of the revisionist line has aroused the peasants' enthusiasm for farm mechanization. Having battled at the frontline of agricultural production for a long time, they know the rural conditions best, and under the commune system, they have the ability and wisdom to do well in mechanization. They have the most authoritative voice as to what should be done first and what later, and what machinery is best suited to local needs. Only by carrying out the three-in-one combination of scientific research, production and user units and by listening to the opinions of poor and lower-middle peasants is it possible to produce farm machinery and implements in light of local conditions, to produce a great quantity of them of higher quality, complete variety and lower cost. As for the purchase, management and use of farm machinery and implements, it is all the more necessary to rely on the masses of peasants. And it is only by fully mobilizing the masses' enthusiasm for socialism and developing the communes' collective economies can we persistently carry out the principle of placing the main emphasis on the collective economy when it comes to buying, managing and using farm machines well.

Giving positive support to the development of commune- and brigade-run enterprises and setting up county-commune-brigade three-level farm machinery repair and manufacturing networks are an important measure for achieving farm mechanization by relying on the peasants. Developing commune- and brigade-run enterprises can augment the socialist collective economy, increase the communes' public reserves, raise the level of public ownership, and create conditions for restricting bourgeois rights and gradually narrowing the three major differences. This completely fits in with the fundamental goal of achieving farm mechanization. To achieve farm mechanization, we must first solve the problem of orientation and road. Materially speaking, what we need are machinery, funds, and technology. Machines must be applicable. It is important that we can afford them and can repair them when they break down. How can we achieve this? We must carry out the policy of taking grain as the key link and insuring an all-round development. We must actively diversify the economy. Proceeding from the availability of local resources, in the light of needs and possibilities, and provided that we do not compete with big industry for raw materials, do not undermine national resources and do not take away manpower from agriculture, we must energetically develop commune- and brigade-run enterprises engaged in growing industrial crops, stockbreeding, processing and mining minerals. When the communes and brigades have their own enterprises and their repair and manufacturing plants, they will be able to accumulate funds for mechanization, bring up technical forces serving both industry and agriculture, and solve the problems of repair and assembly locally. Wherever possible, they may also produce some small and medium-size farm machines and tools. All this will speed up mechanization and raise its level.

The Shanghai suburbs have a higher level of farm mechanization. Irrigation there has been electrified, and 88 percent of the cultivated land is machine-plowed. About 260 catties of chemical fertilizer is applied to each mow of cultivated land. Mechanization or semi-mechanization has been realized in plant protection, threshing and processing of agricultural and subsidiary products. Funds for buying farm machines are basically provided out of the communes' and brigades' own reserves.

Huats'ao Commune, Shanghai county, formerly had to borrow money from the state and fraternal communes to buy machinery; by the end of 1970 it owed a total of 460,000 yuan in debt. After it began to run its own industry, it has not only paid off all its debts in 3 years, but also purchased 16 medium-sized tractors, 4 trucks and 3 tugboats, in addition to establishing some other collective production enterprises. The masses praise the commune- and brigade-run enterprises as golden wings of farm mechanization.

With agricultural machines increasing in number, the need has become more urgent to rely the peasants to set up a farm machinery technical force composed mainly of poor and lower-middle peasants, which is red and expert and serves both industry and agriculture. The main reason why farm mechanization in Tsunhu county is lauded by the masses is that revolutionization is placed in command of mechanization and the "pauper's spirit" is continuously promoted, so that more and more machines are used and the level of mechanization

keeps rising. At the same time, the "pauper's spirit" is used to educate farm machine technicians and help them foster the idea of mastering techniques for the poor and lower-middle peasants. Why is it that some localities have not used farm machines for farming and have not increased much or even reduced the machine-plowed acreage despite of having more tractors? It is mainly because the leading groups there do not have a correct ideological and political line, and fail to firmly grasp class struggle and roundly criticize capitalist tendencies. A farm machinery technical force composed mainly of poor and lower-middle peasants has not been established. In the course of realizing farm mechanization, it is also necessary to stick to the class line of relying on the poor and lower-middle peasants and uniting with middle peasants, to select as backbone farm machine technicians those young commune members and educated youths settling in or returning to the countryside who are good in thinking and willing to learn, and strengthen our leadership over and education among them. We should help them enhance their awareness of the struggle between the two lines and study techniques diligently in order to raise their technical level. This is an important guarantee for putting farm machines to use in the fields and bringing their role into full play.

Chairman Mao says: The masses have a potentially inexhaustible enthusiasm for socialism. Through the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and amid the current upsurge in studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship, the masses' socialist enthusiasm has soared. Let's pin our hope on the masses and further mobilize their enthusiasm according to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. This is the source of our strength in doing all tasks well. Herein lies our hope for basically achieving farm mechanization by 1980, and here, too, lies our guarantee.

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Be Ambitious When You're Poor, Guard against Revisionism When You're Rich

by

Party Branch of Hsiaohsiang Production Brigade,
Yüshu County, Kirin

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Hsiaohsiang used to be a poor mountain village in the past. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, we led the masses to wage a hard struggle for more than a decade and transformed it into a relatively prosperous new village. A review of the development and changes of Hsiaohsiang makes us deeply aware that in the struggle to build a socialist new countryside, it is imperative to persist in the Party's basic line, use Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought to educate the cadres and commune members, continuously overcome the traditional influence of small production, and criticize capitalist tendencies. We must be ambitious when we're poor, and guard against revisionism when we're rich.

Originally there was a stockbreeding farm of a commune here. When the farm was moved away, 16 families stayed behind and set up a production brigade in late 1962. At that time, there were four old oxen--two were blind and the other two lost their teeth , in addition to 2 small mules and a wornout rubber-wheeled cart. That was all we had. Only 19 people--8 old men, 8 women and 3 youngsters--were fit to work in the fields. The 155 mow of lean land was broken into 55 plots of varying sizes, and the per-mow grain yield was only about 130 catties. The brigade members had to be supplied with state grain and given other forms of relief. It was a well-known poor brigade in the county.

What was to be done in face of difficulties? The poor and lower-middle peasants were resolved to work, but some people were in favor of disbanding the brigade, saying: "Trees die and people cannot survive. Let's move to a good place 3 or 4 li away. Why stay here to suffer?" To work or to disband? The struggle was very sharp. Chairman Mao says: "Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution." ("Introducing a Cooperative") When poor, one must have great determination and not be discouraged. To disband is actually to fail to see the strength of the collective and lack the confidence in taking the socialist road; it reflects the mentality of small producers who are incompetent and afraid of difficulties. It is also a manifestation of peasants wavering between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Comrade Ch'i Tien-yün, a Communist and brigade leader, resolved to work with the poor and lower-middle peasants. Together with the poor and lower-middle peasants of eight households who decided to stay, she called door to door on those who wavered and gave them socialist education. She said: "We're poor, yes. But we can't leave because the conditions are bad. We poor people were landless in the old society. Now, Chairman Mao and the Communist Party have given us land, and we must have the ambition to build socialism. If we rely on the collective strength, there is no difficulty that can't be overcome. If we disband and let each work individually, that is a capitalist road, a road we mustn't take." These words cheered everybody.

They also studied the "pauper's" spirit of the Wang Kuo-fan cooperative, boosted their courage to surmount difficulties and resolved to work in and change the face of Hsiaohsiang.

Confidence breeds enthusiasm for work. Hsiaohsiang was described by people as a place even "rabbits desert." To increase grain yield, the brigade members expanded the manure resources in every way and carried them to the fields since there was little animal power and no carts. The women offered the brigade the hemp used to cushion the soles of their shoes and ropes from their baby cradles for use in sowing the fields. Braving the cold winds and treading on ice, Comrade Ch'i and the seven women she led dug ditches for flood control. During breaks, she told them the sufferings of her family. Recalling the hardships of the old society, they felt that in building socialism the bitter became sweet.
After over 40 days of hard work, they dug drainage and irrigation ditches for every plot of land. A year after the brigade came into being, much was achieved, with per-mow grain output exceeding 400 catties. Practice made everyone see the strength of the collective and toil harder still.

When Chairman Mao issued the great call "In agriculture, learn from Tachai" in 1964, the brigade members were so elated that they said: "If we are to advance, we must learn from Tachai. We must put politics in command, improve the soil and harness the water at the same time, and make gullies and slopes grow fine crops." However, some people said: "This is plain silly. Now that we've got enough grain, let's think of money." At that time, a production team leader drove a large cart out to other places and bought cheap and sold dear. He claimed that what he did was the way to make Hsiaohsiang rich. We too wanted to make Hsiaohsiang rich, the more quickly the better. But how? This involved a question of orientation and road. Those who said that developing farmland capital construction was silly thought they were clever, but actually they were bewitched by the spontaneous capitalist tendencies of small production. Getting hold of this, we then educated everyone to see that to transform the poor outlook, it was imperative to stick to the socialist direction, foster the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle and keep away from the evil road. As everyone said, to build socialism, we must combat capitalism, and if the capitalist road was not closed, it was impossible to take the Tachai road. Since then, we let the masses discuss the more important economic activities and decide if they conformed to the socialist orientation. If they were, we would do them hard; if not, we would reject them resolutely.

Though we're poor, our will isn't weak. When we work hard, the land won't be idle. Developing the revolutionary spirit of arduous struggle and going all out for socialism, we ceased to be known as a poor brigade in a few years. Since 1966 per-mow grain yield surpassed the target set for south of the Yellow River for four successive years and reached the target set for south of the Yangtze in 1970; since 1971 it exceeded a thousand catties every year and amounted to more than 1,600 catties this year. The average amount of grain sold to the state by each family annually was 2,811 catties from 1966 to 1970, and it rose to 4,291 catties from 1971 to 1974. Forestry, stockbreeding, sideline production, and fishery also developed substantially. With the growth of the collective economy, the life of the

commune members also improved gradually. Now, 28 families in the brigade are living in newly-built brick houses. Not only are they well-fed and well-clothed, but most have bank savings and surplus grain.

In the past, we used to think mistakenly that it was difficult to do ideological work when we were poor. Because we had practically nothing to offer, we were at a loss for words. When the collective economy developed and the brigade members were well off, it would then be easy to do ideological work. Actually this is not true at all. Prosperity also presents new problems and the need becomes greater to step up ideological work.

With collective production developed and our revenues increased, some people always hoped to get a bigger share. Following the growth of the collective economy, it is logical that the living standard of brigade members should be gradually improved. The problem here is what attitude one should take toward the state and the collective. In respect to improving the living standard, the question is whether to actively develop collective welfare facilities or to make a personal fortune? Some people, while working for the collective, think of personal wealth, and to them, to participate in collective production is to increase their own income. They seldom consider making more contributions to the state, increasing the economic strength of the collective and developing collective welfare undertakings. This is a reflection of the ideology of small producers under the new situation. If we act according to such a logic, we are bound to forget the state and, while making ourselves rich, impoverish the collective, turning the collective economy into an empty shell, widening the gap between the poor and rich commune members and even bringing about a new polarization. For this reason, we should pay special attention to guiding the cadres and commune members in correctly handling the relations between the state, the collective and the individual, the relations between accumulation and distribution among commune members, and the relations between collective welfare and personal consumption. One year, our brigade reaped a bumper harvest. If we had used the past distribution ratio, each man-day might get 3.4 yuan. But we gave only 2.1 yuan, ten cents more than the preceding year. Public accumulation, however, went up 3.5 times compared with the preceding year, and the amount of grain sold to the state was 4.5 times the fixed quota. Beginning 1972, through discussion by the masses, we fixed the value of each man-day at 1.5 yuan. We also paid attention to developing the collective welfare undertakings, strengthened the cooperative medical service, introduced universal education, and built public houses to improve living conditions, so that the life of every commune member could be improved steadily and rationally. This caused the masses to further link their own destiny with the socialist cause, and love their state and collective still more.

When life becomes affluent, some people may also tend to seek leisure and comfort, unwilling to lead a hard life again. Whereas people tried to outperform one another in digging ditches under ice in the past, now they complain about the hardship of transplanting seedlings in the paddy fields. They even ask: "When shall we cease arduous struggle?" When life is better than before, it seems the goal has been attained. Living in "brick houses with glass windows, electricity and a clock" satisfies them already. This is in the same vein as the small producer's idea to have "30 mow of land, an ox, a wife and kids sleeping on a warm k'ang." The only difference is that conditions have changed and the living standard

is higher. But this is no different from the narrow vision and the idea of half-way revolution on the part of small producers. To cope with this problem, we often give the cadres and commune members education on the great objectives of communism, and help them understand that the revolutionary aim of the proletariat is not to feed and clothe oneself well, but to gradually reduce and wipe out the three major differences, rid the world of the system of exploitation of man by man, realize communism, and liberate the whole of mankind. Though we are better off than we were before, compared with the great goal to be realized, there is a long way yet to go. We must not be half-baked revolutionaries. We must fight arduously all our lives, and not just for a spell.

When our brigade becomes rich, whether we should show concern to and help our fraternal brigades is also a problem we must solve. Without the Party leadership, state assistance and the support of fraternal brigades, Hsiaohsiang would not have overcome its poverty. As the brigade members still remember, in 1963, not long after our brigade was set up, a neighboring brigade gave us some cart wheels. Though they were old and not of the same size of our cart wheels, nevertheless they made our carts move along the great socialist path. How excited we were then! Today, when our economic power has grown strong, we must not forget the past. To let each sweep the snow before his own doorsteps while ignoring the frost on others' roofs--this isn't a proletarian idea. We often tell the commune members that with the constant deepening of the revolution and the development of agricultural production, the system of ownership with the production team as the basic accounting unit will eventually pass over to that with the brigade and subsequently the commune as the basic accounting unit. Therefore, it won't do to want only to make ourselves or our own small collective rich. After our brigade grows prosperous, we have the duty to help our fraternal brigades and make our due contributions toward reducing the gap between brigades and developing the economy at both the commune and brigade levels.

Generally speaking, these new problems that arise under the new situation are still those of constantly educating and transforming the peasants and further overcoming the traditional influence of small production. Growing from poor to rich, the peasant masses from their personal experience are more convinced that "only socialism can save China" ("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the people") and are more determined to take the socialist path. However, the concept of private property and traditional mentality of small producers left over from thousands of years will not vanish with the change in economic conditions. Nor will the spontaneous capitalist tendencies among a section of well-to-do middle peasants disappear because life is more affluent. Just as Chairman Mao teaches us: "There are serious tendencies toward capitalism among well-to-do peasants. These tendencies will become rampant if we relax in any slightest way the political work among the peasants during the movement of cooperation and for a very long period to come." ("Introductory Note to 'A Resolute Struggle Must Be Waged against the Tendencies Toward Capitalism'") Thus, when we're poor, we must combat and prevent revisionism, and when we're well off, there is a greater need to do the same thing. Once we relax our political work after we become rich, we cannot continue the revolution and may even slide down the revisionist road. In view of this, we regard educating cadres and commune members to overcome the traditional influence of small production as a long-term task. For many years we have persisted in running an evening political school,

organizing all commune members to study theory and culture, launch revolutionary literary and art activities, and take the rural front with revolutionary ideology and culture. We mobilize the masses to do ideological work. The Party branch leads Party members, who lead the masses. Ideological work has been done more thoroughly and penetratingly. Each year, we hold several examinations to sum up the results, and use the method of comparing the past and present to find out whether our steps are in line with the socialist path, whether the spirit of arduous struggle is strengthened or lessened and how much we contribute to the state. There is constant examination, constant improvement, annual review and annual progress.

The key to educating commune members to overcome the traditional influence of small production rests with Party members and cadres. Although small-producers' ideas as manifested in the behavior of commune members have their historical conditions and profound class origin, they are also closely related to our work. In the past, we frequently educated the commune members on such principles as "when there is water in the big river, the small rivers are full; if there is no water in the big river, small rivers are empty" and "if there is anything in the cooking pot, there is something in the bowl." The aim was to make commune members cherish the collective economy. But some commune members regarded the "small river" and the "bowl" as their aim, and when life was relatively affluent, they felt that with something in the "bowl" and water in the "small river," their goal was reached, and often worked sluggishly for the collective. This shows that when carrying out education among commune members in the past, we were not completely free from the bondage of small-producer ideas and were liable to take the satisfaction of personal interests as the motivation for developing the collective economy. Hence came the idea that when life became affluent, ideological work was easy to do and that all problems could be readily solved if the economic demands of commune members were satisfied. Such an idea was wrong. We deeply feel that in educating commune members we must first educate Party members and cadres to overcome the traditional influence of small production. Therefore we place strict demands on Party members and cadres and organize them to seriously study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in order to constantly raise their political consciousness. We ask them to study first what the masses are about to study, and the Party branch checks on the results of their study at regular intervals. During the movement to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Party members and cadres have taken the lead in study, linking their study with practice, dissecting themselves, overcoming their ideas characteristic of small producers, and making reports at general meetings of commune members. In this way, the commune members have also been encouraged to study.

Although we've accomplished something in the past, there is still a big gap to be filled. We are determined to respond to the militant call of the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, further sum up experience, overcome our shortcomings, continue to constantly educate cadres and masses with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, and do even better in carrying out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, consolidating and expanding the socialist front, and making new contributions to quickening the pace of building socialist agriculture.

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There Is Plenty of Room for Development Through Self-Reliance

- Investigation report on development of farm mechanization in Yent'ai Prefecture, Shantung

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

Yent'ai prefecture has a population of 9 million and more than 14.6 million mow of farmland, of which 70 percent is terraced land on hills. It is a major grain- and industrial-crop-producing area in Shantung province. Since the Agricultural Conference of Northern Areas in 1970, this prefecture has persisted in developing farm mechanization in the Tachai spirit, resulting in a continuous increase in agricultural production and a fairly big step forward in agricultural mechanization. By the end of 1974, each production brigade in the prefecture had an average of 102 horsepower of power-driven machines. This showed a rise of over eight times over 1965 before the great proletarian cultural revolution, and was more than treble the 1970 record. Tractor-plowed land was 50 percent of the total cultivated acreage, while in 1970 it was only 16 percent. Fifty-five percent of the farmland was under mechanical irrigation, compared with 30 percent in 1970. Threshing, milling, fishing, fodder processing and transportation were basically mechanized or semi-mechanized. Average grain yield per mow in 1974 amounted to more than 670 catties. Fairly good progress was also made in forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fisheries. In the vast countryside, all communes had their own factories, and all production brigades had farm machinery. Contingents capable of working in both industry and agriculture kept on growing, and the socialist position was more consolidated than ever. All this has helped strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and provide favorable conditions for gradually narrowing the three major differences.

The process of accelerating farm mechanization in Yent'ai prefecture has fully manifested the mighty power of the policy of self-reliance. Practice in this prefecture indicates that the pace of farm mechanization can be greatly quickened if the leadership adheres to a correct ideological and political line, continues to enhance people's awareness of the vital significance of farm mechanization, and relies on the masses to take the road of self-reliance with perseverance.

To make all-out efforts to develop farm mechanization on the basis of collectivization is a major task in socialist revolution and socialist construction in the rural areas of our country. It is also an urgent demand arising from the deepening movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture. As can be seen from Yent'ai prefecture, after the movements for agricultural cooperation and people's communes in the rural areas were accomplished, new production relations gave a powerful impetus to the development of the productive forces. Particularly, through the great proletarian cultural revolution and the criticism of the revisionist line pushed by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, the Tachai spirit has deeply impressed everyone, and there has been an unprecedented rise in the socialist enthusiasm of the poor and lower-middle peasants, accompanied by new development in agricultural production. A number of advanced units with high-yield records have emerged.

In these circumstances, the question of whether it is necessary to accelerate the development of farm mechanization has sharpened. For example, in the past few years, the counties, communes and brigades built many reservoirs, ponds, dams, pumping stations and a large number of deep wells to combat drought, but these facilities could not be fully utilized due to lack of subsidiary projects. At the same time, with the expansion of multiple-cropping acreage, it was urgently necessary to raise the extent of mechanization in plowing, threshing and other fields. Large-scale farmland capital construction was impossible by using shovels and picks and depending on manual labor. Moreover, in order to increase grain yield, more chemical fertilizer was required, and hog-raising must be developed, which, in turn, called for more feed. In developing fisheries, work must be directed toward deep-sea and ocean fishing so as to expand reproduction, and small, manually rowed and sail boats were far from meeting the requirements. In view of this objective situation, whether to rely on the masses to use their own efforts or to rely on the state and wait for help in a passive way became a question that must be resolved seriously in the course of developing farm mechanization.

Following several years of practice, Yent'ai prefecture has become more aware than ever that whether or not the principle of self-reliance is upheld in developing farm mechanization is, as far as the leadership at all levels is concerned, actually a test of whether or not they can persevere in continuing the revolution. Before the great cultural revolution, this prefecture made very slow progress in agricultural production. At that time, the Party's basic line was not conscientiously implemented by those directing agricultural production. While busily supervising farm work, they neither exerted efforts to develop farm mechanization nor tried to secure industry's support for agriculture. They merely relied on the four basic tools--hoes, sickles, plows and spades, and were content with "a small annual increase in grain output and a little contribution to the state after their consumption needs are met." Consequently, in the ten years from cooperativization to 1965, each brigade in the prefecture had an average of only 10.9 horsepower of power-operated farm machines, an increase of only one horsepower annually. In the same period, per-mow grain yield increased by an average of 9 catties a year, to reach 368 catties in 1965. For this reason, the outlook of the countryside remained unchanged for a long time. Educated through the great cultural revolution, the leadership at all levels heightened its consciousness of class struggle and the struggle between the two lines. After seriously summing up experience and lessons, they realized that the major reason for the slow progress in developing agricultural production and little progress in farm mechanization was that they failed to resolutely implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Obstructed and influenced by the revisionist line, they could not break with the narrow vision of small producers. As a consequence, on the question of farm mechanization, they followed the beaten track, took the Right-deviationist and conservative attitude, relied on the state, waited passively and even erroneously thought "it doesn't matter much if mechanization is introduced sooner or later." Huang county with relatively good natural conditions surpassed long ago the target set in the "Program" /for Agricultural Development/ in per-mow grain yield. However, the leadership of the county Party committee lacked a clear understanding

of the Party's basic line with regard to the agricultural question, thinking that with wells everywhere in the county, drought was not to be feared. As a result, they slackened their efforts to push the technical revolution in agriculture and failed to actively develop farm mechanization. This resulted in prolonged stagnation in agricultural production and very uneven development of the collective economy. It directly affected the consolidation of the socialist positions in the countryside and the relations between workers and peasants. Huang county's lessons greatly enlightened everyone. Over the past few years, the Yent'ai prefectural leadership has organized cadres at all levels to repeatedly study Chairman Mao's teaching: "The fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization," and a series of his other instructions on developing agriculture, and to criticize various erroneous ideas. In this way they have realized that achieving farm mechanization is a great revolution in the countryside. Without farm collectivization, socialism cannot occupy the rural position; without farm mechanization, socialism cannot consolidate its hold over the rural position. To achieve farm mechanization on the basis of collectivization--this is an inevitable trend in the development of socialist revolution in the countryside and a line question of using socialism to defeat capitalism by peasants led by the proletariat in the struggle between the two roads. Only by recognizing the significance of farm mechanization in this light can people persist in relying on themselves to accelerate its development.

Many difficulties and various ideological obstacles are certain to arise in the course of perseveringly carrying out the policy of self-reliance. The process of accelerating the development of farm mechanization in Yent'ai prefecture is also a process of struggle between two ideas and two lines. People realize that a major problem is to constantly overcome the world outlook of the lazy and timid. This can be fully illustrated by the circumstances surrounding the development of the small iron and steel industry, initiated in Yent'ai prefecture in 1967. At that time, the prefectural leadership decided to develop a small iron and steel industry with locally available resources as part of its effort to gradually achieve farm mechanization. As soon as this was suggested, some people stressed the difficulties on the assumption that "local financial resources are too limited to develop this industry." They urged the prefectural leadership to drop the idea and try its best to make good use of steel provided by the higher authorities. Others described the proposal to develop the small iron and steel industry as "unrealistic." Was it necessary to develop this industry? Could it be done? The key to answering these questions lay in the enthusiasm displayed by people to achieve farm mechanization and in the attitude they took toward dealing with material difficulties. The prefectural leadership found that while some comrades professed to favor farm mechanization, they actually did nothing but "wait for, rely on and ask for aid." Others emphasized only material factors without seeing the human factor which was decisive. So, it led everyone to sum up historical experience. During the 1958 great leap forward period, Yent'ai prefecture relied on its own strength to build a small iron and steel industry. Later, however, due to interference and sabotage by the revisionist line, the industry was completely deactivated. Although the prefecture was comparatively rich in mineral resources, it always depended on the state for its steel supply for over 10 years. This showed it was not material conditions but lack of determination and initiative that were

responsible for this situation. Many comrades maintained that, having criticized the revisionist line, the masses had increased their enthusiasm for running small steel plants, while the present material conditions were far better than those in 1958. Why were we now unable to do something that could be done then? This summing-up and discussion increased confidence and enthusiasm and a small iron and steel industry began to be developed. After 3 years of hard struggle, a small-scale iron and steel complex integrating mining, ore-dressing, sintering, iron and steel refining and rolling was completed initially. During the past several years, this "small steel combine" has produced more than 133,000 tons of pig iron, more than 31,000 tons of steel, and more than 24,000 tons of rolled steel, providing 60 percent of the iron and steel needed to manufacture and repair farm machines throughout the prefecture. In addition to this small iron and steel industry, some 36 small mines producing cooper, lead and zinc sprang up in the prefecture, producing during the past 3 years more than 470 tons of copper, lead, zinc and other nonferrous metals, and meeting the basic needs of the local farm machinery industry.

With the masses aroused and the great enthusiasm generated in various quarters for farm mechanization, how to organize the efforts and resources of the prefecture, counties, communes and other units to quickly increase the capacity of farm machinery manufacturing is a question Yent'ai prefecture encountered in achieving farm mechanization through self-reliance. At first, some comrades held that major projects should be undertaken by the prefecture while counties and communes should make their own arrangements. Facts showed that this method could not achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results. However, they found a way out through years of practice, namely, under the unified leadership and planning of the prefecture, the 130 and more factories and enterprises in the prefecture were organized to practice a system of cooperation and division of labor so as to concentrate superior forces to produce farm machines. Coordinated efforts created a kind of productive force. This was conducive to arousing the enthusiasm at various levels of the prefecture, counties and communes, to organizing the strength of various quarters to make the best use of limited manpower, materials and finance and to concentrate superior forces to wage a war of annihilation, turning out farm machines with greater, faster, better and more economical results. Today, the 20-horsepower tractors made in this prefecture are produced jointly by 22 small plants; diesel engines are produced jointly by 31 small units; and parts and accessories are made jointly by 21 units. The prefecture attains a capacity to produce 340,000 horsepower of diesel engines annually as well as some 5,000 medium-size and small tractors. In the past 4 years, farm machines and tools manufactured in the prefecture accounted for over 70 percent of all the newly acquired ones.

"Taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor" is the general policy for developing China's national economy. Whether the leadership at all levels can fully understand and implement this general policy has a great bearing on the development of farm mechanization. In the past, the leadership at all levels in Yent'ai prefecture, influenced by the revisionist line, entertained a metaphysical concept of "autonomous

operation" in their understanding and handling of the relationship between industry and agriculture, separating socialist industrialization from modernization of socialist agriculture and setting one against the other. Some comrades arbitrarily held that Yent'ai prefecture was an agricultural region and therefore it was good enough to develop agriculture. As a result, agriculture was grasped but no serious attention was paid to developing local small and medium-sized industries and no serious effort was made to promote the idea of industry supporting agriculture. Consequently, although there was a subjective desire to quicken the pace of agricultural development, the progress achieved was very slow. As for industrial development, although some enterprises were set up, these were not oriented to serving agriculture because the idea of taking agriculture as the foundation was not solidly established. And industry itself was not developed as it should. In recent years, they have come to understand ever more clearly that industry and agriculture are interdependent and complement one another. To handle well the relations between the two, it is necessary to effectively put agriculture in the first place and repeatedly conduct ideological education among cadres and the masses to take agriculture as the foundation. Facts show that even in areas where agriculture is predominant the idea of taking agriculture as the foundation may not have been firmly established. Speaking of county and commune industry, it developed rather substantially over the past years under the impact of the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture. However, there was also the idea that it would not pay to produce support-agriculture products because the profits were small and the difficulties were many and, moreover, this work was of secondary importance. Also, there were cases in which industry was developed blindly and products made did not suit the needs of the countryside. In this situation, the responsible people helped everyone raise his understanding of the necessity for industry to support agriculture and adhere to the orientation of having industry serve agriculture. At the same time, advanced typical examples were commended. Over the past years, the Chimo County No. 1 Farm Tool Plant has been producing exactly what is needed by agriculture, turning out large quantities of farm tools and machines which are welcomed by the poor and lower-middle peasants. When this experience was spread, it played a good role in promoting county and commune industry. By supporting agriculture, industry itself also develops. At present, an agriculture-supporting industry with small iron and steel, machinery and chemical fertilizer plants as its mainstay has been initially established throughout the prefecture. The number of commune industrial enterprises has increased to over 480, with each commune-run repair and assembly plant owning an average of more than 20 pieces of equipment. Some 90 percent of brigades have set up their own repair and assembly units.

Meanwhile, cadres at all levels in Yent'ai prefecture have also been more consciously following the principle of "taking grain as the key link and insuring an all-round development" in supervising farm production. While paying much attention to grain production, they have actively diversified, strengthened the collective economy of people's communes, and increased public reserves, thereby raising the capacity to purchase farm machines. Today, incomes of communes and brigades in this prefecture account for 32 percent of the gross revenues at three levels. Since 1970, around 85 percent of the funds used to purchase farm machines in the prefecture have been raised by communes and brigades themselves.

Recently, encouraged by the spirit of the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture and after studying the many important instructions issued by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, the leadership at all levels in Yent'ai prefecture have further raised their consciousness of developing farm mechanization. Through their own experience, they have come to understand further that to go all out for farm mechanization not only can greatly increase agricultural labor productivity and promote all-round development of the rural economy, but can also play a significant role in giving full scope to the superiority of the people's commune system, in implementing the strategic principle of "being prepared against war, being prepared against natural disasters, and doing everything for the people," in strengthening the worker-peasant alliance, and in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. For this reason, they have drawn up their plans afresh as they are determined to better study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, deepen the mass movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and develop farm mechanization with still greater, faster, better and more economical results.

Investigation Team of CCP Shantung
Provincial Committee

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An Important Document Opposing Capitulationism

- Studying "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan"

by

T'ien Chih-sung (田志松)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

In accordance with the great leader Chairman Mao's teaching, the whole Party and the people of the whole country are studying in depth the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and unfolding widespread criticism with Water Margin as teaching material by negative example, repudiating Sung Chiang's practice of revisionism and capitulation so as to "enable all people to recognize capitulationists." To penetratingly criticize capitulationism, draw lessons from historical experience and lead the current struggle, we must seriously study the important article "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan" made public by Chairman Mao during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

In November 1937, when this article was published, the War of Resistance Against Japan was at a crucial juncture. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, our Party "stands for a national revolutionary war in the full sense, a war in which the entire people are mobilized, in other words, total resistance." The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army led by the Party went into areas behind the enemy lines, set up extensive anti-Japanese base areas, and ceaselessly dealt telling blows to the Japanese aggressors. By contrast, because it pursued a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the mass participation of the people, the reactionary Kuomintang ruling clique suffered repeated defeats in the frontal battlefield, retreated a thousand li in a few short months, and lost vast areas to the enemy, with Shanghai and Taiyuan successively falling into the enemy's hands. "It is already clear that the Kuomintang's partial resistance cannot last long." The Japanese aggressors struck at and coaxed the Kuomintang at the same time. They continued to advance on Nanking and the Yangtze valley in breadth and depth, while widely spreading peace rumors to induce surrender. The Kuomintang, resisting passively to begin with, became more indecisive. But they knew that the firm stand of the Chinese Communist Party to resist Japanese aggression was the major obstacle to their capitulation. Therefore, clamoring for "the capitulation of the Communist Party" and "an end to class struggle," they stepped up their anti-communist activities. Responding to the Kuomintang's anti-communist and capitulationist activities, in our Party Wang Ming, who had caused serious losses to the Chinese revolution by pushing a "Left" opportunist line, now shifted to a Right opportunist stand, tried his best to oppose Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the principle of independence and initiative within the united front, and practiced a policy of capitulation or accommodation toward the Kuomintang to meet the counter-revolutionary political needs of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. In view of this, Chairman Mao pointed out promptly to the whole Party and the people of the whole country: "Since

the Lukouchiao incident the main danger inside the Party is no longer 'Left' closed-doorism but Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism." He stressed the need "to oppose class capitulationism inside the Party," and "to oppose national capitulationism in the whole country."

Basically speaking, to oppose class capitulationism is to maintain the proletarian leadership of the revolution. After the establishment of the united front, should the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie, or the other way round? Should the Kuomintang absorb the Communist Party, or the other way round? At that time, this meant: Was the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of the Ten-point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, to the level of total resistance as advocated by the Communist Party? Or was the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance? This was a difference in principle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and Wang Ming's Right opportunist line during the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Kuomintang reactionaries preached "one party, one doctrine and one leader" and regarded themselves as leaders of the whole country. They tried their utmost to oppose and reject the leadership of the Communist Party. Among the bourgeoisie, "many people are able for a given period of time to appear as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries. Therefore, they have the qualifications to fool the masses of people, making it difficult for the people to understand their lack of thoroughness and their pretense and disguise. This increases the responsibility of the Communist Party to criticize its allies, expose the bogus revolutionaries and seize the leadership." ("On the Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism") Under these circumstances, whether the Communist Party could adhere to its own correct line and the Marxist principled stand not only would determine the outcome of the War of Resistance Against Japan, but also would spell the difference between life and death for the Party. Chairman Mao clearly pointed out that "we must closely adhere to the principle of independence and initiative in all our united front work," adhere to the correct policy of "both unity and independence," in order to insure the Party's leadership in the War of Resistance Against Japan, hold the ground we already won, extend the revolutionary positions, and mobilize the masses in their millions to join the anti-Japanese national united front to defeat Japanese imperialism. However, the renegade Wang Ming lavished praises on the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and advocated "everything through the united front" and "everything must be submitted to the united front," handing over the leadership of the revolution to the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and making the Communist Party its satellite. This is out-and-out class capitulationism. "It leads the proletariat to accommodate itself to the reformism and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie. If this tendency is not overcome, it will be impossible to win victory in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, impossible to turn partial resistance into total resistance, and impossible to defend the motherland."

Class capitulationism inevitably leads to national capitulationism. Chairman Mao pointed out: "Class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war; it is a vile tendency that lends support to the camp of the rightwing and leads to defeat in the war." The rightwing group of the anti-Japanese national united front, made up of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, was the headquarters of national capitulationism. This was because the big bourgeois of semi-colonial and semi-feudal old China had a strong comprador

character, was a direct appendage to imperialism, and was fed by and served imperialism. To them, the question was not whether they would become slaves in a subjugated nation; it was that they feared and opposed the proletariat and the masses of people rising up in revolution. Therefore, although the action of Japanese imperialism to swallow all of China alone seriously struck at the interests of the British, US and other imperialists in China and those of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie who were attached to these imperialists, and although the Chiang Kai-shek clique was forced to join the resistance against Japan, they feared the people's revolution led by the Communist Party more than they feared Japanese imperialism, and they opposed the anti-Japanese national liberation war led by the Communist Party more than they opposed Japanese imperialist aggression. They had all along waited for the opportunity and prepared the conditions to appease and surrender to Japanese imperialism. Wang Ming denied the reactionary character of the big bourgeoisie and capitulated to the bourgeoisie. It was inevitable that he would move in line with the interests and policies of the bourgeoisie and slip into the quagmire of national capitulationism. In order to firmly and effectively oppose national capitulationism and win the victory in the war of resistance against Japan, it was first of all necessary to oppose and overcome class capitulationism inside the Communist Party. In view of the bloody lesson in history when the revolution was wrecked by capitulationism, Chairman Mao in this article earnestly cautioned the whole Party: "In 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu's capitulationism led to the failure of the revolution. No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood."

Correct handling of the relationship between alliance and struggle in the anti-Japanese national united front was an important aspect of persisting in the revolution and opposing capitulationism. The fact that our Party adopted a dual policy of "alliance" and "struggle" at that time was determined by the dual character of the bourgeoisie. Just as Chairman Mao pointed out in the article "Preface and Postscript to 'Rural Surveys'": "It is not 'all struggle and no alliance,' neither is it 'all alliance and no struggle' (like the Ch'en Tu-hsiuism of 1927). Instead, it is a policy of uniting with all social strata opposed to Japanese imperialism, of forming a united front with and yet of waging struggles against them, struggles that differ in form according to the different degrees in which their vacillating or reactionary side manifests itself in capitulation to the enemy and opposition to the Communist Party and the people." The bourgeoisie, the big bourgeoisie in particular, always tried its utmost by all means to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in such a way as to make the proletariat and the Communist Party lose their independent character ideologically, politically and organizationally and become an appendage to the bourgeoisie and its political party. The Kuomintang reactionaries never stopped their so-called activities to "melt, restrict, contain and repress the Communist Party." They concocted the reactionary "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and stirred up three large-scale "anti-communist high tides." They also attempted to seduce communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune, wine and women. It was obvious that in the united front the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was extremely acute and complicated. Only by resolutely overcoming "the tendency toward unprincipled accommodation with the Kuomintang"

then existing in the Party, fighting on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint, and waging tit-for-tat struggles against the reactionary bourgeois policies was it possible for the proletariat and the Communist Party to maintain their ideological, political and organizational independence and purity, frustrate the capitulationist conspiracy, and maintain and consolidate the anti-Japanese united front. Historical experience has proved that when we seek unity through struggle we will have unity and that when we seek unity by making concessions we will lose it. What Wang Ming advocated was actually "all alliance and no struggle." If he had his way, the anti-communist arrogance of the Kuomintang would become even more inflated, their anti-communist activities would become more unbridled, the Communist Party would collapse, and the War of Resistance Against Japan would fail.

To arm the whole Party and the masses of people with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and educate them to recognize capitulationism and oppose capitulationists--this is our Party's consistent policy, and an important experience we have gained in opposing capitulationism. In the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan Chairman Mao pointed out the way to overcome capitulationism as this: "Both by words, that is, by exposing the danger of capitulationism, and by deeds, that is, by organizing the masses to stop the capitulationist activities." ("Interview with the British Journalist James Bertram") In his work "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan," Chairman Mao again emphasized the need to extend the fight against capitulationism to "all spheres of our work." This tells us that it is necessary to arm the whole Party and the people of the whole country with Marxism, expose the essence of capitulationism, recognize the danger of capitulationism, and wage resolute struggle against it. Once the masses of people, first of all the Communist Party members, grasp the sharp ideological weapon of Marxism, they will be able to distinguish between revolutionaries and capitulationists and between Marxism and revisionism, and consciously resist and overcome capitulationism. "Without a mass base, the capitulationists will be unable to play their tricks" and will be completely isolated. Their counter-revolutionary conspiracies will not succeed. This and other brilliant works by Chairman Mao, works which uphold the revolution and oppose capitulationism, have greatly educated and armed the whole Party and the people of the whole country, guiding them to victoriously carry out the struggle against capitulationism.

After the ruthless Second Revolutionary Civil War, our Party became more mature and consolidated politically, ideologically and organizationally. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's correct line, the whole Party waged a tit-for-tat struggle against Wang Ming's capitulationist line. Thus, although Wang Ming's capitulationist line had for a time adversely affected the development of the people's armed forces and anti-Japanese bases in some areas and caused tragic losses in the "southern Anhwei incident," on the whole its harm was only partial and was quickly discovered and rectified. Wang Ming's capitulationist line was further criticized and liquidated at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee. This enabled the Party to hold a firmer grip of the leadership over the anti-Japanese national united front. It time and again frustrated the capitulationist

activities and splittist conspiracies by the Kuomintang reactionaries, and time and again beat back the anti-communist high tides stirred up by the Kuomintang reactionaries. It consolidated the anti-Japanese national united front and insured the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Later, summing up this struggle in his work "The Present Situation and Our Task," Chairman Mao said: "During the war of resistance, our Party combated ideas similar to those of the capitulationists, that is, such ideas as making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies, having more confidence in the Kuomintang than in the masses, not daring to arouse and give full rein to mass struggles, not daring to expand the liberated areas and the people's armies in the Japanese occupied areas, and handing over the leadership in the war of resistance to the Kuomintang. Our Party waged a resolute struggle against such impotent and degenerate ideas, which ran counter to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely carried out its political line of 'developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating the die-hard forces' and resolutely expanded the liberated areas and the People's Liberation Army. This insured not only that our Party was able to defeat Japanese imperialism in the period of its aggression, but also that, in the period after the Japanese surrender when Chiang Kai-shek launched his counter-revolutionary war, our Party was able to switch smoothly and without loss to the course of opposing Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary war with a people's revolutionary war and to win great victories in a short time." Both positive and negative historical experience shows that to make revolution, we must oppose capitulationism and firmly hold the leadership over it. If we do not oppose capitulationism and if we abandon leadership over revolution, the revolution will fail and the people will suffer. We must keep this valuable historical experience firmly in mind.

The appearance of capitulationism within the Party is not an accidental phenomenon. It is a reflection within the Party of class struggle in society, and has deep class and social root-causes. In analyzing Ch'en Tu-hsiu's tailism, namely, capitulationism, Chairman Mao pointed out incisively: "This is a reflection of bourgeois reformism within the ranks of the proletariat." In the course of its struggle against the proletariat, the bourgeoisie never forgets to use bourgeois ideology to corrupt the proletariat, and also uses the methods of "worming its way in and pulling people out" to cultivate its agents within the proletarian ranks. If Communists fail to resist the influence of bourgeois ideology and to withstand the deception and bribery by the reactionaries, they will betray Marxism, the proletarian revolution and dictatorship, and degenerate into despicable renegades. The history of our Party fully proves that as long as class struggle and the influence of bourteois ideology exist, capitulationism may appear. During the period of the democratic revolution, first Ch'en Tu-hsiu and later Chang Kuo-t'ao were class capitulationists. Wang Ming first turned "Left" and then Right, pursued class capitulationism, and finally surrendered to the enemy in betrayal of the country, thereby becoming a hunting dog of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. Since the period of socialism began, our Party has gone through four major struggles between the two lines. On these four occasions the chieftains of the opportunist line, Kao Kang, P'eng Te-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, were all capitulationists. Revisionism will inevitably lead to capitulationism, and chieftains of revisionism are all running dogs of the bourgeoisie and imperialism.

At home, they practice class capitulationism and surrender to the landlord and bourgeois classes; internationally, they seek the backing of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism and practice national capitulationism. This historical phenomenon merits our attention. To practice Marxism, a revolutionary party and the revolutionary people must persistently criticize revisionism and capitulationism and resolutely struggle against class and national capitulationists.

In the period of socialism, our Party has become a government party, a party that exercises leadership in everything. Although the Party's position has changed, in all our work we must still guard against the appearance of any phenomenon of giving up the leadership over the revolution and losing revolutionary principles. The Party's basic line tells us that throughout the historical period of socialism there is the struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines. This struggle involves every aspect of our work. There is the question of "who defeats whom" in the political, economic, ideological, cultural and other fields. For instance, with regard to revisionist ideas and the capitalist forces and tendencies in cities and countryside, should we allow them to spread unchecked or should we resolutely criticize and struggle against them, and use socialism to occupy all positions? With regard to the corruption of the proletariat and communists by the bourgeois style of life, should we take it easy and ignore it or should we resolutely resist and rectify it? With regard to foreign things, should we critically absorb them and correctly learn from them or should we blindly worship them and unconditionally copy them? And so on and so forth. All these are major questions of right and wrong involving class struggle and the struggle between the two lines. On these questions, we must take a clear-cut stand and uphold the principle. We must fully understand the protracted nature of class struggle and the struggle between the two lines, keep a sober mind and adhere to the Party's basic line. We must act according to Chairman Mao's three basic principles: "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire." We must positively and correctly carry out class struggle and the struggle between the two lines, strengthen the all-round dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat through to the end.

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Comment on Hu Shih's Verification of Water Margin

by

Yü Fan (余 凡)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

After the May 4 Movement, Hu Shih, the reactionary man of letters of the landlord and comprador bourgeois classes, was the first, and the most energetic person, to write on "verification" of Water Margin with the use of idealism. In July 1920, his "Verification of Water Margin" appeared as the first article in his "verification of the novel of several hundred thousand characters." ("Introducing My Thought") Then, from 1921 to 1929, he successively produced "Later Verification of Water Margin," "Preface to the 'Two Editions of Sequel to Water Margin'" and "Preface to the 120-chapter Water Margin." These verifications were connected by a black thread embodying the experimental method of verification and historical idealism; they diffused many reactionary viewpoints regarding the study of Water Margin, and their evil influence has persisted down to this day. In the current criticism of and discussion on the novel, it is essential to criticize again these poisonous weeds and make them, together with Water Margin, play the role as teaching materials by negative example.

In the article "Verification of Water Margin," Hu Shih declared at the outset that his verification was aimed at "exploring a new direction and opening up a new road for Water Margin future specialists." Such was the purpose and general guiding thought for his verification of Water Margin. What, then, were the "new direction" and "new road"? "In a nutshell," as he put it, this verification was "historical verification," namely, to use scholastic verification to "seek every process of legendary evolution." ("Introducing My Thought") This, Hu explained many times, was his "basic method" for verification. Its salient characteristic was what he often publicized as "bold assumptions and careful verification." This was out-and-out merchandise of experimental idealism. The various fallacies deduced by Hu from his verification of Water Margin were nothing more than poisonous sprouts growing out of the soil of experimental idealism.

Let's, then, take a look at Hu Shih's verification!

First, regarding the edition of Water Margin, the conclusion of his "verification" was that Chin Sheng-t'an did possess the 70-chapter "original edition." To convince his sceptics, Hu argued that Chin "had no need to make a false claim to the possession of the original edition." The so-called "original edition," as everyone knows, was merely a lie deliberately cooked up by Chin,the feudal man of letters. Proceeding from the reactionary stand of frantic hostility to peasant uprisings, he chopped off the section of Water Margin after the "seating order for Liangshan heroes" and made up Lu Chün-i's "nightmare" in which the "angel of heaven" Chi Shu-yeh descended and exterminated all the leaders of the insurgent army. Then, to hoodwink the public, he falsely claimed that he had in his possession the "original edition." Exposing this fraud, Lu Hsün likened the mutilated

70-chapter edition (71 chapters if the "foreward" were counted) to "a dragonfly without its tail." However, Hu Shih heaped lavish praise on this so-called "original edition," saying it "revived Water Margin and rebuilt Liangshan" and ushered in "a great era marking the complete foundation of the Chinese vernacular literature." As a result, this "dragonfly without its tail" flew high in the sky and since has been continuously applauded. It has even been suggested that while Chin's motive in mutilating the novel was bad, "the results derived are extremely good." How absurd.

One may ask: why did Hu go to such length to recommend this "dragonfly without its tail," a book whose final section was chopped off by Chin Sheng-t'an? Basically speaking, this was determined by their common reactionary stand. As a running dog of the landlord and comprador bourgeois classes, Hu, like the feudal men of letters Chin, had a deep-seated hatred for the peasant revolutions, whose extermination he could not wait to see. He yelled that "banditry must not be encouraged and must be strongly 'condemned by mouth and pen'." Like Chin, he dreamed of a "peaceful world without bandits." What he did not like was Chin's commentaries, Chin's downgrading and denunciation of Sung Chiang for pretending to practice benevolence and righteousness. Indeed, Chin's condemnation of Sung proceeded from the reactionary stand of favoring armed suppression of peasant uprisings, and therefore he misread the original intention. This explained why Hu blamed Chin for being "trite" and failing to see that Sung was a member of their own family, a chieftain who incited accepting amnesty and enlistment and disintegrated the peasant insurgent army from within. Therefore, he went out of his way to defend Sung, saying Water Margin does not mean to reproach Sung Chiang," and he praised Sung as a "hero of 'benevolence and righteousness'." Owing to the identity of views on Water Margin, although the two had a minor difference of opinion, Hu still lauded Chin's "literary foresight" and his mutilated 70-chapter version. As a result, the wide circulation of Chin's edition exerted a very bad influence.

Second, in his verification of Water Margin, Hu found that in its basic thought the novel was "a book against the government," saying that "it spares no effort to 'extol' the brigands and 'criticize' the government." This viewpoint was not only absurd but had an ulterior motive. For, if Hu had stated that Water Margin was a book acclaiming capitulationism, how could he make it satisfy the needs of the landlord and bourgeois classes and play the role of corrupting and poisoning the people in the China of the 1920's when the people's revolutionary movement was flourishing under the leadership of the proletariat? Therefore, to cover up its capitulationist essence, Hu had to label it "anti-government," just as Chin Sheng-t'an deceived the public by making a false claim to the possession of the "original edition." Anything like Water Margin's "anti-government" would inevitably lead to capitulationism, to selling out the interests of the people, and to wallowing in the dirt with reactionary bureaucrats and politicians. In subsequent commentaries on Water Margin, some people were indeed deceived into saying that Water Margin expressed a "strong resistance" against the evil forces oppressing the poor people such as "the feudal government, officials and the landed gentry," and was an "immortal epic in praise of peasant uprisings." Now is the time to expose Hu Shih's fraud and eliminate its pernicious influence.

What did Hu mean by "anti-government"? This comprador man of letters flatly refused to recognize that a feudal system existed in modern China, saying nonsensically that China's "feudal system had collapsed as early as two thousand years ago." ("The Road We Took") He was also an advocate of "good government," believing as he did that problems could be solved readily if only several "good people" were appointed to the government without ever touching the reactionary system. In fact, what he defended was the reactionary rule of the landlord and comprador bourgeois classes. Since Hu had studied abroad, he was well aware that despite the frequent change of government in modern capitalist countries, the state system of bourgeois dictatorship would not be changed in any way and that change of government was precisely a means of maintaining and consolidating the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. When one thinks of this in the context of the reactionary proposals consistently advocated by Hu, it will not be difficult to understand that what he meant by "anti-government" did not refer to the opposition to the feudal system nor to the reactionary ruling class but only to a few individuals within it, namely, the so-called "evil ministers" and "bad officials." Hu's stand was completely identical with that of the Water Margin author in that both were against corrupt officials only and not the emperor. What he said about Water Margin being "a book against the government" was, in essence, merely a means of embellishing the capitulationist Sung Chiang and a figleaf covering up the capitulationist line preached by Water Margin.

In addition, in his verification, Hu used national contradictions as a pretext to justify Sung Chiang's capitulation. Why did he, in his verification, repeatedly emphasize that Water Margin conveyed "longstanding grievances" and "mentality" such as "nostalgia for one's old land" and "racial sufferings" and expressed the "hope that heroes will come out from the marshes and give their support to the Sung House"? The answer is that he attempted to use national contradictions to cover up and obliterate class contradictions and dress up Sung Chiang the capitulationist as a "national hero," and describe the capitulationist line preached in Water Margin as conforming to the aspirations of the people at that time and meeting the strong demands of the time. It is worth noting that in some of the past commentaries on Water Margin, one of the arguments used to defend Sung Chiang's capitulation was that Sung returned to the fold of the Sung imperial court because he wanted to "serve the country and stamp out the border disturbances" under a situation of "sharpened national contradictions." Some even said that in feudal society "love of one's country has to be realized through one's loyalty to the emperor." These erroneous notions clearly show the influence of this reactionary theory dished out by Hu Shih. We must criticize such fallacies of class capitulationism by Hu.

"In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle." In China's prolonged feudal society both national and class contradictions were often complicated and interrelated. At times national contradictions rose to the leading position, yet classes and class struggle still existed. Therefore, with national contradictions rising, "a theory which attempts to deny the existence of class struggle is a totally wrong theory." ("The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War") It was futile for Hu Shih to attempt to use national contradictions--namely, what he described as the "fall of the central plains," "nostalgia for one's old land," etc.--to negate the sharp class struggle between the peasantry and

the landlord class in the closing years of Northern Sung and to find a basis for Sung Chiang's capitulation. Chairman Mao points out explicitly: "Class capitulationism in essence is a reserve force of national capitulationism." ("The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War after the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan") National struggles and struggles against external harrassment and plunder are always accompanied by the struggle between the two classes and two lines. Take, for example, the closing years of Northern Sung, against which the story of Water Margin was set. When the national contradictions were sharpened, the broad masses of the people were the main forces of the faction advocating a war of resistance for they firmly opposed the national capitulationist line. On the other hand, the reactionary ruling class with the emperor of the Chao family as its chieftain was the headquarters of the faction favoring peace and pushing the national capitulationist line of humiliation. In Water Margin, Sung Chiang hands over the Liangshan revolutionary base with a radius of several hundred li and a strong force to Sung Hui Tsung, who consistently submits to foreign domination, and the peasant revolutionary armed forces are reorganized into "government troops" of the Sung Dynasty. This shows that Sung Chiang already leans to the camp of the capitulationists. What, it may be asked, can he use to resist foreign aggression and "defend the national interests"? Sung Hui Tsung is willing to become a junior emperor, and Sung Chiang too has to follow him, the "sacred and enlightened" Son of Heaven, and become a traitor! Isn't this the inevitable outcome of "love of one's country" accompanied by "one's loyalty to the emperor" and practicing class capitulationism? However, through the several chapters on "expeditions against Liao," Water Margin not only offers a noble explanation for Sung's acceptance of the amnesty and enlistment offer and practicing capitulationism but transforms this faithful lackey of the landlord class into a "hero" of national resistance. Despite the fact that the author ruthlessly tampered with history and put makeup on the capitulationist Sung Chiang, Hu Shih still argued that this reflected the people's "state of mind in worshipping marshes heroes" when they were ruled by an alien nationality. This shows more than anything else that the aim of fabricating this reactionary fallacy was not only to defend Sung Chiang the capitulationist but also to defend himself as a lackey and traitor.

From lauding Chin Sheng-t'an's 70-chapter version to praising Sung Chiang the capitulationist--this is the outcome of Hu Shih's so-called "historical verification" of Water Margin. In the article "Later Verification of Water Margin," he boasted gleefully: "My conclusion in these articles on the verification of the novel may be wrong, but I am confident that my attitude on study cannot be wrong." That is to say, you may not believe in his conclusion on the verification, but you must believe in his experimental method of "historical verification." Otherwise, he would say you do not have "historical foresight" nor understand the "historical method." It appears he had the highest respect for history and paid the greatest attention to "historicalism." Chairman Mao points out: "Classes struggle, some classes triumph, others are eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of civilization for thousands of years. To interpret history from this viewpoint is historical materialism; standing in opposition to this viewpoint is historical idealism." ("Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle") Basically Hu Shih did not recognize the facts of classes

and class struggle, was consistently opposed to the Marxist theory of class struggle and the Marxist method of class analysis, and stood completely in opposition to the viewpoint of historical materialism. In his verification of Water Margin, he used what he called "airing longstanding grievances" and "the psychology of longing for heroes" to explain the historical causes for the formation of Water Margin, and basically made no political and economic analyses. His various preposterous views on Water Margin were all drawn from the viewpoint of historical idealism. This fact clearly shows that his so-called "historical verification" was merely intended to peddle experimental idealism under the guise of respecting history. His so-called "historical method" was nothing but a method of distorting and reversing history! We would depart from class analysis and fall into the quagmire of historical idealism in the study of classical literature if we, taken in by Hu Shih, "refrain from finding out who were the enemies who oppressed the Chinese people in history and if there was anything worthy of praise in surrendering to and serving these enemies." ("Importance Should Be Attached to the Discussion on the Film Story of Wu Hsün") By peddling the experimental and scholastic method of verification in his verification of Water Margin, Hu Shih intended to induce people to refrain from making a class analysis of the general trend of Water Margin and to play up certain fragments or phrases. Lu Hsün said: in literary reviews, the "easiest way to lead the reader astray is to 'quote out of context.' Often it is an embroidery torn from a dress, exaggerated or misrepresented, and described as a thing outside a thing, free from dust or dirt. The reader, without seeing the whole, is so dazzled that he loses all his senses." ("Subject Unfixed" Draft, Ch'iehchieht'ing Miscellaneous Essays, Part II) The various erroneous viewpoints that were engendered from past commentaries on Water Margin invariably resulted from departing from the Marxist class analysis and sinking into historical idealism. We should seriously sum up and draw on this experience.

Barely a year after the May 5 Movement, the anti-emperor, anti-feudal revolutionary tides were rolling forward. Why did Hu Shih suddenly develop a "nostalgia" for Water Margin, undertake a verification of it and loudly praise it? This has profound class and social root-causes.

Chairman Mao points out: The landlord and comprador classes are counter-revolutionary classes that "represent the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hinder the development of the productive forces in China." ("An Analysis of Various Classes in Chinese Society") Hu Shih was precisely such a representative figure of these reactionary forces in the ideological and cultural circles. Born into a feudal bureaucrat-landlord family, he inherited in his childhood the legacy of the Ch'eng-Chu school of rationalism from his bureaucrat father. When he grew up, he was deeply influenced by imperialist culture and became a comprador man of letters and lackey of foreigners. His reactionary class stand determined that his thoughts, words and deeds were totally incompatible with the aim of the Chinese revolution. He vigorously opposed the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle at home and frantically trumpeted national capitulationism and national betrayal abroad. A capitulationist who mixed with the May 4 New Cultural Movement, Hu Shih was no better than

a stray running dog. All he wanted was a master, be it the Ch'ing emperor, the feudal warlord or the Kuomintang reactionary. In the capacity of a doctor of philosophy, he had an audience with the former defunct Ch'ing emperor and addressed him "Your Majesty." His relations with the northern warlords were so dirty that they could not be revealed. His "Verification of Water Margin" was actually a statement in which he disclosed his intents and offered his strategy to the northern warlords. Later, he surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek, the dictator and enemy of the people, offering to write in the interests of the Kuomintang reactionaries. It can be seen that Hu Shih's propagation of Water Margin's capitulationism and his eulogy of Sung Chiang the capitulationist were entirely based on "mutual pity"--one lackey praising another!

The years in which Hu Shih began his verification of Water Margin were years which marked the great change of the Chinese revolution from the old democratic revolution to the new democratic revolution. The salvoes of the October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to China, and the Chinese working class already mounted the historical stage as an independent political force. The rapid spread of Marxism-Leninism in China, combined with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, pushed the vigorous development of the Chinese revolution. In this important historical juncture, Hu Shih, a "disciple of experimentalism," could "no longer stand and endure it," and "pledged to involve himself in politics." ("My Detour") With a view to stopping the spread of Marxism-Leninism in China, he loudly yelled that we must "study more problems and talk less about isms." Gnawing his teeth, he cried aloud that "he is not a good fellow who is led by the nose by Marx, Lenin and Stalin." ("Introducing My Thought") While posing as a "scholar," he assumed the airs as a "mentor of young people," saying he wanted to "give people the golden needle." ("Verification of the Story of Good Marriages") He said he wanted to teach people "some techniques for self-protection." ("Introducing My Thought") These hysterical barks could not block the wheel of history from rolling forward, but only exposed his reactionary features of hostility to the proletarian revolution and to Marxism-Leninism. His verification of Water Margin was a black specimen of "studying more problems and talking less about isms." His so-called "golden needle" referred to his experimental method of verification, taking the verification of such novels as Water Margin as an example. His "techniques for self-protection" was his counter-revolutionary theory which found revolution guilty and capitulation justified as preached through his "verification." Hitting the nail on the head, Lu Hsün exposed this "verification" game as this: "to make a big antique out of the young people and boys" for the "appreciation" of the reactionaries (K'aihua Collection: Suddenly Think of (6)), to make "people, especially the youth, follow the rules, neither arrogant nor flippant," (Sequel to K'aihua Collection. Some Comparison) so that they might follow Hu Shih, this "reckless" teacher. This analysis by Lu Hsün was very correct. In the violent storms of class struggle, he who was deceived by Hu Shih estranged himself from the revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people. However, the Chinese people were awakening day by day under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. The victory of the Chinese people's revolution has long ago dashed Hu Shih's counter-revolutionary dream.

When poisonous weeds are uprooted, they may be used to fertilize the fields. At present, to unfold the criticism of Water Margin in conjunction with that of Hu Shih's verification of Water Margin in accordance with Chairman Mao's directives not only will help us further expose the essence of the capitulationist line advocated by Water Margin and thoroughly eliminate the reactionary influence of Hu Shih's bourgeois idealism. It will also help us raise our consciousness in studying Marxism and upholding historical materialism, in combating and preventing revisionism, and in further strengthening the all-round dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the sphere of the superstructure.

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Look at the Essence Through the Appearance

- Comment on Sung Chiang's struggle against Kao Ch'iu

by

Fang Ching (方荆)

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People who look over the book Water Margin can perceive that Sung Chiang, who advertises he is "carrying out the wish of Heaven" when he takes temporary refuge in the body of water, confronts Kao Ch'iu, a senior courtier living on the fat of the land, alternately with hostile outbursts and conciliatory gestures bordering on servility. Because the strife between the two at times appears rather violent, some people tend to have the false impression that Kao Ch'iu is wicked and that Sung Chiang who struggles against him may be considered not bad. How should we view this question in perspective? What after all is the nature of the Sung-Kao struggle? Chairman Mao has recently pointed out: "Sung Chiang's struggle against Kao Ch'iu is a struggle waged by one faction against another within the landlord class." Chairman Mao's instruction has enabled us to clearly discern that the Sung-Kao strife is the struggle between two factions within the landlord class, not a life-and-death struggle between two major antagonistic classes--the peasantry and the landowners. To further make clear the nature of these two factions and the causes of their contentions, we must proceed from the analysis made by Chairman Mao.

In feudal society factions and cliques within the landlord class constantly struggled against one another. This reflected the clash of interests between different political forces within this class. With the further aggravation of the principal contradiction in feudal society, that is, the contradiction between the peasantry and the landlord class, peasant uprisings continued to pound at the landlord class administration. This placed the landlord class rule in a state of instability. As a result, its inherent reactionary and decadent nature that was discernible in its declining stage began to manifest itself and this tended to bring about a sharpening of the strife between different factions and cliques within the landlord class. Factional strife within the landlord class assumed different forms under different conditions, one of frequent occurrence being the "dogfight" type of struggle carried out by the reactionary factions of the landlord class for the purpose of grabbing power and wealth. One example is the struggle waged between the faction represented by Sung Chiang without power in the imperial court and the other faction in power represented by Kao Ch'iu toward the end of the Northern Sung period.

Both Sung and Kao were careerists and conspirators, aspiring to high office and great wealth. The inherent nature of the exploiting classes determined their characteristic approach: as long as their desire to get ahead could be fulfilled they would stop at nothing, by fair means or foul and using pretense and reaction as an ideological weapon. However, Sung is to be distinguished from Kao in terms of their social positions and political backgrounds. One was a high official in the court wielding immense power, the other a minor official at the beck and call of others. By the time Kao rose to great power and was wallowing in wealth at the height

of his carrer, Sung remained in relative oblivion in terms of either power or wealth, "like a ferocious tiger lying in the wilderness, its claws drawn and teeth concealed." As the representative of one faction within the landlord class, Sung was naturally not reconciled to this and would therefore try every means to achieve his "soaring ambitions." As regards Kao, he would invariably exclude and strike at the Sung faction which stood in his way, for the purpose of safeguarding his own vested interests. In these circumstances, the "dogfight" between Sung and Kao became something inevitable. Sung joined the peasant revolutionary contingent, usurped the leadership of the insurgent army and accepted the amnesty and enlistment offer in order to use this as "capital" for struggling against the Kao faction so he could have his share in the redistribution of power and wealth in the feudal imperial court. The Sung-Kao contention therefore amply gives expression to the reactionary and decadent nature of the feudal landlord class in its declining period.

The Sung-Kao strife had nothing to do at all with any attempt to expose and shake the dark rule of the Sung imperial court nor was related to some progressive measures in the political, economic and military, scientific, and cultural fields. Ideologically speaking, moreover, it was permeated with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. This strife, therefore, was quite different from the Confucian-Legalist struggle in history. It was neither a struggle between two political lines nor one between the reformers and diehards within the landlord class. It was at best a struggle between two groups of Confucian devotees, an ugly farce in which lackeys within the landlord class vied with each other in toadying on their masters. In terms of its content, form and ending, this kind of struggle exactly illustrates that essentially they all belonged to the reactionary landlord class.

Chairman Mao says: "When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing: this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis." ("A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire") By concretely analyzing Sung Chiang and Kao Ch'iu with the Marxist method of class analysis, it will not be difficult for us to perceive that the two were essentially the same in stubbornly and persistently taking the stand of the landlord class, wholeheartedly upholding the rule of the imperial court, frenziedly suppressing the peasant uprisings and willingly serving as the lackeys of the reactionary landlord class administration.

Pledging loyalty to the emperor, going all out to defend the feudal system and the existing order and closely identifying their own destiny with the feudal government of the reactionary landlord class--this basically determined the essential similarity between Sung Chiang and Kao Ch'iu. The rapid rise of Kao from a humble origin to eminence is entirely due to Sung Hui Tsung's "appreciation." Therefore, it is quite natural for Kao to toady on the emperor and do what he could to serve the latter. The novel portrays Kao as a ruthless and overbearing person living on the fat of the land. It gives the impression that he will do his utmost to

uphold the feudal system and its existing order, a running dog needed by the Sung court. But Sung proves himself not a bit inferior to Kao in respect of serving the emperor and upholding feudal rule. This is mainly expressed in Sung's political program of "carrying out the wish of Heaven," which is "against corrupt officials only, but not the emperor." In Sung's opinion, Chao Chi is a very good emperor, "most sacred and most enlightened," and therefore he must not be opposed at all. He considers Kao Ch'iu and other corrupt officials as bad and "treacherous" courtiers, who "deceive the monarch" and "bring about disorder to the country." They not only infringe on the emperor's highest interests but also obstruct "loyal and just," "benevolent and virtuous" people like Sung from "rendering meritorious services to the country and leaving their fine names in history." For this reason, they must be opposed. If the emperor is also opposed, isn't it tantamount to disowning one's parents and renouncing one's bright prospects in seeking "promotion in public office"? Therefore, Sung repeatedly makes clear his "undivided allegiance" to the Sung court. He remains "loyal" even when he is dying of poisoned wine. He even poisons Li K'uei to death to prevent him rising in revolt against the court. There is no possible explanation for Sung's unremitting devotion to the feudal ruler other than the fact that he willingly identifies his destiny with the cause of consolidating the landlord class government. No wonder the supreme ruler of the feudal court expresses unreserved appreciation for this servile display of loyalty, praising Sung for his "consistent manifestations of loyalty, justice and benevolence and unshakable determination to surrender and render meritorious services." An episode at the end of the 120-chapter edition of Water Margin about "Emperor Hui Tsung's visit to Liangshan Mountain in his dreams" depicts Sung after his death as giving vent to his grievances through a dream. After knowing the truth, Hui Tsung bitterly denounces Kao Ch'iu and Yang Chien for murdering Sung and brands them as "evil officials who wrecked the nation and ruined the people." He confers a title on Sung Chiang and decrees that shrines be built to honor him. This shows that though both Sung and Kao are loyal to the emperor, the latter prefers Sung and lackeys like him.

Proceeding from their devotion to feudal reactionary rule, both Sung and Kao are bitterly hostile to the peasant revolution and do their utmost to put out the fierce flames. Out of their counter-revolutionary landlord class instinct, Kao Ch'iu, Ts'ai Ching and T'ung Kuan are keenly aware of the lurking danger of the seething peasant revolution movement. They feel that if this "thorn in the side" were not removed the consequences would be unthinkable. Their endorsement of armed encirclement and suppression of the insurgent forces illustrates that Kao and his confederates are the peasantry's sworn foes, the diehards of the reactionary landlord class ruling clique. And Sung Chiang, as a landowner and official leading a comfortable life, also opposes the peasant uprising at the outset. While later he goes to the mountain by force of circumstances, this does not mean that he turns against his own class. Rather, he practices revisionism so he can infiltrate into the peasant revolutionary contingent to disintegrate the insurgent army. As expected, Sung schemes to usurp the leadership and changes the insurgent army's correct line into one in favor of revisionism and capitulation. Thus the fine prospect of the Liangshan peasant uprising is ruined. Sung Chiang achieves in a relatively short time what Kao Ch'iu and T'ung Kuan fail to accomplish with tens of thousands

of troops. In fighting "brigands" who do not "carry out the wish of Heaven" for the reactionary government, Sung displays particular enthusiasm. In a battle to put down the Fang La uprising, he slaughters more than 20,000 men, a significant contribution to the Sung court. Judging from the course of actions taken by Sung against the peasant uprising--from opposing and betraying to frenziedly suppressing it--does he do any worse than Kao Ch'iu? Is there any difference in the underlying counter-revolutionary character and motives? Identifying Sung with the landlord class reactionaries is not doing him any injustice.

Ideologically, both Sung and Kao are rooted in decadent and reactionary Confucianism. Both try to use treachery to benumb and dissipate the people's will to resist and to maintain the reactionary rule of the feudal court. People like Kao Ch'iu fill high posts by preaching the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and through intrigues and machinations. In order to retain their positions of power and deceive the people, from beginning to end they advertise themselves as adherents to the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, occasionally coming to such false talk as exhortations on "filial piety and loyalty." In numerous instances the novel heaps praises on Sung, who "studied Confucian classics in his childhood," saying that he peddles the Confucian ideas of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence and righteousness. His references to "loyalty and justice," "the futility of living in this world if one is disloyal and unfilial," "never doing any harm to loyal ministers, martyrs, pious sons, worthy grandsons, righteous men and chaste women," and "being a loyal and just man not recognized in the four seas" reveal only the hideous and reactionary features of a downright Confucian hypocrite. Sung uses "loyalty and justice" to disintegrate "assembly for justice." He unfurls the yellowish banner of "carrying out the wish of Heaven" to declare his allegiance to the Sung court through his avowed espousal of Confucian teachings. He confesses his dedication to practicing the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius for the sake of the "sage-king" and nothing else! This shows that both Sung and Kao are out-and-out Confucian devotees.

What is particularly noteworthy is that the Water Margin author leads the peasant revolution onto the orbit as expected by the landlord class for the purpose of embellishing and extolling Sung Chiang the capitulationist. Consequently, he spares no effort to cover up the class character common to Sung and Kao and the Sung-Kao strife as a factional struggle within the landlord class, and to obliterate the irreconcilable nature of the struggle between the peasantry and the landlord class. Instead, he equates the Sung-Kao struggle with the struggle between the "loyal officials" and "evil officials," a struggle that is finally resolved through the emperor's "arbitration." This reveals the author's extremely sinister motives.

Commenting on the book Water Margin, which serves as teaching material by negative example, and criticizing the capitulationist line it preaches will help us recognize the features of revisionists, particularly the class features of revisionists like Sung Chiang who are engaged in strivings with another faction. Lenin pointed out: "Opportunists are bourgeois elements who are against the proletarian revolution." Sung is a hundred percent reactionary landlord element who opposes the peasant revolution. Both he and Kao Ch'iu are hangmen bent on stamping out peasant uprisings.

While one does so openly, the other carries out sabotage by sneaking into the revolutionary ranks. Sung Chiang is thus more deceptive and dangerous than Kao.

One of the main reasons why for a long time the true features of Sung Chiang and the nature of his struggle against Kao Ch'iu have not been recognized by many people is that they have not applied the Marxist method of class analysis to perceive the essence through the appearance. As a result, they have not been able to arrive at a correct conclusion. In studying Chairman Mao's important instruction on the question relating to Water Margin, we should further make clear the essence of Sung Chiang as a capitulationist. We should persist in applying the method of class analysis in observing various problems, so that we can remain clear-headed and possess greater discerning power in face of complicated and intricate things.

* * *

Is There Such a "Law" for Peasant Uprisings?

by

Yang K'uan (杨宽)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

Chairman Mao points out: "Water Margin is against corrupt officials only, but not the emperor." This is the essence of the capitulationist line advocated by Water Margin. Some people, in defense of Water Margin, which is teaching material by negative example, think that not opposing the emperor reflects the "law" of peasant uprisings in feudal society. It is essential to make this vital question of principle clear.

Is not opposing the emperor the "law" of peasant uprisings? Take the Liangshan peasant uprising in Water Margin for example. Under Ch'ao Kai's leadership, the peasant army pursues a revolutionary line of opposing not only corrupt officials but also the emperor, demonstrating the wish to set up a peasant revolutionary government. Although the Water Margin author tries hard to conceal this point, still it cannot be negated. Ch'ao Kai's former nickname is "Heavenly King of Iron." (Anecdocts of Hsüan Ho) "Iron" means he is as tough as iron. To deprecate Ch'ao Kai's revolutionary image, Water Margin changes his nickname into "Daring Heavenly King" to obliterate the truth that he is called "Heavenly King of Iron." However, Water Margin still lets the cat out of the bag when it says: "Lest he dares to proclaim himself as king, he dies early; but Sung Chiang appeals to the multitudes to defend justice and reigns over the stronghold as leader." What is meant by "daring to proclaim himself as king"? It means daring to challenge the feudal emperor and declare oneself as king. By calling himself "Heavenly King of Iron," Ch'ao Kai wants to do the same thing as Fang La: to establish a peasant government opposing the Sung Court and to direct the spearhead of struggle at the supreme feudal ruler. This reflects the firm fighting will of the revolutionaries within the Liangshan insurgent ranks. But to preach the capitulationist line, Water Margin "excludes Ch'ao Kai from the 108 people," and causes him to "die early." The motive cannot be more vicious.

Unlike Ch'ao Kai, who "dares to proclaim himself as king," Sung Chiang calls himself the "justice protector" by "appealing to the multitude to defend justice." There is a twofold purpose here: One is to call on the Liangshan insurgent peasants to submit to his feudal patriarchical rule and join him in achieving "both loyalty and justice." By promoting "justice to help one's family and nation," Sung aims at "serving the state loyally." The other purpose is to show his resolve to serve the emperor as a lackey to the death. "Justice protection officer" /Pao-i Lang/ was originally the title of a low ranking military officer by the side of the Sung emperor. Military officials in the Sung Court were divided into 52 classes, "Pao-i Lang" being the 49th. Such a military official was no more than the emperor's bodyguard. As class contradictions were extremely acute at that time and the throne was tottering, Sung Hui Tsung did his best to encourage his ministers to show "loyalty and justice" to him. In 1112 A.D. (2nd year of Cheng Ho), Sung Hui Tsung changed the titles of government officials and added the words "loyalty" and "justice" to the titles of many military

officers serving as his bodyguards, so that they might serve him with "both loyalty and justice." By calling himself "Pao-i Lang" while being the "head of the stronghold," Sung merely wanted to show that "while his body is in the water margin, his heart is with the imperial court," in effect turning the Liangshan insurgent forces into "palace troops" protecting the emperor. The feudal ruling class of course highly approved of this. In the closing years of Southern Sung, Kung K'ai's "Ode to Sung Chiang and 35 Others" warmly lauds Sung Chiang in these words: "He calls himself not a king but a justice protector." It also praises him as an "intelligent, outstanding and upright man following the right track." Sing, who "does not call himself king," naturally does not oppose the emperor. By calling himself "Pao-i Lang," he is of course "waiting for an offer of amnesty and enlistment from the imperial court." This, in the view of the landlord class, is certainly "following the right track." What "track"? Of course, the "track" laid by the Sung emperor, that is, the "track" leading to capitulation.

History is replete with cases in which when certain peasants rose in revolt, they invariably first directed the spearhead against their local officials and landlords. They did not immediately raise the demand for overthrowing the feudal dynasty, and their banner of opposing the emperor was not clearcut. This suggested that the insurgent peasants had a process of gradually deepening their knowledge on the question of dealing with the state political structure. However, provided that a peasant uprising did not fail or degenerate within a short period, then, with the development of the revolutionary situation, it would in the end embark on the road toward opposing the feudal autocratic administration and its representative--the emperor, and clearly put forth a political program for opposing the emperor. In Chinese feudal society, no peasant revolution could be described as a genuine one if it did not oppose the emperor. A political program of opposing only corrupt officials and not the emperor could only satisfy the needs of one faction in its fight against another within the landlord class. If a peasant army proposed and carried out such a political program, it could in the end do nothing else but to accept amnesty and enlistment. For example, Chang Ying in Eastern Han rebelled in Kuangling (now Yangchou, Kiangsu). Persisting for over a decade, he developed his army to several tens of thousands of men and killed the governor. But he opposed corrupt officials only and not the emperor, and asserted that he "could not gain any access to the royal house" only because he was "on several occasions wrongly accused by the Erh-ch'ien-shih /two thousand shih of grain received by the governor as his remuneration/," forcing him to revolt. When the new governor Chang Kang assumed office, he personally visited him and offered him amnesty and enlistment. While acknowledging the mistakes of the former goveror and dwelling on the "benevolence and holiness of the Son of Heaven," he dangled the bait of an official appointment and preached the Confucian concept of loyalty and filial piety. In the end, Chang Ying capitulated to the feudal court. Therefore, opposing corrupt officials only and not the emperor could only be described as a political program of the capitulationists within the peasant insurgent army.

In Water Margin Sung Chiang opposes corrupt officials only and not the emperor, and finally accepts amnesty and enlistment. The moment Ch'ao Kai dies, Sung usurps the leadership and adopts double-dealing tactics in tampering with Ch'ao's revolutionary line. On the one hand, Sung still reveres the "dead" Ch'ao Kai as "Heavenly King" and installs his memorial tablet at Liangshan. On the other, he changes Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang and tosses out the slogan "carry out Heaven's wish." Actually, the "Heavenly King" at this time is not Ch'ao Kai, but Sung Hui Tsung, who, Sung hopes, would "issue a decree offering amnesty and enlistment." From then on, Sung not only addresses the Sung emperor as "Heavenly King" but also describes the offer of amnesty and enlistment from the imperial court as an opportunity to "see the light of the day again." When he meets court emissaries, he hastily kneels and knocks his head on the ground, imploring for amnesty and enlistment, so that he might "go to the Capital and work for the state." At the oath-taking ceremony attended by the 108 people, Sung Chiang claims that what he does "corresponds to the wish of Heaven above and conforms to the will of the people below," taking "preserving both loyalty and justice and winning merit for the state" as the goal of "carrying out Heaven's wish." Here, Sung plays the revisionist tricks and changes the anti-emperor revolutionary line into a capitulationist line of "waiting only for the offer of amnesty and enlistment from the imperial court." Then, Sung moves step by step to carry out this capitulationist line, eventually accepts the offer of amnesty and enlistment, and goes off to fight Fang La, thus becoming an accomplice of the landlord class in suppressing other peasant insurgent armies. Not opposing the emperor is exactly the essence of the capitulationist line, and how can this be described as the "law" of peasant uprisings?

In order to turn opposing corrupt officials only and not the emperor into the "law" of peasant uprisings, some people advance this argument; peasants in feudal society could not possibly understand that they were oppressed by the feudal social system as a whole and not by individuals, and so they opposed individual corrupt officials only and supported the "good emperor." This argument cannot stand. Peasant uprisings in feudal society began spontaneously, and of course they still could not understand that feudal oppression was caused by the feudal system as a whole, nor could they chart their policies and tactics for struggle on the basis of scientific class analysis. However, suffering from prolonged brutal oppression and exploitation and in the continuing violent class struggle, they could not fail to see the social injustice caused by inequality between the rich and the poor, and demand a change of the status quo. Peasant uprisings in Sung raised the slogan "remove the distinctions between the noble and the mean, rich and poor." Although they expressed social relations only in terms of wealth and poverty, their targets were aristocrats and men of wealth, in effect opposing the entire landlord class. How, then, could they be said to oppose individual corrupt officials only?

In order to prove that not opposing the emperor was the "law" of peasant uprisings, some people cited some cases in which peasant insurgent armies enthroned descendants of former emperors, and leaders of peasant armies impersonated descendants of former emperors, and used these as proof that in our country peasant uprisings supported "good emperors." This theory must be concretely analyzed. Among the several hundred big and small peasant uprisings in our country, peasant leaders who enthroned or impersonated descendants of former emperors represented only a small

minority. This was a kind of struggle tactic which they used to oppose the supreme feudal ruler in power at that time. The reason why they did so was explained by the specific environment of class struggle at the time. For example, Chao Kao and the Second Emperor of Ch'in murdered the crown prince Fu Su, upsurped power, and restored the old order. So, Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang called for support in the name of Fu Su, and this had the effect of dividing and disintegrating the royal forces in toppling the rule of the Second Emperor of Ch'in. For another example, when Wang Mang usurped the political power of Western Han and restored the old order, the Lulin and Ch'ihmei Armies put a member of the royal house of Liu on the throne as a means of fighting Wang Mang. The Yüan and Ch'ing dynasties were founded by the feudal aristocrats of minority nationalities after overthrowing the Sung and Ming dynasties, and so the peasant armies in the Yüan and Ch'ing dynasties impersonated descendants of Sung and Ming emperors as a tactic of struggle. All this was a kind of strategy used to oppose the emperor. How could it be used as proof that peasant uprisings did not oppose the emperor?

Chairman Mao points out: "The emperor reigned supreme in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed forces, the law courts, the treasury and state granaires in all parts of the country and relying on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal rule." ("The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party") In Chinese feudal society, the emperor was the chieftain of the feudal administration, the general political representative of the landlord class, and the biggest sworn enemy of the peasantry. From the emperor to the officials to the landlords, they weighed on the peasants like huge mountains. Any sporadic resistance from the peasants would be most brutally suppressed. If the peasants wanted to make revolution, resist and overthrow the dark rule of the landlord class, they had to overthrow the organ of power maintaining this dark rule--the feudal court, and direct the spearhead of struggle against the emperor.

In promoting the capitulationist line of opposing corrupt officials only and not the emperor, Water Margin stands against the glorious traditions of Chinese peasant revolutions. Since the Ch'in and Han dynasties, peasant uprisings in Chinese feudal society were aimed at ultimately overthrowing the feudal court and founding the peasants' own revolutionary government, and were all opposed to the emperor. "Most dynastic changes came about as a result of such peasant uprisings." Almost none of the several powerful feudal dynasties were not overthrown by peasant wars. Judging by the strategic dispositions of successive peasant wars, the peasant insurgent armies invariably took the capitals of feudal empires, where the emperor resided, as the prime or ultimate targets of attack. From Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang who ordered Chou Wen to lead a western expedition to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan ordering Lin Feng-hsiang to lead a northern expedition, this strategic policy was adopted. It was because they adopted this correct strategy that many peasant uprisings in history succeeded in overthrowing or defeating the feudal government at that time and seized political power by violence. As peasants did not represent new productive forces and relations of production and as it was impossible for them to found a new social system, so, before peasant uprisings were given the correct leadership of the newly emerging proletariat

and its political party, the fruit of revolution still was eventually usurped by the landlord class. However, no one can deny the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry in challenging the reactionary rule of the landlord class and the great historical exploits of peasant wars.

Dictated by the need of practical struggle, peasant uprising leaders in history often founded peasant regimes in confrontation with the feudal courts while organizing peasant armies to wage armed struggles. Successive peasant wars in our country invariably led to the establishment of peasant regimes. The moment the insurgents led by Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang captured Ch'en county (now Huaiyang, Honan), they founded the "Chang Ch'u" peasant regime. Shortly after Hung Hsiu-ch'üan revolted in Chint'ien, he founded the peasant regime known as T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo. The establishment of peasant regimes was aimed at overthrowing the feudal dynasties, and invariably peasant wars developed from small to big. In China, not only nationwide, large-scale peasant wars, but also regional, small-scale peasant uprisings called for the overthrow of feudal regimes and the founding of peasant regimes. It was this revolutionary demand that enabled the peasant masses to be further mobilized and organized to wage a bigger peasant war. Take peasant uprisings in the Sung period for example. Wang Hsiao-po and Li Shun revolted in the early years of Northern Sung, with Li declaring himself "the Great King of Shu" with the emperor's title known as "Ying Yün". Fang La rebelled toward the end of Northern Sung, calling himself "Holy Lord," with the emperor's title known as "Yung Lo". Chung Hsiang and Yang Mo revolted in the early years of Southern Sung, with Chung calling himself the "King of Ch'u" with the emperor's title of "T'ien Tsai" and Yang Mo calling himself the "Great and Sacred Heavenly King." By installing themselves as kings, they all aimed to sieze the political power of the Sung Dynasty.

In Water Margin, Sung Chiang, Wang Ch'ing, T'ien Hu and Fang La are described as "four big brigands" (of whom, T'ien Hu and Wang Ch'ing are fabricated by the author). T'ien Hu, Wang Ch'ing and Fang La "occupied prefectures and counties and assumed emperors' titles." They set up peasant regimes in the lands they held, determined to seize power from the Sung Court. However, Sung Chiang pursued an entirely different line--not opposing the emperor, not assuming an emperor's title, and not taking prefectures and counties. Arriving at Liangshan to offer amnesty and enlistment on the order of Sung Hui Tsung, General Su explained that the offer was extended because, "as the Son of Heaven has heard, the Liangshan people take justice as the cause and do not harrass prefectures and counties nor harm the innocent population but profess to carry out the wish of Heaven." Therefore, as can be seen from Water Margin, whether or not to oppose the emperor is the watershed separating the peasant revolutionary line from the capitulationist line.

The essence of Water Margin, which is teaching material by negative example, is capitulation, and the reason for capitulation is not opposing the emperor. To say that not opposing the emperor is the "law" of peasant uprisings is to say that it is an inexorable "law" that insurgent peasants head toward capitulation. This then will obliterate the sharp opposition between the peasantry and the landlord class and the principled struggle between those who adhere to the peasant revolutionary line and those who push the capitulationist line. The essence of this theory of class reconciliation is

to negate the law that class struggle is the motive power for historical development and to substitute class cooperation for class struggle. Instead of using class struggle to overthrow the reactionary feudal rulers who should be overthrown, they surrender to these reactionary feudal rulers. The theory of class reconciliation has all along been the ideological basis of revisionism and capitulationism. Successive revisionist ringleaders have all been capitulationists fanatically trumpeting the theory of class reconciliation. This is true with Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Today, we must thoroughly criticize this theory of class reconciliation and let Water Margin, which is teaching material by negative example, fully play its role, "so that all people can recognize capitulationists." This is of tremendous and far-reaching significance for us in upholding Marxism, opposing revisionism and persisting in Chairman Mao's revolutionary line now and in the future.

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"Yielding Position to Men of Virtue" and Capitulation

by

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When we are reading Water Margin, teaching material by negative example, a question attracts our attention. We see that after his arrival at Liangshan Mountain, Sung Chiang repeatedly tries to offer his own "position" to somebody else as the "stronghold master." Are there any mysteries about this?

To answer this question, let us first see how Sung does this on a number of occasions.

The first time: Hu Yen-cho, "commander of the army" sent by Kao Ch'iu to attack and suppress the Liangshan insurgent army is captured alive by the Liangshan heroes. Sung Chiang immediately shouts to someone to "untie him quickly" and tells Hu, "I, Sung, would like to yield my position to you, General."

The second time: Sung sends some people to induce Lu Chün-i, a man of means in Tamingfu of Peking, to come to the mountain. The moment Lu sets foot at Chung-i T'ang, Sung wants to make him "master of the stronghold."

The third time: Kuan Sheng, "commander of the force" sent by Ts'ai Ching to suppress the Liangshan peasant uprisings, confronts Sung in the battlefield. Sung says: "If I could get this man, I would yield my position to him."

The fourth and fifth times: Sung insists on yielding his position to Lu Chün-i as "the master of the stronghold."

The sixth time: The Liangshan heroes capture alive Tung P'ing, "Military Supervisor" of Tungp'ingfu. Sung immediately wants to yield his position to him as "master of the stronghold."

In this process, we see clearly that the several "men of virtue" to whom Sung wants to yield his position are either wealthy landlords or court military officers. None of them is a genuine leader of the insurgent army. Li K'uei and the three Juan brothers have all worked hard for the cause of the Liangshan peasant uprising, yet Sung, instead of wanting to yield his position to them, represses and excludes them in every way possible, and he even wants to put Li K'uei to death. But Hu Yen-cho, Kuan Sheng and Tung P'ing have not contributed anything to the Liangshan revolutionary cause, and are all reactionary generals leading troops to suppress the insurgent army. Yet, in Sung's eyes, these are "men of virtue." As a matter of fact, this is not surprising at all. In a class society, historically different classes have different standards in understanding

the "worthy." How can Sung, an agent of the landlord class who advocates "loyalty and justice," refrain from taking those loyal ministers and generals who are hostile to the peasant revolution and do their best to safeguard feudal rule as "men of virtue"? Here we cannot help recalling that when Sung Chiang first arrives at the mountain, he says this about the seating order for Liangshan leaders: "Let's decide it in the future when all of us have done something." The fact of "yielding position to men of virtue" on these occasions fully shows that "doing something" is nothing but a lie to cheat the other leaders.

On the surface, Sung seems to be very sincere in "yielding position to men of virtue." But a careful look reveals that he is not. Take the case of Tung P'ing. Before this, Sung has three times offered his position to Lu Chün-i, but the latter refuses to accept. So Sung hits upon an idea. He proposes to attack Tungp'ingfu and Tungch'angfu simultaneously, and let the one who wins first be the master of the stronghold. However, when the battle fought by Lu is still undecided, Sung wants to make Tung P'ing "master of the stronghold." Doesn't he contradict himself? This contradiction reflects Sung's ruffled state of mind. On the one hand, to meet the needs of capitulation, Sung really wants to hand over the leadership of the peasant insurgent army to those landlords and generals who surrender--people who "live and die as the loyal subjects of Sung." This may dispel the suspicion of the court toward the insurgent army, thus paving the way for the smooth realization of his reactionary ideals of capitulation and for his ascent to power. That is why sometimes Sung really wants to give away his position. But, on the other hand, the capitulationist Sung is also an ambitionist. He is resolved to "exchange the murky water margin of Shantung for the beauty of the Feng city." In other words, he is to use his "leadership" of the uprising to "bring prosperity to his offspring and leave a good name in history." How can such a chieftain of the revisionist line lightly give away the power he usurped? Therefore, his profession to yield his position to others only reveals his pretense in the end.

Chairman Mao points out: "Sung Chiang capitulates and practices revisionism." It has long been the case that he who practices revisionism will necessarily intrigue and conspire. It is indeed true when Sung Chiang says "I studied classics and history in childhood, and when I grew up I knew how to use wiles." He is well versed in the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and in the treacheries of the reactionary classes. "Yielding position to men of virtue" is precisely one of the expressions of his intrigue and conspiracy. Sung Chiang once shouted at those leaders who opposed his giving away his position: "What do you know?" Yes, how could this "wile" be understood by the leaders of the insurgent army? Sung alone "knows" that his trick of "yielding position to men of virtue" is aimed at killing several birds with one stone.

First, through "yielding position to men of virtue" and advocating "brotherhood," he deceives the insurgents into following him willy-nilly. As we know, the Liangshan insurgents have the greatest respect for "brotherhood," but they fail to see the essence of it. Taking adventage of this, Sung deceives them by a series of tricks including "yielding position to men of virtue." At first glance, how "noble" Sung is! He recruits for the stronghold one more "hero," to whom he would give his top position. And lavishly praised by these "men of virtue" for his "brotherhood" and having

"a true sense of justice," Sung practically becomes the personification of "justice." This makes him even more deceptive, and who dares to come forward to oppose him? Indeed, the revolutionary leaders are opposed to Sung yielding position to others, and on two occasions Li K'uei even wants to "rebel." But the idea has never occurred to them that in terms of class nature, Sung is in no way different from Lu Chün-i and others. So, every time Sung wants to "yield his position to a worthy man," leaders of the insurgent army rise to object, and the "worthy man" to whom Sung wants to "yield" his position lavishly lauds him. This results in Sung's position being consolidated even more.

Second, taking the opportunity of "yielding his position to men of virtue," he creates public opinion for capitulation. As we see, whenever Sung offers to "give away his position," he invariably talks at length about the reasons for capitulation. He would say "let's work together to carry out the wish of Heaven" or "how dare I betray the imperial court?" "I am only waiting for an offer of amnesty and enlistment from the court." After capitulation, "we may be appointed to high positions in the government" and "all our brothers will lead a glorious life." And so on and so forth. This, on the one hand, shows his intent to the emperor and the generals who surrender to him. On the other hand, and this is far more important, he tries to benumb and corrupt the insurgents by repeatedly talking about the meaning of capitulation so as to pave the way for him to push the capitulationist line later.

Third, he makes organizational preparations for capitulation, as it is impossible for him to push the capitulationist line singlehandedly. To realize a certain political line, it must be accompanied by an appropriate organizational line. "Yielding position to men of virtue" is exactly an important aspect of the organizational line Sung rigs up in order to push the capitulationist line. He knows well that if those landlords and generals were given important positions the moment they arrived at the mountain, he would lose the support of his associates. But if he staged a farce of "yielding position" before installing these men in the leadership core, it would be difficult for others to object. Take the case of Lu Chün-i for example. When Lu arrives at the mountain, he is greeted with music and carried in a sedan chair. Upon seeing him, "Sung Chiang is the first to kneel," and the other leaders cannot but follow suit. This raises Lu to an exalted status. After a lot of persuasion, Lu finally takes the No. 2 position. Wu Yung, who has been the second-in-command up till then, has to step down and take a lower position. Now, the truth is clear. One of the purposes of the so-called "yielding position to men of virtue" is merely to make the leaders of the Liangshan insurgent army to yield positions to Sung Chiang's "men of virtue." Through Sung's scheming, when the final seating order is arranged, these "men of virtue" capture all the power, being assigned to the first 15 seats and placed in the leadership core. But the genuine leaders of the insurgent army are pushed back again and again. For instance, the three Juan brothers were leaders of the naval force while Ch'ao Kai held the rein of leadership. But now they are placed in about the 30th positions, and they are no longer the principal leaders of the naval force. When later the composition of the leading group of the insurgent army is changed, more than half of the top men are former generals of the imperial court. As a result, a leadership core with the capitulationist forces holding the ruling position is formed, which is one important reason why Sung succeeds in his plot to capitulate.

From Sung Chiang, we can see the ugly features of all capitulationists. Sung is a very good teacher by negative example. Since anyone who trumpets capitulation within the revolutionary ranks is bound to lose support, a capitulationist is necessarily a double-dealer, forming a faction, appointing his men, exaggerating his importance and organizing forces loyal to him. Isn't Lin Piao also good at this? Today, as we criticize Water Margin and Sung Chiang, we must "enable all people to recognize capitulationists," and this is of tremendous significance for us in combating and preventing revisionism and in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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Some Understanding from Our Criticism of Water Margin

by

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Since Chairman Mao's important instruction concerning criticism of Water Margin was published, both cadres and the masses of our brigade have unfolded criticism of and discussion on the novel. We link the comments on Water Margin with our study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship. Conducting an animated line education in light of reality has enbled the cadres and the masses to further enhance their ability to recognize capitulationists and revisionism and thus heighten their awareness of implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

When we first started commenting on Water Margin, some cadres and commune members were somewhat hazy about the idea. Some, for instance, said that commenting on Water Margin was the concern of literary and art workers and therefore had nothing to do with rustics like peasants. Others were of the opinion that since they had not read the book nor seen the opera, they had no idea about Water Margin and thus they were unconcerned with commenting or not commenting on the book. Some older people who previously had read the book and seen old "Liangshan operas" found they could not immediately get over their old viewpoints. We felt that if these ideological problems were not solved it would be impossible to set the masses in motion and then Chairman Mao's instruction concerning criticism of Water Margin could not be implemented well.

To enable the cadres and the masses to comprehend the spirit of Chairman Mao's instruction and truly understand the meaning of commenting on Water Margin, we employ the method of uniting the backbone with the masses and linking general appeals with specific actions in getting the masses mobilized. First, we printed copies of Chairman Mao's instruction and Lu Hsün's commentaries on Water Margin and distributed them to every household. Then we organized Party and League members and backbone theorists to conduct house-to-house propaganda, using such mass media as blackboard bulletins and wired broadcasting to bring the message home. Moreover, we made use of the evening political school and study classes with several households as a unit and organized the cadres and masses to hold forums on the need to comment on Water Margin. Through study and discussion, everybody came to realize that making comments on Water Margin is not merely concerned with the novel itself but is geared in a broader sense to the education in combating and preventing revisionism so we can enhance our ability to recognize revisionism and capitulationists. This is an important aspect of our study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship. The worker-peasant-soldier masses are the main force in combating and preventing revisionism, their degree of awareness having an important bearing on the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proeltariat. During the great cultural revolution Chairman Mao pointed out: "A line or a viewpoint must be discussed frequently and repeatedly. It won't do to

explain it to a few, it must be made known to the vast revolutionary masses." When Chairman Mao was referring to the need to make clear the question of the proletariat exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, he pointed out with emphasis: "This must be made known to the whole nation." Now, he has instructed us to take Water Margin as a teaching material by negative example so as to "make all people recognize capitulationists." Commenting on Water Margin concerns the line and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is not merely the concern of a few literary and art workers but a matter of prime importance requiring the active participation of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country. Many poor and lower-middle peasants say that for the sake of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and carrying the struggle to combat and prevent revisionism through to the end, we must conscientiously study the theory of proletarian dictatorship and take an active part in the criticism of and discussion on Water Margin.

Once the masses are set in motion, how can we deepen the drive? Chairman Mao has pointed out to us that we should regard the novel as "teaching material by negative example and make all people know capitulationists." This tells us that we should get hold of the book's substance of preaching capitulationism and in the process of commenting on the novel recognize the special features of the capitulationists. Sung Chiang is a teacher by negative example, through whom we should see how capitulationists and revisionists tamper with the revolutionary line and sell out the revolution. Together with the poor and lower-middle peasants, we link our comments on Water Margin with the current struggle and with criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, directing our criticism at their ideological, political and organizational lines as well as counter-revolutionary tactics. We know that the class represented by Sung Chiang in the novel is different from the reactionary class represented by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao and besides he lived under different historical conditions. Nor are their concrete conditions in many ways similar. As capitulationists, however, they have many things in common. They all had sneaked into the revolutionary ranks, conspiring, scheming, recruiting renegades and defectors, tampering with the revolutionary line, and finally selling out the revolution and becoming lackeys of the reactionary classes. In this way, we have further recognized the features of these capitulationists, increased our understanding and resentment of these people. All capitulationists are termites in the revolutionary ranks, and they are often able to accomplish what open enemies cannot achieve. As Lu Hsün pointed out: "The enemy is not to be feared. What is fearful are the termites in one's own camp." Sung Chiang revises Ch'ao Kai's peasant revolutionary line, capitulates to the feudal ruling class and ruins the revolutionary undertaking of the Liangshan peasant insurgent army. This is something the feudal imperial court cannot accomplish with violence. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique alters the Marxist-Leninist line and restores capitalism in the Soviet Union. This likewise is what Hitler in those days wanted but failed to accomplish. In ancient and modern times capitulationists have invariably appeared in the revolutionary camp; this is a reflection of the law of class struggle. In the historical period of socialism, the main danger comes from revisionism, which means capitulationism. As long as classes and class struggle exist at home and imperialism and social-imperialism exist abroad, capitulationists will not become extinct. Therefore, we must constantly heighten our

awareness, enhance our ability to recognize and resist revisionism and capitulationists, and strive to uphold Marxism and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

In commenting on Water Margin, we take into account the reality of the two-line struggle in the rural areas and raise our awareness of implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. In the countryside, it is quite easy for us to find enemies like landlords and rich peasants openly attacking us. However, it is often difficult for us to find those enemies hiding in the revolutionary camp who distort the Party line to achieve their goal, and against whom we must be particularly vigilant. Sung Chiang disintegrates the Liangshan peasant insurgent army by revising Ch'ao Kai's peasant revolutionary line. Similarly, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao sneaked into the revolutionary ranks and undermined the Chinese revolution and construction by interfering with and opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. During the period when the national economy was beset with temporary difficulties, Liu Shao-ch'i stirred up the evil wind of going it alone in the rural areas. Since at that time we did not comprehend very well Chairman Mao's thesis concerning classes, class contradictions and class struggle during the historical period of socialism, we failed to wage a resolute struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line. As a result, the collective economy suffered considerably. When later the Lin Piao anti-Party clique pushed the counter-revolutionary revisionist line, we likewise failed to recognize and resist it because our Marxist-Leninist level was not high. Failing to keep to the Party's basic line, we dared not grasp class struggle. This paved the way for the re-emergence of capitalist tendencies which favored trading at the expense of farming and advocated distributing and eating all. This was detrimental to the collective economy. Only under Chairman Mao's wise leadership and through the great proletarian cultural revolution was the counter-revolutionary conspiracy hatched by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao smashed. Commenting on Water Margin in light of the realities of the class and line struggles in the countryside helps us deepen our understanding of the importance to the revolutionary undertaking of a persistently upheld correct line. Our cadres and masses have all expressed their determination to repudiate revisionism and capitalism and steadfastly keep to the socialist road and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Citing the case of a production team member who waved the banner of "working for the collective" to engage in profiteering, a team cadre said: "In the past I wrongly believed that 'anyone who says he works for the collective can't be wrong,' so I didn't firmly struggle against some capitalist activities. This was harmful to the collective economy. From now on, I shall resolutely carry out the Party's basic line, criticize capitalism, and practice socialism in a big way."

In the course of discussion, we also criticized the ultra-class "justice" preached in the book. The pernicious influence of this idea is relatively deep-rooted in the rural areas since in varying degrees people--regardless of whether they have or have not read Water Margin--have been affected. Some people enter into binding relationships under oath and assert the "justice of sworn brothers" in disregard of classes and the line. The class enemies also take advantage of the avowed "justice" to foster clannish ties in a vain bid to confuse the class front. So we unfolded

criticism of the ultra-class "justice" in relation to these questions and uncovered its reactionary essence. Everybody came to realize that in class society the relations between men are class relations and that Sung Chiang's "justice" is not above classes. Outwardly, Sung Chiang calls all Liangshan people either "elder brother" or "younger brother" and professes "help in weal or woe." However, he bares his true nature when there is divergence on the line. At the "Chrysanthemum Banquet" Sung Chiang calls for accepting the "amnesty and enlistment" offer, but Li K'uei is so strongly against this that Sung wants to put Li to death. Even when Sung is dying he is apprehensive that Li might rise in revolt, so he poisons Li to death as well. What "brotherly affection" is this! The poor and lower-middle peasants pointed out that Sung Chiang's "justice" is aimed at blurring people's class boundary so he could push his capitulationist line. Li K'uei, suffering from his blind belief in "brotherly affection" and "justice," eventually falls victim to Sung's capitulationist line precisely because he failes to recognize Sung's reactionary nature. If we insist only on "brotherly justice" and "neighborhood ties" without keeping to Party principles, criticizing and struggle against capitalist tendencies and doing nothing about criticizing and educating those who are imbued with capitalist tendencies, we shall encourage the growth of the capitalist forces and undermine the revolutionary undertaking of the proletariat. It is unanimously agreed that there is a need to conscientiously study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, draw lessons from history, and strengthen the concept of classes and class struggle. A member of our brigade was previously an ardent admirer of Sung for his "justice," calling Sung "Welcome Rain" and "Justice Protector." Now, his whole idea has been reversed, and he has written an article identifying Sung Chiang as "Welcome Rain to the landlord class" and unmasking him as the faithful lackey of that class.

We have achieved some results in mobilizing the masses to study Chairman Mao's instruction concerning Water Margin, understand the meaning of these comments and unfold criticism of the book in relation to the class and line struggles in our own locality. This illustrates that Water Margin indeed serves as fine teaching material by negative example. We must seriously sum up the experience in the criticism of the book at the preceding stage and combine the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship with comments on the novel so as to bring into play Water Margin's role as indeed teaching material by negative example.

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The Power of the Sea

- comments on the main theme of the film "The Second Spring"

by

Ch'in Hsin (秦 新)

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The vast billowy sea stretches into the horizon, revealing the mighty power of nature. This spectacular scene of the great sea can be seen in the color feature film "The Second Spring." However, what really excites us is another kind of "sea"--the masses of people marching bravely along the road of "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts" as charted by Chairman Mao.

"Storms are not to be feared. It is in the midst of storms that human society has developed." Only those who dare to advance through the chopping waves can truly understand the power of the sea. The hero of the film, Feng T'ao, is one of these people. As a naval fighter, he is deeply in love with the sea of the motherland, and as a fine Party worker, he appreciates even more the power of another kind of "sea" in the motherland.

In that unforgetable first spring of the 1960's, when Feng arrived at Plant 1060 to become secretary of the work committee in charge of building a gunboat, what a tremendous battle was facing him! The new gunboat, "Sea Hawk," produced on a trial basis only after three years of hard work, was badly wrecked in an explosion. The director of the plant, Ch'i Ta-t'ung, was disheartened, and the deputy director of the Gunboat Research Institute, Liu Tzu-ch'iang,lost his confidence. But the chief engineer, P'an Wen, took the opportunity to whip up an evil wind, saying that to find out the cause of the fire on "Sea Hawk" would take at least three years. The workers were burning with anxiety, and Liu Chih-yin, responsible for the design, was angry, but none knew what should be done then.

Where to find a way out? Ch'i Ta-t'ung, who had all along listened to P'an Wen, wanted to find a way out by seeking "aid" from that great power which self-styles itself "socialist" but turns revisionist. But Feng T'ao had too much personal experience of such "aid." In the battle of Tuanshan Reef, he already saw how the main engine of his recently imported gunboat broke down and could not be fixed with spare parts, and the enemies, almost in the net, were allowed to escape. Then, in an exercise, the barrel of a gun on a gunboat given as "aid" exploded, leaving the young fighter, Little Li,in a pool of blood. Now, there was this "flying fish," but on the blueprint three important figures did not fit. These lessons made Feng see that: This kind of "aid" to the recipient country "is not a road but a pit."

There is only one genuine way out, that is, taking the road of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and

relying on our own efforts, and relying on the power of the "sea"--the Chinese working class--to produce our own gunboats.

The power of the "sea" is inexhaustible because "the people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history." The film shows us that the road of "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts," as indicated by Chairman Mao, is the road leading to the concentration of the wisdom and strength of the masses of people, just as the sea seems to converge the demands and hopes of the people in their millions.

This is a simple truth. However, people understand it differently as they differ in their class stands and world outlooks. For such a fine cadre as Feng T'ao, he has not only grasped the truth and translated it into his own action but is also good at turning it into the action of the masses, showing a high level of consciousness of class and line struggles and an outstanding leadership ability. However, people like P'an Wen always stand in opposition to this truth. And people like Ch'i Ta-t'ung can only understand this simple truth after going through repeated struggles in practice. The contradictions and struggles among them reflect the class and line struggles in real life. The film does not evade the contradictions, but, through the approaches taken by Feng T'ao, Liu Chih-yin, Hsia Ch'ang-fa, Ch'i Ta-t'ung and P'an Wen toward the question of trial producing gunboats, fully unfolds the struggle between two kinds of ideas and lines.

To insist on maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts is to insist on relying on the hundreds of millions of revolutionary people under Party leadership. In portraying Feng, the film does not exaggerate his personal heroism but praises him for regarding himself as a drop of water consciously flowing into the "sea"--the masses of people. When Feng entered the plant, the first thing he did was to go among the worker masses to make an investigation and take a hard look at the badly burned "Sea Hawk." When "Sea Hawk" was towed away, he saw from the silence of the masses a strong urge among them--to maintain independence, keep the initiative in our own hands, and rely on our own efforts. It was these revolutionary masses who gave him infinite confidence and courage. Liu Chih-yin said to him in an emotional voice: "How determined you're, political commissar." Feng replied: "No, this determination comes from the comrades building the 'Sea Hawk'." When Old Liang asked Feng what should be done, he answered, smiling: "Let the comrades make the suggestions and then the secretary decides. However good I may be, I can't do things alone."

Well said, indeed! It is the power of the "sea" that gives Feng the determination and helps him find the way to overcome the difficulties. Relying on this strength, Feng resisted Ch'i Ta-t'ung's erroneous line, curbed P'an Wen's interference and sabotage, frustrated Tikhvinskiy's(赫鲁晓夫) conspiracy, and stood firm up against the pressure of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique in tearing up the contracts, withdrawing its experts and withholding the supply of the main engines. He dispelled the icy cold and ushered in the second spring, bright and sunny. From this, we saw not only the greatness of the policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts, but also the power that came from inheriting and promoting the mass line of the

Party. The strength of a person alone is insignificant, but he can do great things by flowing into the "sea" and relying on the strength of the masses. No one can have inexhaustible strength and, like Teng T'ao, concentrate the wisdom of the masses to surmount all difficulties unless he is closely tied to and relies on the masses and becomes one of them. This is true with the relationship between an individual and the masses as it is with that between the Party and the state and the masses. A party will have vitality and a state will have hope and the might to march forward if they are closely tied to the masses and lead them to take the road of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts.

Ch'i Ta-t'ung shows this truth by his negative example. He was Feng's old comrade-in-arms, and the two had fought and suffered in the past. However, in the new environment of struggle, Feng was all for self-reliance, but Ch'i "wavered, became timid and lost confidence." As Feng said, Ch'i had changed. Yes, why did a revolutionary fighter who fought fiercely in the past allow himself to be led by the nose by the modern revisionists now? What was wrong with Ch'i?

Both Ch'i and Feng wanted to build gunboats for the navy, but they differed in their attitude. To build China's own "Sea Hawk," Feng plunged into the "sea" and drew unlimited wisdom and strength from the masses. But Ch'i only hovered around the "sea" without seeing its power. Moreover, he was frightened by the sound of the roaring "sea." His belief that it was impossible to make warships by relying on the vigorous mass movement made him different from Feng. Although, as plant director, he had power to issue orders, he felt he was weak because he estranged himself from the masses. A man of fast action ten years ago, he now felt that the problems were unsolvable. A drop of water cannot survive without the sea. Ch'i wanted to build warships, yet he abandoned the masses and found it impossible to do so. What else could he do? He had no choice but to depend on P'an Wen, who threw himself at the feet of the Soviet revisionists, believing that only those foreign dogmas mastered by P'an, could be called "science." In the end, he pinned his hope on the "system of joint trial manufacture by two families" proposed by the Soviet revisionist experts, taking the "pit" dug by others as a "road" that he must take. This was the inevitable outcome of distrusting the Party and the masses of people, and was also the basic reason for his going astray. So, what Ch'i lost was not only a "Sea Hawk" but also the Party's heirloom, the policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts and the fine tradition of forging close ties with the masses of people.

Such people are bound to magnify the diffuculties in work and fail to see the bright prospects ahead. Let's listen to Ch'i's logic: "Who doesn't want to rely on one's own effort? But don't forget this is a difficult period. We can't have things that we want." In his view, the temporary difficult period was so gloomy that the enthusiasm of the people disappeared and the road of relying on one's efforts was impossible. He who estranges himself from the masses of people is frightened to death by difficulties, depressed and failing to see the essence and the main stream of things and even posing a stumbling block to the revolution.

Can't we use this image of Ch'i as a mirror, so we can see the importance of preserving the flesh-and-blood relationship between cadres and the masses?

Difficulties can cow such cowards as Ch'i Ta-t'ung, but they can only temper such fighters as Feng T'ao. At the crucial moment of the struggle against the political blackmail by the Soviet revisionists, the debate between Feng and Ch'i on how to deal with the difficulties was actually a battle between two kinds of world outlook. The artistic treatment of this climax of the film is charged with revolutionary passion and spirit. When Ch'i asks "what are we going to do?" the scene shifts from the director's office to the shipbuilding platform, where in front of the worker masses, Feng loudly replies to a letter of blackmail from the Soviet revisionists: "We'll do it!" "Let them tear up the agreement! Let them withdraw their specialists! .... Without them, we sure will live a better life." "We the Chinese people have the spine. We won't submit!" How powerful and inspiring these words are. They represent the voice of the Chinese people. They are the sound of the billows of the "sea." Close-up shots show Feng in a state of agitation and resolve, and carry considerable artistic appeal. Through Feng's struggle, the film shows that the Chinese people's spirit of self-reliance is even more important under the new international environment. What Feng said is entirely correct. When we have the wise leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao, the unity in struggle of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country, and the revolutionary line of self-reliance and arduous struggle, is there any difficulty we cannot conquer? "Sea Hawk" took to the skies in the second spring of the 1960's. Victory belonged to Feng, who was afraid of neither difficulties and setbacks nor the enemy's blackmail, it did not belong to Ch'i, timid and incompetent.

Does self-reliance mean that one must try "to be strong on one's own"? Liu Tzu-ch'iang, the institute's deputy director, was not clear on this question. This old intellectual, who spent the greater part of his life in the old society, experienced the imperialist exploitation and oppression. He recognized that it wouldn't do to rely on foreign people in carrying out national defense construction. Therefore, he did not endorse Ch'i's proposal. In loving his country and trying to build China's gunboats, he was no different from Feng. However, influenced by the old society, he mistakenly interpreted self-reliance as meaning that one must shut oneself in a room and try to "be strong by oneself." In the disaster-ridden old China, certain people among bourgeois intellectuals once also raised the slogan "be strong by oneself." But after it was shouted for decades, it still remained an empty slogan, and the reason was that they did not and could not integrate themselves with the workers and peasants. Thus, Liu was no different from Ch'i for both failed to see the strength and creativity of the masses. When Ch'i decided to cancel the production of "Sea Hawk," Liu was fully behind him. Politically, Liu had no blind faith in the Soviet revisionists, and unlike P'an Wen, he did not want to become a lackey and lean over to the revisionist "big brother." On this point, he must be strictly distinguished from P'an. However, in world outlook, he did have blind faith in foreign bourgeois data and books. Since he departed from the Party's correct line and the masses, even when he gave himself a touching name "Tzu-ch'iang" /Be strong by oneself/, he still "was incapable of doing what he wanted" after decades of trying "to be strong by oneself."

As regards such an intellectual, we should naturally unite with him and guide him to plunge into the "sea" of the masses of people and bring his positive role into play. The waves of the "sea" will wash away the old traces on his body and help him break the fetters of bourgeois world outlook and establish the proletarian world outlook. This Feng did. When Liu engrossed himself in paperwork, Feng asked him to go out to breathe the "fresh air." This is a fine scene in the film. As the sun was setting, Liu and Feng were walking toward a slope. At this moment, there was the cheerful sound of the waves and the sound of the lute; both people and the sea were expecting a new flying leap in the thinking of this old patriotic intellectual.

Among intellectuals, Liu Chih-yin was one with a relatively correct understanding of the policy of maintaining independence and taking the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts. A young designer brought up by the Party, she was deeply influenced by the fine socialist system and the militant life in the armed forces. In particular, three years of hard work in designing "Sea Hawk" made her realize that her father's study method of confining himself to books did not fit with the development of the time. She knew that self-reliance did not mean an individual trying to "be strong by oneself." Although "Sea Hawk" was designed by her, she was aware that it was impossible to transform a piece of paper into a warship sailing on the sea without relying on the worker masses. So, when Ch'i decided to tow the badly burned "Sea Hawk" to be stored away, she pleaded with him with tears: "You mustn't do that, Director. If 'Sea Hawk' leaves the plant and the workers, it will be finished!" The basic reason why Liu Chih-yin understood the Party's policy of self-reliance more profoundly than Liu Tzu-ch'iang and why she could not be led astray by P'an's bourgeois idea of fame and gain was that she was living in the "sea" and integrating herself with the worker masses. The course of action taken by Liu Chih-yin shows that only by "becoming one with the masses" can revolutionary intellectuals shine with revolutionary youth and accomplish something. Things always develop in a spiral, and it is normal that in the course of integrating with the workers and peasants, intellectuals may suffer some reverses. When "Sea Hawk" was towed away, she rode home alone on a bicycle, lost in her feelings. Seeing her weakness, Feng encouraged her to stick to the truth when suffering a setback, consciously go back to the worker masses, and turn the truth into the action of the masses. Otherwise, "however high your own confidence, 'Sea Hawk' won't fly." From this small setback suffered by Liu Chih-yin, it can be seen that revolutionary intellectuals must still go through ceaseless ideological struggle and hard tempering before they can consciously take the road of integrating with the masses of workers and peasants.

In the film, P'an Wen is a character trying to fight the power of the "sea." He looked at all things from the reactionary bourgeois stand. He attacked the self-reliance of the masses as "reckless" and "no substitute for science." From the individual standpoint, he interpreted Liu Chih-yin's persistence in building "Sea Hawk" as "trying to achieve fame overnight." The unique bourgeois prejudice caused him to worship foreign things and fawn upon foreigners. Even though the drawings by the Soviet revisionist experts clearly contained errors, he did not care to look at them. Instead he told people: "We must adjust our attitude toward foreign technology."

In his eyes, the moon abroad was rounder than China's and "it is difficult to produce even a spare part which is better than that made abroad." This is a typical example of slavish comprador philosophy. When his extreme individualism and reactionary road of worshipping things foreign and fawning upon foreigners came into conflict with the socialist system and the road of maintaining independence and taking the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts, he instinctively tried to resist and even wanted to offer his drawings of "Sea Hawk" to the Soviet revisionist experts, thereby fully revealing his ugly features as a capitulationist. It is indeed absurd for P'an to think that he could use foreign forces to challenge the "sea." People abroad are also divided into classes. Proletarians and the working people abroad will not accept such a person as P'an . The foreign people on whom P'an wanted to rely were only a small handful of bad people like Khrushchev and Brezhnev. These renegades are merely scums with foreign markings, and they likewise will be swallowed up by the "sea" abroad. Although the film does not tell P'an's ending, it forcefully criticizes his extreme individualism,his slavish comprador philosophy and his reactionary road of going over to the Soviet revisionists. His failure shows by negative example that no one can prevent the Chinese people from taking road of self-reliance.

Self-reliance does not mean rejecting all foreign things, and in the field of science and technology, we must study all things useful to us. But study does not mean dependence or blind faith, nor does it mean bargaining with others in a way harmful to our sovereignty. The film is permeated with the struggle between capitulation and anti-capitulation, closely linking the persistence in taking the road of self-reliance with the struggle to combat and prevent revisionism, the struggle against hegemonism and national capitulationism. This makes its main theme deeper than that of the original script 12 years ago. The film shows the Chinese people's heroism, their daring to fight Soviet revisionism, the erroneous line and capitulationists in a most inspiring manner. The cause of proletarian revolution can only rely on the broad masses of revolutionary people, first and foremost the people in one's own country, to achieve self-reliance through hard work. In the past, we followed this revolutionary line in making revolution and seizing political power. Today, we must follow the same line in building warships, carrying out construction and consolidating political power. In the past, when imperialism and social-imperialism imposed a blockade on us, we had to stick to this line; today, we must still do so when this blockade has been broken. Feng T'ao says rightly: "The imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are not afraid that we may build a 'Sea Hawk.' What they are afraid of is that we will continue following Chairman Mao's revolutionary line of self-reliance and arduous struggle for the next 5, 10, 20 years and forever." From now on, we must stick to this line, whatever the circumstances. In this sense, although the film "The Second Spring" deals with the struggle between the two lines on national defense construction in the early 1960's, its main theme still has and will have a strong militant significance now and in the future.

The film also projects the images of the old, the middle-aged and the young workers representing the strength of the masses of the people. The retired old worker, Old Liang,is a live record of the history of development of the Chinese navy; Hsia Ch'ang-fa is the backbone element persistently taking the road of self-reliance; and Liu Chih-hua is a new

element injected into the ranks of workers. These workers of three separate generations have different backgrounds and experiences. Their gathering together to build "Sea Hawk" provides favorable conditions for the portrayal of the main theme of self-reliance. But it is a pity that the images of the workers of three generations are not as well defined as those of the three intellectuals including Liu Chih-yin. There are a number of reasons for this. Apart from the fact that the author has less feel about the militant life of the worker masses in struggle, the creative composition also leaves something to be desired. The reason why the images of various types of intellectuals in the film are so vivid is that the author dares to write freely about the contradictions and struggle among them in terms of ideology and the road to be taken. If the author also dares to write freely about the workers to make their spiritual features fully revealed in struggle, then, the heroic images of the workers will be richer and more colorful than they are now, and the whole theme will be presented more powerfully.

The course of the birth of "Sea Hawk" in the film represents an epitome of the Chinese proletarian revolution. 45 years ago, the great leader Chairman Mao compared the proletarian revolution at that time to "a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen from the shore." Today, the Chinese people in their hundreds of millions are proud to see that this ship is sailing at high speed on the sea. It will break all blockades and continue to steam ahead along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

* * *

Attach Importance to Popularizing Sciences

by
Hsiang Ch'ün (项群)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

At present, the people of the whole country are thoroughly implementing the great leader Chairman Mao's three important instructions--combating and preventing revisionism, promoting stability and unity, and pushing the national economy forward. Things are thriving everywhere in the motherland. Both in cities and the countryside, the three major revolutionary movements--class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment--are continuing to deepen. The grand goal of striving to achieve, before the end of the current century, modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology is inspiring. Under this excellent situation, the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and young people have placed higher, multifarious demands on the work of popularizing natural science. They are strongly appealing to related departments to attach importance to this work and do it well in order to meet the needs of the developing situation.

Some comrades think that natural science concerns only professional people and that it matters little whether the broad masses learn a bit more or less. To them, therefore, the work of popularizing natural science is a matter of no consequence. This idea is obviously incorrect.

As early as more than 30 years ago, Chairman Mao pointed out: "Natural science is one of man's weapons in his fight for freedom." "For the purpose of attaining freedom in the world of nature, man must use natural science to understand, conquer and change nature and thus attain freedom from nature." More than 30 years ago, we were still in a period of revolutionary war. At that time Chairman Mao already attached importance to the question of developing natural science and popularizing it among the masses of people. Today, with socialist revolution and construction going on, how can one say that the work of popularizing natural science has nothing to do with the broad masses of people and is a matter of no consequence to them?

Natural science both sums up the experience of production struggle and further pushes the development of production. With the continuous deepening of the movements to learn from Tach'ing in industry and Tachai in agriculture, new problems will continue to appear in industrial and agricultural production, with the broad masses of workers and peasants feeling the urgent need to grasp scientific knowledge and all kinds of advanced techniques. They deeply understand that it is impossible to change the backward state of the national economy and push industrial and agricultural production forward at the highest possible speed without studying and grasping science and technology. Some new achievements and new techniques introduced through popular scientific publications and scientific education films over the years have been warmly hailed by the broad masses and promptly grasped by them. These have effectively promoted the development of industrial and agricultural production. For instance, use of superior cross breeding has become a mass practice for the vast numbers of poor and lower-middle peasants in achieving a high yield of grain. The dissemination of the knowledge of microorganism has brought about the comprehensive application of "920," "5406," kasugamycinum, anti-rice borer bacilli, and green-insect bacteria. The new technology of guided explosion has been used in removing mountains to create farmland, and has displayed its tremendous power in farmland

capital construction. The popularization of electronics has caused the continuous appearance of automatic lines for various kinds of process control, considerably changing the backward features of many production processes. All this has vividly shown that "with the rapid growth of knowledge about the law of nature, man has become increasingly capable of reacting against nature." (Engels, Dialectics of Nature) By grasping scientific knowledge and using advanced techniques, the broad masses of people will be able to demonstrate their abilities in the struggle to understand and change nature and to create ever more welfare undertakings for themselves.

Popularization of natural science is of tremendous significance in smashing superstitions, conquering idealism and metaphysics, and establishing a dialectical-materialist world outlook. The continuous development of natural science has provided the theory of proletarian revolution with rich factual data. Dialectical materialism was born on the basis of a vigorous development of modern natural and social sciences. In their works, the teachers of proletarian revolution summed up and generalized the rich achievements of natural science, citing a huge amount of scientific data in criticizing the idealist and metaphysical world outlook and profoundly verifying the correctness of dialectical materialism. Therefore, the popularization of knowledge about natural science will help both cadres and masses study and appreciate Marxist-Leninist theories in a penetrating way.

Failure to attach importance to popularizing science and technology among the broad masses is not only due to lack of a correct understanding of the role of natural science, but also is related to the influence of the exploiting-class ideology and the revisionist line. Science and technology are the brain child of the laboring people, and to do a good job in popularizing science and technology is to make them "return to their old home." For a long time, the exploiting classes advocated "the highest are wise and lowest are stupid," describing scientific and technological inventions as the products of a few "geniuses." They slandered the laboring people as "fools," trying by all possible means to exclude them from participation in scientific research. With a view to restoring capitalism, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and company also did their best to oppose the laboring people acquiring science and technology. Although these reactionary idealist conceptions of history have been criticized, their influence cannot be thoroughly eliminated at one stroke. Neglect of the work of popularizing science and technology can often be explained by such ideological influence.

The teachers of proletarian revolution have always attached importance to natural science, to the popularization of science and technology among the people. After the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin repeatedly stressed the need for the proletariat to grasp science and technology in order to build socialism and communism. When Lenin was leading the Soviet Union to realize the plan of electrification, he said: "It is essential to disseminate the knowledge of electricity." "Let's write in a hurry several popular booklets," "for use in schools and to be read by peasants." (Letter to G.M. Keljizanovskiy 格·马·克尔日札諾夫斯基) During the socialist transformation of the system of ownership of the means of production, Chairman Mao called on the whole Party to make an effort to study scientific knowledge so as to change in a few decades China's backward state in the economic, scientific and cultural fields and to rapidly

attain the advanced level of the world. After summing up both positive and negative historical experience at home and abroad, Chairman Mao set forth his brilliant thesis concerning the three major revolutionary movements, and taught us to look at and grasp the movement of scientific experiment from the plane of building socialism, combating and preventing revisionism and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's illuminating idea, the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers have mounted the stage of science and technology, and mass activities of scientific experiment have flourished vigorously. The situation in which scientific and technological work concerns only a few has changed significantly. Workers, peasants and soldiers have increasingly assumed the status as masters of science and technology. This is cause for jubilation.

Through the great proletarian cultural revolution, many scientific and technical workers have further solved the problem of whom to serve, heightening their understanding of the work of popularizing sciences. While energetically engaging in scientific research and professional work, they have actively committed themselves to the task of compiling and writing popular science reading material, and their hard work has been hailed by the broad masses. However, some comrades who fail to correctly understand the relationship between the popularization of science and its elevation argue that popular scientific reading matter "offers nothing new and is nothing but copy-work." It is a big mistake to adopt such an attitude toward reading matter needed by workers, peasants and soldiers in their millions.

In his "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art," Chairman Mao pointed out that some comrades "adopt the wrong attitude of underestimating or neglecting the work of popularization," and scientifically elucidated the relationship between popularization and elevation. He stated: "What is meant by popularization is popularization among workers, peasants and soldiers." The popularization of natural science is also mainly popularization among workers, peasants and soldiers. Under no circumstances must we think that things for popularization are not important, and under-estimate them. Under-estimating popular scientific reading matter is in effect a manifestation of under-estimating the workers, peasants and soldiers.

Popularizing scientific and technical knowledge among workers, peasants and soldiers is not only necessary for class and production struggles but also necessary for developing natural science itself. Requirements of production and society provide a strong driving force for the development of science. For instance, the needs of animal husbandry and agriculture produced astronomy; the needs of water conservation engineering and construction produced mechanics; the needs of land surveying produced geometry, etc. Engels said: "Once society has a technological need, such a need will be more powerful in pushing science forward than 10 universities." ("Letter to W. Borgius") The rich experience and wisdom of the broad masses of people in transforming nature are an inexhaustible source of science and technology. The elevation of science and technology calls for a summing-up of the experience of the masses in the struggle for production and scientific experiment. If scientific and technological knowledge is more widely popularized, this will facilitate even more the development and expansion of the scientific and technological forces and the

elevation of science and technology, so that a more extensive and solid foundation may be laid for the elevation of scientific research. For instance, the study of seismology in our country is a good case in point. Earthquake forecasting is a problem of top priority in the study of seismology. The study of earthquake forecasting has moved to the front ranks of the world and yielded gratifying results because we have persistently popularized seismological knowledge among the masses, launched mass forecasting and reporting activities, and combined professional personnel with mass movements. Of course, our popularization is guided by elevation. In fact, popularization cannot forever remain at the same level. The demand of the people for popularization is followed by their demand for elevation.

As far as a scientific and technical worker is concerned, can he do the work of popularization well, while engaging in the work of elevation? In our opinion, he is fully capable of doing this as long as he attaches major importance to it. In this connection, many scientists may be cited for their effort at elevation as well as at popularization. While engaging in professional research, they are concerned with the practice of the masses. Finding out the needs of the masses, they seriously go about compiling and writing popular reading matter, reporting to the people the results of their research. This has not only not interfered with their own professional work, but has also promoted their work of elevation.

Turning out good popular scientific reading matter is a kind of tough but creative labor. It is not easy to compile and write such material in simple and plain language, to make it readily acceptable to the broad masses of people. It is even more difficult to propagate materialism and dialectics in the context of science and technology. In recent years, thanks to the effort of the scientific and technical personnel and publishing workers, a batch of popular scientific books, magazines and films have appeared, many of which are good as they warmly reflect and praise the new achievements and creations of our scientific and technological work in implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and are also capable of applying dialectical and historical materialism in introducing science and technology in simple and plain language. This has enabled people not only to acquire scientific knowledge but also to heighten their thinking. The magazine "Fossil," dealing with paleontology and paleoanthropology, disseminates scientific knowledge while conducting education on dialectical-materialism in a vivid and concrete way. It is rich in content and colorful in lay-out, and its form also appeals to the broad masses. But such popular scientific publications as "Fossil" are still few at the moment. We hope that scientific and technical workers as well as publishing workers will seriously sum up their experience, double their effort and publish more and better popular scientific reading matter for the broad masses.

Popular scientific reading matter must take Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought as the guide and vigorously propagate materialism and dialectics. Such propaganda is conducted by means of profounding the laws of nature and the process of the laboring people's struggle in transforming nature and through introducing scientific knowledge and advanced technology.

It should not confine itself to an empty discussion of political and philosohical concepts detached from these concrete aspects. Natural science provides philosophy with facts and data, but natural science itself is not philosophy. What we hope to obtain from popular scientific reading matter is vivid and concrete education on dialectical materialism in relation to scientific and technological knowledge, and not those words which "only transmit Marxism almost without properly chosen facts." Some publications have not done well in this respect not because certain branches of science and technology are difficult to be combined with the propagation of materialism and dialectics, but because the writers themselves have not studied materialism and dialectics well.

The work of popularizing natural science must be oriented to serving the workers and peasants. This calls for the publication of a large quantity of scientific and technological reading matter linked with the needs of current production struggle in order to meet the urgent needs of the worker-peasant masses and so that advanced technologies can quickly play their role in industrial and agricultural production. Scientific knowledge is very extensive in scope just as the needs of the worker-peasant masses are variegated. Anything which is useful to socialist construction and conducive to combating and preventing revisionism and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat will be welcomed by the broad masses. We must not only satisfy the varied needs of the worker-peasant masses but also conduct popular science education in various fields taking the cadres and young people as the target. At present, there are too few popular science publications suitable for educated youth and middle and primary school students. We suggest that several magazines rich in ideological and scientific content and written in plain and vivid language, particularly general natural science magazines and science pictorials, be published for reading by young people.

We must fervently encourage and support scientific and technical workers as well as teachers in compiling and writing popular science reading material and give full play to their enthusiasm for working creatively for revolution. It is a good thing for scientific and technical workers to squeeze out some working hours and use their spare time to contribute to newspapers and magazines and to compile books for publishing houses. This should be positively supported and given every assistance. We hope that when drawing up research and teaching plans, scientific research institutes and institutions of higher learning and colleges will also consider the work of popularization, regard it as an unshirkable duty, include it in their plans, and take it up energetically.

We must also fervently assist the worker-peasant masses in writing books. Fighting on the first line of the three major revolutionary movements, they have rich practical experience, have made many discoveries and creations in the scientific and technical fields, and understand the needs of the masses best. Given effort, they shall surely be able to write very good books.

Making a success of publishing work is an important link in promoting science popularization. The related publishing departments must catch up with the needs of the prevailing situation. Science and technology

are popularized not only in books and magazines but also in newspapers, broadcasting, films, slides, exhibitions, forums, and technical demonstrations. All of these are good forms for popularizing scientific and technological knowledge. We should make full use of these forms and constantly and extensively popularize scientific and technological knowledge among the masses of people. Let's,under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and in close conjunction with the practice of the three major revolutionary movements, exert ourselves to carry out the work of science popularization well.

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CORRECTION /by Hung-ch'i editor/

Hung-ch'i No. 10, p. 36, line 4 (SPRCM No. 844, P. 42, line 11), and innovations" (创造发明) should read "innovations and inventions" (发明创造); p. 7, line 14 (p. 4 , line 7 from bottom), "more than doubled" should read "more than trebled"; p. 47, line 2-3 (p. 56, line 18), the sentence "ballads like....." should be deleted; p. 51, footnote (2) (p. 62), "Chunghua Book Company" should read "Shanghai People's Publishing House."

Let Revolutionary Poems and Songs Occupy the Battlefield

- On Re-reading Lu Hsün's Observations on the Question of Form for New Poems

by

Jen Tu (任 犨)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

The several important observations which Lu Hsün made with respect to the question of forms for new poetry summed up the historical experience of the period after the May 4 Movement. Today, as we further develop the writing of socialist poems and songs under the guidance of Chairman Mao's proletarian line for literature and art, it will be very beneficial for us to re-read these observations by Lu Hsün.

Wherever there are works of revolutionary literature and art that are full of vigor and vitality, they generally strive to achieve "unity of revolutionary political content with the most beautiful artistic forms possible." However, there were a great many new poems after "May 4" that were unable to settle this question properly. This was closely related to the fact that comprador scholars like Hu Shih had sneaked into the May 4 Movement. Hu Shih professed to carry out "a revolution in the sphere of poetry." What kind of "revolution" was it? He said: "Where does one begin a revolution in the realm of poetry? We must write poems just as we write prose," "say whatever needs to be said," and "it doesn't matter whether or not it rhymes." Hu Shih's fallacy, while seemingly "radical," in fact hindered the development of new poetry; taking prose which had neither rhyme nor rhythm to be poetry became a tendency of "new poems" in form since "May 4", thus opening the way for the restoration of feudal reactionary culture in the realm of poems and songs.

What form then should the new poems adopt? Lu Hsün said: "Poems must have form, should be easy to remember, understand and sing, moving to listen to but the style need not be too rigid. They must rhyme, but it is enough that they read smoothly and need not rhyme like the old-style poetry." He added: "The new poetry must first of all have rhythm and should rhyme enough that everyone may easily remember, read and sing it." If the new poems "have neither rhyme nor rhythm they can't be sung; if they can't be sung, then they can't be remembered; if they can't be remembered, then they will neither root out nor supplant the old poems in people's minds." These concrete observations comprise a thoroughgoing examination of acceptable criteria and what is customarily appreciated by the Chinese working people. If new poems are to be acceptable to the broad masses of people then the artistic forms must be national and popular in character.

Ease of understanding is the minimum condition for all revolutionary propaganda. The requirement set by Lu Hsün that all the various branches of the new literature and art "should make things easy to understand for the masses," was in precise agreement with his opinion on new poems. However, poems and songs have their own special features and apart from being easy to understand, they must also be easy to remember and sing. In order to

do this, we must demand that new poems have both rhyme and rhythm. If there is neither rhyme nor rhythm, then even though the revolutionary content of the new poems is very good, people won't remember or sing them, and the special features of poems and songs will be lost. Any art form that does away with its own particular artistry will also lose its raison d'etre. This was precisely why Lu Hsün time and again stressed the rhyme and rhythm of new poems.

Lu Hsün held that it was still not enough that revolutionary poems and songs merely be easy to remember and sing, but that their artistic quality had also to be carefully studied and perfected; there had to be "poetic beauty" in literary expression and it could not "taste like chewing wax." Therefore he was opposed to the tendency toward slogan and poster forms in the new poetry. "Actually, slogans are slogans, poems are poems." "For instance, the relationship between literature and propaganda originally was described no more than this: wherever there is literature there will be propaganda, because generally it could not avoid propagating something or other; but later, there were some people who interpreted literature as a necessary and deliberate way to make propaganda. Poems must use slogans, whether right or wrong, and so forth." Even though this new kind of poetry was "deliberately done" in slogan form, was easy to understand and sing, it was not at all easy to circulate. "If an artistic work lacks artistic quality, no matter how progressive it is politically, it still lacks force." /quote from Chairman Mao/ Artistic forms divorced from what the masses like to see and hear and which do not give full attention to the tempering of words will not be appreciated by the masses, even though the content is correct.

Separation of form and content in works of revolutionary literature and art will necessarily lead to separation of the works from the masses. In such instances, there are situations of two kinds: In one, they expect to be accepted by the masses but are not, "considering that what they write and say can be understood by anyone when in fact it is not at all so." /quote from Chairman Mao/ In the other situation are those who from the outset do not take the masses to heart and who are not willing to let acceptance or non-acceptance by the masses serve as the criterion for judging the quality of their works. The latter attitude reflects a problem of world outlook on the part of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois revolutionaries. The new democratic revolution under proletarian leadership was a revolution marked by mass participation in the fight against imperialism and feudalism; if it did not rely on the broad masses of people, it would not have been victorious. But at that time there were many new poets who, as Lu Hsün often criticized, "considered poets and writers superior to all others, and their works nobler than all the rest," but who did not "take the worker-peasant masses as their object." Inasmuch as they did not take the worker-peasant masses as their object, they of course were also unable to get a good grasp of the means of serving the worker-peasant masses.

Finally, then, the matter of artistic form came to involve the question of for whom should the writers of poems and songs occupy the battlefield. To be sure, we must seek the effect for the motive, but on the other hand, we may also see the motive from the effect. Chairman Mao points out:

"Social practice and its effect are the criteria for testing subjective wishes or motive." "The motive of serving the broad masses and the effect welcomed by them are inseparable." This is a truth which distinguishes many complex phenomena in the history of literature and art. As for Hu Shih and people like him, by no means did they shun forms for new poems. On the contrary, they were carrying out "system importation and experiments" in the forms of poems and songs. The reactionary scholar Liang Shih-ch'iu once tried to vindicate them by saying: "Their experiments were aimed at using the Chinese language to create the style of foreign poetry and filling poems with foreign-type poetic meaning." And the class content of this "poetic meaning" was purely "aristocratic." The result of such experiments was that very strange "foreign poems in the Chinese language" were produced: "Newton and Edison; Bacon and Kelvin; Zola and Hawthorne, 'inspiration'." There can be no doubt that this kind of "artistic form" could only express the ideological content that the "moon was rounder in the West." Could they still create some newer artistic forms? They couldn't. Therefore, those who write new poetry must seek out forms in poetry and music that the Chinese working people enjoy seeing and hearing, and first and foremost they ought to embrace the viewpoint of serving the broad masses of working people. To be sure, having the determination to serve the broad masses of working people witout discovering an appropriate form to do so--such cases also exist within our revolutionary ranks in a large number, but such a phenomenon is temporary. Having a deep feeling for the proletariat, our poem and song writers will not be cowed by setbacks and defeat and, in practice, they will ultimately create forms appropriate to the revolutionary content and represent the proletariat and the broad masses of working people in resolutely occupying the battlefield in poems and songs.

When the various classes vie for the position of poems and songs, the artistic forms of poems and songs also often become an object in this struggle. Lu Hsün once graphically depicted this phenomenon: "Songs, poems, verses, music, I had originally considered to be matters of folklore, but the scholars took these over as their own; the more they wrote the more difficult they were to understand. They turned these things into petrified rocks. Then they went out to take other things and slowly strangled them to death." As an example, in the "May 4" period, Hu Shih and his like, on the one hand, destroyed the national and popular character of new poems, and on the other, they gathered old folksongs, proceeding from the bourgeois reactionary viewpoint. In his essays such as "Literary Chat Outside the Door," Lu Hsün incisively elaborated on the cultural history created by the working people and set great store by the good folksongs, while calling for "paying heed to popular artists and things." At the same time, he again reminded everyone that since folksongs had been "considerably influenced by the artistic taste of the consumers," they needed to be repeatedly refined and transformed. Lu Hsün paid close attention to using the old cultural legacy of the working people to serve the working people of today, carried out a new transformation of old forms of poems and songs that had been "turned into petrified rocks" after they were seized by the reactionary rulers, and injected a completely new content into them. Lu Hsün himself had written a great many poems in the old form. They remarkably reflected the tempestuous times in which he lived, and graphically recorded the class and national struggles of the 1920's and 1930's, gleaming as they were with the radiance of revolutionary ideals. This was also one aspect of occupying the battlefield in poems and songs.

As for inheriting the cultural legacy of history, Lu Hsün emphasized that we should not take it over wholesale but inherit it critically and analytically. For example, he called for new poems that could be sung, in a form that was not too strict and whose rhyming did not have to follow old-style rhymes. Such is the attitude of critical inheritance. We ought to study this dialectical viewpoint. As to what to criticize, what to inherit, and how to transform and create, various approaches should be permitted. It follows that in creating poems and songs there will also be a variety of schools and styles. Only with comparison can there be discrimination. The policy of letting one hundred flowers bloom in literature and art is beneficial to the formation of our new poetry, to the rich creation of poems and songs and to the broadening of the socialist front over them.

In the early "May 4" period Lu Hsün expressed the following wish toward a journal: "It will be nice if we can have more poems of different styles." This wish can be truly realized only in the socialist era of today. Naturally, poisonous weeds may take this opportunity to raise their heads, but that is nothing to fear for they can be turned under as fertilizer. What is true can only develop in struggle against what is false. The path for developing revolutionary poems and songs is no exception.

In the course of struggle, the revolutionary poems and songs will surely be able to firmly occupy the battlefield of poems and songs!

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Please Look at a New Trade of the Soviet Revisionists

by

Yang Ko (阳戈)

(Hung-ch'i /Red Flag/, No. 11, Nov. 1, 1975)

In Soviet revisionist society a new trade has emerged in recent years. Although it has not been included by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique in the list of "colossal achievement," it is really not bad at all and is now rapidly "prospering." Let's cite a few small examples of this trade to serve as an eye-opener to the reader.

First, "private tuition." It is presently flourishing throughout the Soviet Union and reportedly intended for high school graduates going on to universities. Private tuition rates range from 5 to 10 rubles per hour, equivalent to over 1½ day's wage of an ordinary worker. Colorful advertisements for private tuition can be found on the streets of Moscow everywhere, stuck on "posts" and on "walls in corridors"; they dazzle the eyes of the passers-by.

Second, the "exam-candidate substitutes." According to "Moscow Evening News," there is an "examination substitutes organization" that specializes in sitting at university entrance examinations for others. Such operations are said to be so busy that they find it hard to meet all appointments. A member of such an organization sits for someone else at an entrance examination given by the Technical School of Food Industries in the morning and at an entrance examination given by the University of Textile Industries in the afternoon; the following day he sits at an entrance examination for the Department of Economics of Moscow University. If the examination is successful, he will collect from each applicant a fee of 500 rubles for his service to stand in for him.

Third, the "thesis selling." According to "Komsomol Pravda," at the Rostov Railway Transportation Engineering Institute a "united organization" specializes in "helping people with graduation design, study thesis, test exercises and laboratory work." A copy of design sells for 90 rubles, in some cases 150 rubles.

Fourth, "diploma manufacturing." As reported in "Izvestia," a "diploma manufacturing center" charges 1,000 rubles for a copy of diploma, and has sold 56 copies in two years.

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If one asks why such services have flourished so greatly, we must look into the educational system of the Soviet revisionists. Following the general restoration of capitalism, Soviet revisionist education, higher education in particular, has long become a ladder by which one climbs into the privileged class. Said the chieftain of the Soviet

revisionists, Brezhnev: "The state draws its cadres primarily from among experts trained by institutions of higher learning to carry out economic work, the work of the Party and state administration, to staff the diplomatic and military services, and to engage in all social activities." A great amount of data shows that a university diploma is the decisive criterion for cadre recruitment. Having such a diploma, even if one were an idiot, one would still be able to get an official post, however unimportant it may be. Without it, even if one were a "communist labor shock worker," had been on a certain job "since the wartime years" and "possessed professional knowledge in that field," he would not be hired. What Brezhnev said and countless facts tell us that once a person enters a university or in some other ways gets hold of a university diploma, he would be able to get a high-salary government position and the chance to ride the crest of his career. If one could not get in, then sorry, he would "forever" be a scornful "functionary." In order to realize the goal of "rocketing to success," it becomes quite natural for many people to make the best of their ingenuity, just as the eight Taoist immortals /in a Chinese legend/ did when they had to leap across the sea. Hence the emergence of all kinds of queer services.

But this new trade must not be taken lightly. An important means by which members of the privileged class bequeath their peerage and high remunerations on their children is through education. Without the help provided by the above-mentioned services, it would be difficult to do so. Take examinations for example. The "high school curriculum" does not include "all the material used for a university entrance examination." How can an ordinary high school graduate pass such an examination? With the above-mentioned services, the new aristocrats of the bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union have nothing to be afraid of. They have the money, so they may hire "private tutors" or send their children to all sorts of private "supplemental classes" that charge exorbitant fees. After sending their children into institutions of higher learning, do they rest at ease? No. Some pampered sons and daughters are used to an easy and comfortable life. How can they devote themselves to hard study? What if they could not graduate? So, the above-mentioned services still have to be relied on. On the "education market," one can buy, if one can afford the price, a graduation thesis, a diploma, or even an "associate doctorate." With these one can ride roughshod over the laboring people. It is not difficult to see that these new services in the Soviet revisionist educational circles exist to meet the needs of the privileged class to exercise bourgeois cultural dictatorship over the laboring people.

"With money, one can enter an institution of higher learning." This is a truth disclosed by a Soviet revisionist official newspaper of fair standing. Of course, this is not the "standard proposition" of the Soviet revisionist rulers. If it were, would not their sham "socialism" be exposed? Now, look at the high-sounding Soviet revisionist "Legislative Principles of National Education": All Soviet citizens, irrespective of their property and social position, "are entitled to equality in education." But what about the facts? Under the rule of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, the laboring people have neither the money to hire "private tutors" nor the position to obtain the "favor" of their colleagues. How can their children enjoy the "equality" as those pampered sons and daughters enjoy either in respect to marks or to other fields? Take, for example,

a survey conducted by the Soviet revisionists in new Siberia. There, nearly 90 percent of the children of peasants are excluded from universities, while nearly 90 percent of the children of city intellectuals (including, it must not be forgotten, bureaucrats) are in universities. According to the "legislative principles" of the Soviet revisionists, perhaps it may be said that 90 percent is "equal" to the other 90 percent. Isn't it? In fact, "freedom" and "equality" in the abstract have always been bourgeois lies. Lenin once said: "Until classes are abolished, any talk about freedom and equality in general deceives oneself or deceives the workers, all laborers and people exploited by capital. In any case, it is aimed at maintaining the interests of the bourgeoisie." By these remarks, Lenin ruthlessly exposed the hypocrisy of all speeches about freedom and equality in general. But in face of facts that clearly point to inequality, the Brezhnevs, who self-style themselves as "Leninists," are still talking about such myths as "equality for all." Have they done so to deceive the Soviet laboring people?

Commercialization of schools and knowledge is an inevitable result of all-out restoration of capitalism by the Soviet revisionists in the field of education. Through education in the school and propaganda outside it, the Soviet revisionist rulers openly ask the young people to establish the world outlook of "rational egotism," telling them quite frankly that "studying and acquiring knowledge" is a highly profitable business, "a deposit box that will yield handsome dividends." Since "knowledge," "diplomas" and "degrees" can all be bought with money, once these things are received, they of course must be put into "circulation" to seek greater profits. Who is willing to do a losing business? Such an extremely rotten "education" is a black dye-pot, which will erode and poison not only the children of the privileged class but also those few children of the laboring people who are in schools. It can only bring up new bourgeois elements dedicated to the philosophy of profit, namely, successors of the privileged class.

This new trade in the field of Soviet revisionist education has befouled the air and aroused the anger of the laboring people, so much so that even the Soviet revisionist press cannot but express dissatisfaction with it. This is of course only a show to hoodwink the masses. They know that wiping off some grease from the bodies of these plump overlords would not hurt their health at all. Not only would they reject those articles which dare to expose the social causes of such ugly phenomena, but they would have sent their authors to a "mental hospital" long ago. Those articles that are published evade the real issues and are no better than advertisements seen in the streets of Moscow. They can only promote and encourage the growth of these services and even have the effect of "introducing experience." It is obvious that to thoroughly solve these problems would mean to overthrow the existing Soviet revisionist social system, and this the Soviet revisionist rulers do not even dare to think of. However, the Soviet people do think of this, and one day they will rise up to sweep away these dirty things once again.

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